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Self-Discovery in Plato's Phaedo

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Self-Discovery in Plato's *Phaedo*

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Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Abstract

How can we know ourselves? This thesis argues that Plato's dialogue *Phaedo* replies to this difficult question. The dialogue suggests that we must discover our intellectual desire and governing function through the practice of philosophical investigation. Although this is an implicit suggestion, it is just as important as the explicit discussion of the soul's immortality.

Focusing on this topic, the thesis also argues that we should read the dialogue as a suggestion for the process of improving a human being; it does not intend to provide a complete definition of the soul's nature. A philosopher will recognise his progress towards achieving his objective, the Forms, through the investigation itself. Moreover, this thesis argues that *Phaedo* asserts that a philosophical desire should be found explicitly in a process of discussion with Socrates. In the first main discussion of the dialogue, interlocutors of Socrates request him to defend the goodness of death (62c-63a). This goodness is based on a claim that death as the soul's separation from the body provides them with wisdom. However, the defence will be meaningless to people who do not desire wisdom. When the interlocutors become clearly conscious of their desire for wisdom, Socrates' arguments would succeed in the truest sense.

The process of the philosophical investigation, though, is not simple. This thesis will argue that a philosopher must employ both objective discussion and subjective self-recognition of his desire, which contrasts with the view that focuses on the objective understanding of human psychology in Plato's work. This thesis argues for a reading of *Phaedo* that focuses on the process of self-improvement, not the goal or the definition of the soul's nature. Moreover, it also emphasizes self-discovery of intellectual desire in a philosopher, which cannot be reduced to an objective discussion.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors in King's College London, Professor Raphael Woolf, Dr Joachim Aufderheide, and Dr Shaul Tor. I sincerely appreciate their great and amazingly patient guidance.

I would like to thank Professor Hiroyuki Ogino, Sophia University, Japan. His thorough supervising gives me an essential foundation of my philosophical research and ancient Greek reading.

I appreciate Professor John Ferrari, UC Berkeley. Thanks to his encouraging guidance, I could decide to research Plato in my second language, English. I also appreciate Professor Shinro Kato (Tokyo Metropolitan University) and Professor Noburu Notomi (University of Tokyo) for giving me great occasions to study Plato in the international academic world.

I have received great benefit from Ancient Philosophy research community of King's College London and University College London. I would like to thank Dr Fiona Leigh, Dr Margaret Hampson, Niels Christensen in UCL and Dr Tamsin de Waal, Dr Tonguc Seferoglu, Dr Mike Coxhead, Branislav Kotoc, Kyo-Sun Koo, Enrique Altimari, Michael Rhodes in KCL and members of the 'Thursday Seminar'.

The draft of chapters of this thesis were presented in the following conferences: 11th Symposium Platonicum of the International Plato Society in Brasilia, 2016, organized by Professor Gabriele Cornelli (chapter 5); British Society for the History of Philosophy in the University of Sheffield, 2017 (ch. 4); 12th London Ancient Science Conference, 2018, organized by Professor Andrew Gregory (ch. 2). I appreciate the organizers and precious comments for my papers.

I thank my friends and family. I thank Fr. Hugh Mackenzie and Dr Yafeng Shan for the Plato-Trio meeting. This meeting always encourages my research. I thank my parents, Taro and Akiko, my grandparents, Syumon and Chizuko, and my grandaunt, Mari. Thanks to their support, I can continue studying philosophy.

Finally, I express my heartfelt thanks to my wife, Ayumi. Thanks to her existence, I have accomplished this thesis and can do my best for everything.

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Introduction

Summary of the Thesis

How can we know ourselves? In this thesis, I argue that Plato's dialogue, *Phaedo*, replies to this difficult question.¹ Specifically, the dialogue suggests that we discover our intellectual desire and governing function through the practice of philosophical investigation. That contention is implicitly suggested, but it is of the same importance as the dialogue's explicit discussion of the immortality of the soul.

Focusing on that topic, this thesis also argues that we should read this dialogue as a suggestion for the process of improving a human being. That process is shown in the interlocutors' evolutions through their discussions with Socrates. The process does not provide a complete definition of the soul's nature. Socrates suggests that a philosopher improves himself as part of his objective which is to know the Forms.

Moreover, I argue that *Phaedo* states that Socrates helps the interlocutors, mainly Simmias and Cebes, to understand that a philosopher must have intellectual desire. Specifically, the initial main argument of the *Phaedo*, the Defence of Death (63e8–69e8), discusses the philosopher's desire for wisdom and the necessity of managing one's life based on that desire. This desire supports the goodness of death, defined in the dialogue as soul's separation from the body. The philosopher's objective, which is wisdom, can be obtained through the soul's separation from the body. In the course of the dialogue, we should observe the process of improvement of a human being in two areas. One area is the philosopher's improvement discussed by Socrates and the interlocutors. The other area is the interlocutors' progression through the argument about the philosopher.

¹ All Greek texts of *Phaedo* are from *Platonis Opera, tomus I*. 1995. Duke, Hicken, Nicoll, Robinson and Strachan edit. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Other Platonic texts are also from the latest Oxford Classical Texts referred to in the bibliography. All translations of *Phaedo* are by D. Sedley and A. Long 2010.

The dialogue offers a normative blueprint for the improvement of a philosopher as well as the actual progress of the interlocutors. Readers of the dialogue should understand both the philosopher's ideal conditions and the interlocutors' recognition of the conditions and intellectual desire. In many cases, the process is advanced by a revelation of the interlocutors' problematic beliefs. Thus, *Phaedo* also suggests the interlocutors' self-discovery of their problematic beliefs.

The interlocutors observe that a philosopher has the intellectual desire for the Forms within himself,² but neither the nature nor all the essential contents of the self are defined clearly in *Phaedo*; therefore, the self is not a fixed concept upon which we can depend in the dialogue. Rather, the self must always be improved gradually, through philosophical investigation. In that sense, this dialogue intends to show the interlocutors a possible method of improving themselves. It does not, however, define the true nature of the self. Thus, the self in *Phaedo* exists within the context of a dynamic process. Andrea Nightingale also explains the concept of the philosophical desire as it is revealed in Plato's middle dialogues (especially in *Phaedrus*) as follows:

To grasp the nature of the soul, Socrates must apprehend its erotic desire for the Forms (and feel this desire in his own soul) and also contemplate the Forms themselves.³

² Plato does not think that only males can become philosophers. In the *Republic*, he admits that a female should also perform the same task depending on her nature (455e–456c). In this thesis, I use the masculine pronoun while referring to a philosopher to simplify the use of pronouns. A philosopher can be a woman.

³ Nightingale 2010, 23. She also claims that "Ultimately, however, he attains self-knowledge by moving back and forth between his contemplating soul and his earthly person: it is the interplay between these two that generates self-knowledge in the Platonic philosopher" (ibid., 26). I admit that an individual corporeal person dynamically improves himself through his focus on attaining wisdom. However, I still think it is problematic to acknowledge the concept of "contemplation" in *Phaedo*. The dialogue shows that we have some higher-order quality that we must use as much as possible to attain wisdom, but wisdom can only be obtained after death. If Nightingale thinks, by using the term "contemplate," that the soul can know the Forms in this world, I cannot acknowledge the presence of that kind of contemplation in the dialogue.

I argue that we can also discern the “apprehension of desire for the Forms” in *Phaedo*. We must not say, however, that the dialogue suggests that a philosopher can grasp the nature of the self in this life. The dialogue displays a possible and viable process of improving ourselves, but we cannot observe our true nature when we are in the process of investigating the Forms. There are two levels of cognition regarding the Forms: 1. Investigation or attempting to know the Forms; 2. We know the Forms following the investigation and the purification of the soul. In this second (higher) level, knowing of the Forms is accomplished only after the complete separation of the soul from the body, namely, after death.

Phaedo also suggests Socrates’ epistemic modesty regarding knowledge of the Forms. The Forms are hypothesised in the dialogue; however, Socrates does not claim that he knows the true nature of every Form. Rather, the hypotheses regarding the Forms need to be examined (107b4–9). Thus, the interlocutors are required to continue their examination without steadfast knowledge of the Forms. The immortality of the soul is explained based on the hypothesis of the Forms in *Phaedo*. Additionally, the soul’s essential characteristics are considered in its affinity to the Forms (in the Affinity Argument of *Phaedo*). Thus, it does not seem that the nature of the soul is grasped before knowing the Forms since the Forms are foundational in explaining the soul’s nature. Knowledge of the Forms is obtained after the soul is separated from the body (66e1–4); thus the interlocutors must continue their examination of the Forms in this world to eventually know their true nature after death. Therefore, the process of philosophical investigation cannot reveal a clear scheme of interplay between individuals and the true self during life.⁴ Rather, the *Phaedo* shows that a philosopher must manage himself in

⁴ Nightingale defines “self-knowledge” as a kind of “self-referential awareness.” (Nightingale 2010, 13). She claims that “when epistemic knowledge is achieved (even if only partially) the soul also comes to know itself in its ontological relation to a divine Other” (ibid., 25). I do not think Plato actively suggests the kind of direct grasp of the Forms in *Phaedo* that Nightingale observes in *Phaedrus* (ibid., 23). The method of dealing with the

a more difficult way. Socrates suggests that death, as the soul's separation from the body, would allow a philosopher to grasp his true nature, because in death, bodily distractions that interfere with the intellectual ability of the soul are removed, so that one is able to understand the Forms (66e4–67a1). Self-discovery of one's intellectual desire and identification of faults is important in a philosopher's continuous effort and development. Socrates and the interlocutors decide how they should live based on the desire and correct their beliefs accordingly. They cannot know the Forms in this life. However, the purified soul will obtain the Forms after death. Knowing the Forms is the final goal for a philosopher. To get close to the goal, a philosopher must do his best in this world. Socrates' epistemic modesty regarding knowledge of the Forms suggests that the dialogue is intended to encourage the philosopher's continuous effort, not to offer Plato's doctrines regarding the soul and the Forms. Self-discovery of intellectual desire and the governing function of the soul encourage the philosopher to continue his efforts to know the Forms and the nature of the self in the end.

Considering the importance of self-discovery and the indeterminate outcome of the argument regarding the nature of the true self, this thesis also intends to clarify the importance of philosophical desire. It will suggest a reading of *Phaedo* that emphasises the process of improvement.

The Self as an Essential Problem in *Phaedo*

Consideration of the self should be an essential topic in a demonstration of the soul's immortality. Even if Socrates and the interlocutors successfully demonstrate the soul's immortality, if the soul is irrelevant to their existence, this demonstration gives them no advantage. Indeed, Socrates and the interlocutors in the dialogue try to confirm the immortality of "their own" souls (c.f. 76e3, 78b9).

Forms is hypothetical as suggested in the Final Argument (I will discuss the hypothetical characteristics of the theory of Forms in Chapter 6.)

The theory of the soul should not be merely an abstract idea. Therefore, the demonstration must include some arguments that connect the soul and those involved in the dialogue themselves.

Plato seems to recognise the pressing problem of selfhood or that of the connection between the soul and the self in his demonstration of the immortality of the soul in *Phaedo*. Besides the multiple references of Socrates and the interlocutors to “their own souls,” the notion of selfhood is also an important factor in the arguments. For example, the Recollection Argument (72e1–77a7) and the criticism of the *Harmonia* theory of the soul (85e3–86e5, 91c7–95a3) emphasise the important role played by selfhood. In the Recollection Argument, the interlocutor Simmias not only wants to understand the theory of recollection, but also needs to experience that recollection himself (73b6–9). In the criticism of the *Harmonia* theory, Socrates suggests to Simmias that they would not “be agreeing with” themselves, if they acknowledge the Soul-Harmonia theory (94e8–95a2). In these important arguments concerning the demonstration of the soul’s immortality, Socrates is deeply concerned with the interlocutors’ mental state and encourages them to engage in their own understanding. In other words, Socrates is concerned with how to make their own souls conform to the ideal soul as much as possible.

Moreover, in both the introduction and the end of the dialogue, Plato makes remarkable statements that describe selfhood and aid us in our investigation. The first term that is brought up in *Phaedo* is the Greek “*autos*,” which means “yourself” in the sentence.⁵ Plato writes the first sentence of *Phaedo* in the form of a question that Echecrates poses to Phaedo: “Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?”⁶ (57a1–3). Echecrates is eager to hear the details of Socrates’ death from Phaedo,

⁵ Burger, Burnyeat, and Notomi also point out the importance of the first word in the dialogue (Burger 1984, 7; Burnyeat 1997, 9–11; Notomi 2013, 54). Burger says, “The very expression that will be used to designate the “idea,” that which is “itself by itself,” refers at the outset to the individual and identifies the self with the living being, without implying any separation of *psychē* from body...” (Burger 1984, 7).

⁶ Translation of *Phaedo* by D. Sedley and A. Long 2010.

who was himself at Socrates' side at the last moment. Moreover, in the final part of the dialogue, after presenting all the arguments, Socrates is about to drink poison. One of Socrates' friends, Crito, becomes anxious about how he should bury Socrates. Socrates responds by laughing:

However you want, [...] as long as you catch me and I don't escape you [...] Gentlemen, I'm not convincing Crito that I am Socrates here, the one who is now holding conversation—setting out remarks one by one. Instead he supposes that I'm that corpse which he'll shortly be seeing, and he actually asks how he should bury me. As for the argument I have spent a long time propounding, that when I drink the poison I won't stay behind in your company any longer, but will depart and be gone to some happy state fit for the blessed, I seem to be wasting my breath on him, while reassuring both you and myself." (115c4–d6, emphasis mine).

Socrates' response to Crito implies his intention in his long arguments: the audiences must understand that the one who is really Socrates would leave this world after death and "be gone to some happy state"(115d4). As we will see in each argument of the *Phaedo* discussed in this thesis, the intellectual function of the soul is the essence of Socrates: the body does not define him at all. If someone misunderstands who Socrates really is, his demonstration will be worthless to that person, because immortality is offered only to the soul which comprises a human's core. In other words, his core must be "who Socrates really is." If Crito still believes that Socrates' body is also 'Socrates,' what Crito calls 'Socrates' cannot be immortal.

A Method of Self-Discovery and Self-improvement

Socrates establishes that a philosopher has an intellectual desire for wisdom. Thus, how do the interlocutors discover philosophical desire and

improve themselves properly? Socrates and his interlocutors develop arguments about the goodness of death and the immortality of the soul throughout this entire dialogue. Through those arguments, the essential characteristics of the soul are also suggested (specifically in the Affinity Argument), and the interlocutors' false beliefs are examined (in the Criticism of the Harmonia Theory). Thus, *prima facie*, it seems that the objective arguments or Socratic dialogue achieve the aim of self-discovery and the resulting improvement of the interlocutors.

Indeed, some influential scholars have already pointed out that in ancient Greek thought, which includes Plato's ideas, objective interpretations of human beings are revealed.⁷ They seem to claim that the value of ancient Greek thought is in its escape of the problems caused by the extreme subjective understanding of the self as evinced in post-Cartesian thought. In other words, they try to resolve the gap between the individual and the universal in order to answer the question related to how we understand the outside or universal world from our individual view-points.⁸ Christopher Gill emphasises the "objective-participant view" in Plato's understanding of the human being, which is contrasted with the "subjective-individualist view."⁹ The objective-participant view means that the mind is guided by objective reason and does not depend on a subjective or isolated self, which has a privileged access to one's own mental conditions. This privileged access can be also understood as a first-personal authority in knowing one's own psychological conditions. For example, if I cut my finger and feel pain, I have a cognitive authority over my pain. Gill interprets the self in Plato's ideas through the image of an interpersonal dialogue or a dialogue with reason. Furthermore, A. A. Long also denies the subjective understanding of the concept of the self in ancient Greek thought. Instead, he offers the possible different view of selfhood, stating: "The facts that they denote are subjective because *only I* can do *my* thinking; only *she* can have *her* feeling. However, the fact that I can think is not

⁷ Gill 1996, 11–16. A.A. Long 1992, 260–262.

⁸ cf. A.A. Long 1992, 260–261.

⁹ Gill 1996, 6–12.

subjective, but objective because it is grounded not in my being *me*, but in my being human. Furthermore, while *my* thinking is peculiar to *me*, what I think can be objective and something you share, as when I say there are people in this room. That statement does not express my personal perspective. It identifies an objective or public fact.”¹⁰ He introduces the concept of the “objective” self that was originally suggested by Thomas Nagel, which claims that we can be both subjective and objective selves. Long explains the objective self as follows: “The objective self is my thinking of the world as something that contains me and my consciousness along with everything else. It is my capacity to achieve a viewpoint in which my ordinary human individuality ceases to be the perspective from which I look at the world.”¹¹ Indeed, *Phaedo* develops rich interpersonal discussions and shows that the interlocutors improve themselves through examining their beliefs by means of discussions. Thus, the dialogue seems to emphasise the objective viewpoint in accomplishing the philosophical investigation and the improvement of oneself.

I argue, however, that *Phaedo* also includes some points that cannot be reduced to an objective form of investigation. There are two kinds of limitation of the objective dialogues: 1. The discussions in *Phaedo* use the interlocutor’s subjective or individual experience and self-decision to agree with the conclusion of each argument. 2. *Phaedo* suggests that a philosopher can obtain wisdom only after death, thus, the objective arguments or dialogues in this world are insufficient to achieve the final goal. Regarding the second point, a philosopher obtains wisdom only after death (66e4–67a1). Thus, the objective arguments or dialogues are necessary but preparatory steps in the pursuit of the final goal. Regarding the first point, we can observe following specific points in the *Phaedo*. First, the demonstration of the soul’s immortality originally surfaces in an attempt to defend Socrates’ claim of the goodness of death (63e8–69e4). Death’s goodness is

¹⁰ A. A. Long 1992, 260.

¹¹ Ibid., 262.

supported by the philosopher's desire to attain wisdom, because death is defined as the soul's separation from the body and the body disturbs this attainment (66e1–6). If the interlocutors did not share that desire, they would not be persuaded by the argument, because it would be difficult for them to find an advantage in death. Thus, they would not be willing to be separated from bodily sensations and desires as philosophers wish to do. Socrates also mentions false virtue (68e2–69c3). Some people, who are not philosophers, may appear to control bodily pleasure and pains and possess the virtue of temperance. However, they merely exchange large and small pleasures and pains in the same manner as they would exchange currencies. Their lack of self-indulgence is not in the interest of gaining wisdom. They merely fear, for example, “being denied other pleasures” (68e5–6). Such virtue, as they possess it, is called *skiagraphia* (i.e. “scene-painting” or “painting with the shadows”),¹² and is considered a kind of illusion (69b7). It is the internal desire that decides whether that restraint is truly virtuous. Therefore, whether they really possess that desire is important in deciding the quality of their life. The discussion might encourage that desire. Without self-recognition or conviction related to the desire, however, Socrates' claim of the good life or goodness of death is not effective for individuals. Second, even after concluding two arguments that demonstrate the immortality of the soul (the Cyclical Argument and the Recollection argument), Socrates perceives that the interlocutors have a childish fear of the soul's destruction following its separation from the body. He advises them to chant a spell to their inner child every day until they manage to chant the fear away (77d5–77e10). Socrates also advises them to look for singers of such chant everywhere, regardless of cost (78a3–9). This advice implies that they should continuously allow themselves to be persuaded by the demonstration. Simply listening to an argument once cannot create the internal attainment of goodness. If a demonstration is correct, however, why must they receive it repeatedly? When that demonstration is true, its core claim neither can nor should be changed. I think

¹² Liddell and Scott 1940, *A Greek–English Lexicon*.

Socrates presupposes a process of gradual change within his listeners. The shared argument alone is not sufficient to improve the listeners completely. Third, the requirement of continuous persuasion is implied through vivid descriptions of the characters in the final part of the dialogue (115b1–118a17). Although Socrates and his friends share all the arguments (some as interlocutors, others as audiences), the results within each person are different. Crito, one of Socrates' best friends, does not understand Socrates' claims of the soul's independence and his encouragement of its separation from the body. Crito is concerned about how to bury "you" (i.e., Socrates) (115c3), even though Socrates' corpse could never be Socrates himself. Other clever friends cannot stop themselves from becoming overwhelmed by emotion when they watch Socrates drink poison. In contrast, Socrates maintains his imperturbable attitude even in the moment of his death. His attitude suggests that he can organise himself harmoniously as a whole person, based on the beliefs he obtained through the arguments. The friends, however, must still endeavour to continue improving themselves after they have lost Socrates.

Furthermore, Socrates himself confesses in *Phaedo* that he must have been solitary or introspective during his youth. He thought that he knew why things grow. However, any existing explanation of why things grow became insufficient to him (96c3–97b7). He lost confidence in his beliefs because he became aware of reasoning that was the basis of natural science. Thus, he had to begin his own investigation based on what he considered to be "the most robust" hypothesis (100a3–7). He hypothesised that Beauty existed by itself, and Good and all the rest (what should be called the Platonic "Forms"). In this period, Socrates had to recognise his ignorance and begin an independent investigation, because he did not receive any refutation of his beliefs from others through the discussion. He recognised the problem with his own previous understanding of the growth or development of things.

In that confession, he mentions his past investigations. We also find that Socrates offers some support for an introspective investigation in the progressing arguments of *Phaedo*. He mentions cases in which a “belief” occurs to people who are truly philosophers (66b1–67e1). This belief states that the body distracts them from attaining truth and they must be separated from the body to view things with the soul itself. Moreover, he says that “philosophy” encourages lovers of learning to separate their souls from their bodies (82d9–83b4). Socrates says that such an encouragement occurs to lovers of learning, but he does not mention other ordinary people. We should emphasize this qualification of the recipient of learning. I argue that Socrates presupposes the love in those who will listen to that philosophical encouragement.

On the other hand, similar to Plato’s other dialogues, *Phaedo* also shows that objective arguments or shared discussions are indispensable to efforts to improve a human being. Indeed, young Socrates did not remain at the introspective investigation either. He started with the recognition of his ignorance and advanced to examination of himself and others through discussions with other people. A philosopher whom Socrates depicts in the arguments also organises his own conditions based on both discussions and intellectual desire. The interlocutors are shown these characteristics of a philosopher and must examine their similarity with him if they agree with Socrates’ arguments.

However, we should not ignore the aspects of self-improvement in *Phaedo* that cannot be understood only from an objective viewpoint. I call those aspects “subjective” because they are closely connected with the introspective recognition of their own conditions, as a response to Gill’s interpretation of ancient Greek thought that emphasizes an objective model of mind. According to Gill, subjectivity or subjectivism is characterised by two points: 1. it gives “privileged status to the idea of the ‘subject’, the ‘I’ as seat of self-consciousness.”¹³ 2. it gives “a similarly privileged status to the subjective (especially first-personal)

¹³ Gill 1996, 6.

perspective in their accounts of our access to, and knowledge of, human psychology.”¹⁴

I argue that the interlocutors are required to recognize their own intellectual desire and governing function over the body in the context of improving themselves. The context is specifically suggested in the Defence of Death and the Recollection Argument. Furthermore, Socrates’ autobiography in *Phaedo* (96a–100a) suggests that Socrates’ recognition of his own ignorance does not depend on a dialogue with others. In addition, even though Socrates and his friends share the argument of the soul’s immortality, their mental conditions suggested in the ending part are diverse (115b–118a). The discussion alone cannot sufficiently improve the interlocutors. The arguments in the *Phaedo* include subjective or individual approaches in improving one’s own conditions, which cannot be recognized only from the objective viewpoint.

Does *Phaedo* suppose a first-person viewpoint to improve oneself in the sense that only the individual himself has privileged access to his own mental state that other people cannot have? The dialogue requires the agreement of the interlocutors with the steps and conclusions developed in each argument. Those arguments suggest intellectual desire and the governing function of the soul. If the interlocutors cannot confidently agree with those arguments regarding the soul’s immortality, they will never become as stable in their stance as Socrates. Therefore, considering those points, *Phaedo* requires self-recognition of intellectual desire and reflective access to their own mental conditions. With regard to their decisions related to how to live or their agreement with Socrates’ encouragement about the best kind of life, the first-person view seems to be required. This perspective will clarify the subjective aspects in the dialogue.

Structure of this Thesis

¹⁴ Ibid., 6.

Based on the general strategy described above and my intention to clarify the concept of self-discovery in *Phaedo*, this thesis examines each argument in the dialogue, using the following structure:

1. Separation of the soul from the body as a method of self-discovery
—Socrates' Defence of Death (63e8–69e4) —
 2. The soul and self-discovery in the Recollection Argument
—The Recollection Argument (72e1–77a7) —
 3. The Encouragement of Self-improvement in the Affinity Argument
—The Affinity Argument (78b4–84b7) —
 4. Removal of the false theory from the soul
—The Criticism of the Soul-*Harmonia* Theory (85e3–86e5, 91c7–95a3) —
 5. Examination of the soul as the cause of life
—The Final Argument of the immortality of the soul (102a11–107b10) —
 6. Self-discovery through Socrates: the meaning of Socrates' deeds
—The ending of *Phaedo* (115b1–118a17) —
- Conclusion.

1. Socrates' Defence of Death (DD) suggests that the defence presupposes the existence of intellectual desire for the Forms. The DD defines a philosophical life as the practice of the soul's separation or purification from the body. Philosophers long for wisdom and therefore attempt to purify their souls. This argument clarifies the target of a philosopher's desire which is knowing the Forms. Based on the target, purification is acknowledged as a required process. Therefore, death is good because it allows the philosopher to escape from the bodily distractions of the soul's intellectual ability. Furthermore, philosophers are able to observe the appropriate way of dealing with bodily pleasures and pains by recognizing wisdom as their true objective. Through this argument, the interlocutor finds the philosopher's ideal conditions and intellectual desire. Without this recognition, the

argument regarding the goodness of death is worthless to the interlocutors, because the goodness presupposes that desire. Thus, the interlocutor's self-discovery of intellectual desire is indispensable in the Defence of Death.

2. The Recollection Argument (RA) as a demonstration of the soul's immortality is also a suggestion for self-discovery of the intellectual desire. The RA presupposes the love of the Forms and implicitly encourages the agent of recollection to recognise the love by himself. This love or desire to know the Forms displays shortcomings in the sensible things. Both the desire and shortcomings cause the things to appear to "want" to be the Forms. The RA is also remarkable in that the interlocutor, Simmias, wants to experience recollection. This implies that he should also experience intellectual desire and the process of intellectual cognition that an agent of recollection must experience.

3. The introductory part of the Affinity Argument (AA) suggests that the interlocutors must chant away their childish fear of the soul's dissipation. After that point has been made, Socrates demonstrates the soul's characteristics which displays its similarity to divine existence. These characteristics are offered through an examination of the characteristics of their soul and body. Thus, through the Affinity Argument, the interlocutors find the proper characteristics of the soul. The soul's cognitive ability, which is independent from the body, and its governing function over the body are also confirmed through an examination of the characteristics. The AA also depicts an encouragement of "philosophy" for "the lovers of learning" to allow the release of their soul from the body. We see that the philosopher's soul agrees with that encouragement and chooses a better life because of that encouragement. At that time, the philosopher internalizes the encouragement by his intention to follow it.

4. The criticism of the Soul-Harmonia theory both implicitly and explicitly reveals false beliefs based on a problematic mind-set within the interlocutor's soul. Socrates explicitly reveals the inconsistency of Simmias' Harmonia theory with his agreement with the RA and argues that it contradicts itself. Meanwhile, Socrates implicitly reveals that the Harmonia theory lacks the element of the harmonization of the agent. The absence of the idea of the agent is remarkable, considering that such an agent is clearly mentioned in Plato's other dialogues. The lack of an agent is based on Simmias' insufficient understanding of the causative relationship between the soul and the body. This point is emphasized when the Harmonia theory is compared with Cebes' counterargument to the Affinity Argument, which is examined in Chapter 5. The harmonizing agent is closely connected to a governing function. Indeed, Socrates quotes Homer's work and depicts Odysseus' self-governance in the conclusion of his criticism of the Harmonia theory. The lack of the agent is a problematic obscurity in the account of the causal or governing order between the soul and the body.

5. Another interlocutor, Cebes, also offers a counterargument against the AA. His argument compares the relationship between the soul and the body to that which exists between a weaver and cloaks. The weaver makes and wears out many cloaks. In the end, the weaver might die, leaving behind the final cloak. In that way, although the soul can endure entering and existing the body, at the point of life and death, it might perish before the body. In this argument, the soul does not depend on the body for its existence, as it is the cause of life. Even that soul, however, might finally perish. Socrates takes this argument seriously and says that they must "study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be." (95e10–96a1) Therefore, he confesses his past despair with existing causal theories in natural science, which caused him to begin his solitary investigation and to establish the hypothesis of the Forms.

The Final Argument (FA) shows that Socrates considers the soul that animates the body to be the cause of life. He demonstrates that the soul, as a cause of life, cannot accept death. The FA forces the interlocutor to reconsider his understanding of life: as presented in this argument, the soul can be damaged even though it is the cause of life. Thus, the FA encourages him to recognize the soul's animating function and to change his understanding of life accordingly. Cebes is concerned that life might damage the soul as his core, as it is a disease to the soul. Socrates suggests that there is such a thing as eternal life. Thus, the perspectives of Socrates and Cebes reveal completely different kinds of souls; one is the invulnerable soul, and the other is the consumable one. The soul should be the core of one's self. Thus, believing in the consumable kind of soul would lead to a nihilistic perspective, since every living thing can perish. Believing in the invulnerable soul requires ongoing and continuous efforts to self-improvement, since the self never perishes and requires purification. Thus, this belief in the invulnerable soul encourages and forces Cebes to live a life dedicated to the consistent improvement of his soul. The belief in soul's eventual perishing does not support or provide guidance of how to live a good life, since any effort would be of little consequence in the end. In this way, the concept of self-discovery would make a significant difference in affecting how one should live.

6. The ending of the *Phaedo* again implicitly suggests that the focal point in the dialogue is of the investigation into what should be the true self. Furthermore, it provides an example of the internalisation of the theory through Socrates' deeds. The contrast between Socrates' steadfast attitude and that of his friends, who are disturbed by emotions, demonstrates the difficulty of self-management and encourages the ongoing improvement of the individual's psychological states.

Conclusion. Through my discussion of *Phaedo*, I argue that the philosophical investigation in the dialogue requires self-discovery. The objects of self-discovery

are the soul's intellectual desire and its governing function over the body. In the process of that discovery, false beliefs must also be revealed, because they lead to a false understanding of the soul. Self-discovery is practised in various and ingenious ways. Some of the ways include a subjective approach. As I have mentioned above, Christopher Gill emphasizes the objective-participant conception in ancient Greek thought. I will compare my perspective with that of Gill and clarify the meaning and role of subjectivity. In my conclusion, I will clarify the significance of self-discovery. Self-discovery of intellectual desire and the governing function of one's own soul reveals how one should live. Knowing the Forms and one's own nature is the final goal for a philosopher, which will be accomplished only after death. Self-discovery contributes to one's understanding of how one should manage one's life in pursuit of that final goal.

Chapter 1. Separation of the soul from the body as a method of self-discovery

—Socrates' Defence to Death (63e8–69e4) —

Introduction to Chapter. 1

Plato's *Phaedo* is a dialogue that depicts the last day of Socrates. Facing his own death, Socrates surprisingly suggests to his friends that a person who is a philosopher should follow him, specifically, he should die (61b8–e4). Socrates demonstrates that a philosopher seeks to cause his soul to be by itself, by separating it from the body (67b1–e7). Therefore, death, as the soul's separation from the body (64c4–9), is exactly what a philosopher seeks. He thus defends the goodness of death to his discussants, who are not persuaded by this astonishing claim.

This view is the essential starting point of all the arguments in *Phaedo*, because the subsequent discussions of the soul's immortality are required to ensure Socrates' defence to his interlocutors. Anyone who correctly engages in philosophy pursues¹⁵ dying and being dead (64a4–6). Through that pursuit, a philosopher will obtain wisdom, and, moreover, he will be able to be with better people and gods after death (63b9–c4). In this way, the Defence of Death (DD) defines the theme of *Phaedo*; thus, what is the theme?

¹⁵ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν: Burnet and Gallop understand this word as “practise.” Indeed, the Defence of Death suggests the practice of the separation. However, this term also means “pursue” as Sedley and Long translate. This sentence is followed by “If this is true, it would surely be absurd for death to be their sole aim throughout their life, but, when it actually arrives, for them to resent that which has long been their aim and pursuit” (64a6–9). This “aim” is depicted by the Greek word “προθυμείσθαι,” which relates to the word “pursuit” (ἐπετηδεύον, the imperfect form of ἐπιτηδεύειν). It seems that ἐπιτηδεύειν must include the meaning of practise, but it also presupposes the implication of aiming in its practice. I think the English word “pursue” or “pursuit” can mean both ‘prosecuting’ and ‘seeking’ according to the *Oxford Dictionary of English* second edition revised 2005 (edited by Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson). Thus, the translation by Sedley and Long of the term ἐπιτηδεύειν as “pursue” seems correct.

In the DD, Socrates focuses in particular on the philosopher's way of life and explains the soul's conditions in this context. In that sense, the defence is also an explanation of who philosophers are and a suggestion of the criteria for true philosophers. Socrates proclaims that he has tried to be one of "those who have pursued philosophy correctly" (69d1–4). Therefore, this argument also explains who Socrates is concerning his occupation (we should probably call it a "mission" considering his statement in *Apology* 23b–c).¹⁶ On the other hand, *Phaedo* does not clearly suggest that other discussants profess that they are philosophers, although they agree with an essential point of Socrates' investigation, namely, the existence of the Forms. They agree with the explanations of the philosopher shown objectively or normatively in the discussions with Socrates. However, it is not clear whether they admit becoming philosophers. The DD is based on the notion that death can contribute to a philosopher's search for wisdom. Therefore, the value of the argument depends on whether the listener is a philosopher. As a result, the DD requires the listeners to be a philosopher if they want the argument to be worthwhile for them.

So then, who is a philosopher? Socrates' arguments on this topic have two remarkable points. First, Socrates considers what a philosopher longs for and what he avoids. Second, he points out that a philosopher is misunderstood by ordinary people "because they haven't realized the *sense* in which true philosophers are near death, the sense in which they deserve death, and what that death is like" (64b7–c1). This suggestion replies to Simmias' statement that a philosopher appears to desire death in the eyes of ordinary people (64b4–6). We can assume that this is because a philosopher seems to have abandoned all corporeal pleasures, although Simmias does not clearly assert that. Indeed, Socrates and Simmias admit that a philosopher does not appear to be eager for such pleasures (64d2–7). However,

¹⁶ "So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me—and I go around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise. Then if I do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is not wise." (23b4–7). Translation by G.M.A. Grube in *Plato Complete Works*.

ordinary people do not recognize the philosopher's real purpose: wisdom. In this chapter, I argue that essence of being a philosopher is about what he wants; philosophers' apparent abstemious attitudes are a source of misunderstanding by ordinary people. A philosopher must separate the soul from the body for the sake of wisdom, and those superficial abstemious attitudes are merely by-products of this separation. To be a philosopher, a person must have a clear aim and manage his life based on the desire for the goal.

The distinctive feature of the philosopher's life and its difference from that of an ordinary person are also demonstrated in the exchange metaphor (69a6–c3). Socrates considers true and fake virtues in the metaphor. Even when ordinary people appear abstemious, they are merely afraid of being deprived of other pleasures; therefore, they abstain from one set of pleasures out of desire for another. In other words, their apparent virtue of temperance is a false or slavish one. A philosopher, however, is concerned with pleasure, pain, and fear in a different way. While ordinary people merely exchange pleasures or other sensations as currencies, a philosopher only exchanges these experiences for true currency, i.e., wisdom. The interpretation of this metaphor can be used to understand the philosopher's life as compared with that of ordinary people. However, since this metaphor is difficult to understand when reading the Greek text, it has caused considerable controversy. I will explain my reading of the text and a good life of a philosopher based on this reading.

Throughout the whole of the DD, we find that Socrates explains the characteristic of a philosopher, namely his desire. Socrates covers what the philosopher should want and what he becomes when he follows his desire. The DD explicitly suggests the goodness of death, but it also implicitly requires the listeners or participants in the discussion to consider their desire and whether they are philosophers or not.

Based on this viewpoint, I consider the topic of self-discovery in the DD through the following process. First, I discuss the real desire of philosophers and

their tendency to be misunderstood by ordinary people. Second, I examine the meaning of the soul's separation from the body. In this separation, what does a philosopher do? Third, I investigate the relationship between wisdom and true (or fake) virtue in the exchange metaphor. How should a philosopher deal with sensations in order to be virtuous? Furthermore, how does wisdom work in a philosopher? Through these arguments, I will claim the importance both of self-recognition of philosophical desire and of the management of life based on the desire.

1. Real characteristics of a philosopher

At the start of the DD, Socrates suggests that a philosopher pursues dying (ἀποθνήσκειν) and being dead (τεθνάναι) (64a4–6). The philosopher's pursuit is depicted using two terms: ἀποθνήσκειν has a form of the present infinitive and seems to express the process of dying, and τεθνάναι has a form of the perfect infinitive and seems to express the state of being dead. Hearing Socrates' suggestion, Simmias, a discussant of Socrates in the DD, laughs and says that many people would think that Socrates' saying applies accusatory to philosophers, believing that philosophers wish to die (θανατῶσι)¹⁷ and that they themselves realise that philosophers deserve to suffer that (ἄξιοι εἶσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν) (64a10–b6). However, Socrates disagrees with Simmias, saying that those people do not realize in what sense philosophers desire to die and deserve death (ἄξιοι εἶσιν θανάτου) (64b8–c1).

¹⁷ θανατάω can be translated as both “desire to die” and “to be moribund.” *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Liddell and Scott, 1940) supports the former, Burnet, Gallop, and Sedley and Long supports the latter (Burnet 1911, 29. Gallop 1975, 8. Sedley and Long 2010, 50). Rowe suggests that both fit this text (Rowe 1993, 136). I think θανατάω should include both meanings. A philosopher wants to die because he can escape bodily disturbances by death. This attitude appears to be dying in a sense. On the other hand, being close to death does not necessarily mean that the agent wants to die. A dying person can still have a strong desire to live. Therefore, I think “to desire to die” is better here than “being close to death” or “moribund”.

Furthermore, Socrates offers the following definition of death:

Text 1.

Can we believe that it (θάνατος) is anything other than the separation (ἀπαλλαγὴν) of the soul from the body? And do we believe that being dead (τὸ τεθνάναι) is the following: the body has been separated from the soul and come to be apart, alone by itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), and the soul has been separated from the body and is apart, alone by itself (αὐτήν καθ' αὐτήν). Can death be anything other than that? (64c4–8)

This definition deals with both death and being dead.¹⁸ It is not clear whether death and being dead are distinguished here and they exactly correspond to dying (ἀποθνήσκειν) and being dead (τεθνάναι) mentioned in philosopher's pursuit (64a4–6). Death is defined as the soul's separation from the body, but it might be able to include both a process of separation and the state of being dead. After discussing about "being dead," Socrates simply inquires whether "death" can be anything other than that. Thus, it seems that death is rather an inclusive term here that can cover both process and separation. At the very least, the definition of "being dead" conveys the state of death by depicting the state of the soul and body. Being dead is specifically defined as the soul being by itself and the body being by itself, which is the target of the philosopher's pursuit. The process of dying arguably aims at that state. Socrates must explain why philosophers pursue that state in the DD.

¹⁸ This point is suggested by Ebrey. He thinks Socrates "carefully gives distinct formulations, which he later relies on, but he realizes that Simmias may not have immediately grasped these nuanced differences, so he only asks Simmias about the simpler definition, that of death." (Ebrey 2017, 18). He also claims that "death is easier to obtain than being dead" (ibid., 19), because "being dead" means that the soul is alone by itself (in Ebrey's translation, "the soul is itself according to itself") while death just means the soul's separation and "something can be separate without being itself according [to] itself" (ibid., 19). I think that Ebrey's use of two different terms regarding death is appropriate. However, it is not clear why Socrates need to consider Simmias' lack of understanding. It seems more appropriate that Socrates understands the term of "death" as that with the wider significance. Death is a continuous process aiming at the proper state.

After this definition, Socrates describes the three stages of the philosopher's practice as corresponding to the three realms; they are listed below:

1. The philosopher despising corporeal pleasure (64c10–65a8)
2. The soul's pursuit of wisdom (65a9–65d3)
3. The description of the Forms as targets of thought (65d4–66a10)

It should be noticed, as Dorter claims, those realms are in ascending order.¹⁹ Regarding stage 1, Socrates argues that a philosopher is not eager for the so-called pleasures of eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse, and that he does not value beautiful clothing. Even ordinary people who do not recognize the philosopher's real desire to die would be able to recognise only the condition of the philosopher in this stage; however, they see only the superficial manifestations of the philosopher's abstinence. Socrates explains this abstinence from consideration of the relationship between the soul and body as follows:

Text 2.

Socrates:

So first of all, is it clear that in matters like these the philosopher releases his soul as much as possible from its association with the body, he above all other people?

Simmias:

So it seems. (64e8–65a3).

When a philosopher despises corporeal pleasure, his real objective is to release his soul from the body. This release, which a philosopher is devoted to achieving, corresponds to the definition of death, since death is defined as the separation of the soul from the body. In this first stage, Socrates describes the philosopher's first

¹⁹ cf. Dorter 1982, 26.

step towards death and states that ordinary people perceive only the appearance of this attitude:

Text 3.

And ordinary people think, don't they, Simmias, that life isn't worth living for someone who finds nothing of that kind pleasant, and who takes no interest in bodily things. They think that he who gives no thought (μηδέν φροντίζων) to the pleasures which come via the body is pretty close to being dead. (65a4–7)

These ordinary people can see that philosophers do not care for bodily pleasures; therefore, they think that their lives are worthless. They cannot see the real desire in the philosopher's life. A philosopher has a real target that is suggested in stage 2. Socrates implies that the object of a philosopher's acquisition is wisdom. He states as follows:

Text 4.

Socrates:

What about the acquisition of wisdom itself? Is the body an impediment or not if one recruits it as a partner in one's inquiry? I mean something like this: do both sight and hearing offer people any truth? Or are even the poets always telling us this sort of mantra, that nothing we hear or see is accurate? And yet if these particular bodily sense are not accurate or clear, then the *others* will hardly be, because, I assume, they are all inferior to them. Don't you think so?

Simmias:

Certainly. (65a9–b8)

As poets also say, perceptions are not accurate regarding the offering of truth. Socrates inquires further as to whether the body is an impediment or not when it is a partner in inquiring wisdom. How does the inaccuracy of bodily perceptions make the body an impediment? He asks about the impediment as follows:

Text 5.

Socrates:

‘So,’ he said, ‘when does the soul grasp the truth? Because whenever it attempts to examine something together with the body, clearly at those times it is thoroughly deceived by the body.’

Simmias:

That is true. (65b9–c1)

The body is not only unreliable but also deceptive; therefore, the philosopher’s soul despises the body and seeks to escape it to be “alone by itself” (αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτήν) (65c11–d2). However, Socrates does not offer any evidence of the deception here. Just because the body gives incorrect information, it does not necessarily mean that it causes deception. Thus, as Rowe claims, the poets’ suggestion that they cannot trust perception does not support the claim that the body is deceptive.

²⁰ However, if his claim implicitly presupposes that a human being tends to believe in perceptions, it would be more plausible. Socrates indeed explains this danger in the Affinity Argument later: “Because each pleasure and pain rivets and pins it to the body as if with a nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be real the very things that the body says real.” (83d4–7). In the argument, Socrates is concerned that the bodily perceptions make the soul believe them to be real, which can indeed be acknowledged as a deceptive characteristic of the body. Thus, to

²⁰ Rowe says “[...] the argument is singularly lacking in rigor; we should need more than poetic hyperbole (b2–4) to convince us that the evidence of the senses is *always* deceptive, as S[ocrates] here implies (cf.66a5–6).” (Rowe 1993, 139–140)

understand the deception of the bodily perceptions in stage 2, we need to assume that Socrates supposes that those perceptions make a human or the soul believe they are true.²¹

Socrates does not develop this danger of bodily deception further, but he introduces the object of wisdom in stage 3. What, then, is this wisdom? Is it general knowledge like craft knowledge or natural science? Socrates defines wisdom as the acquisition of the "*ousia*," namely, Just, Beauty, and Good itself, as well as Largeness, Health and Strength, and what each of them really is (65d4–e1). This kind of existence is repeatedly mentioned in the dialogue, and it is also described in a different term, "*eidos*." (102b1, 103e2, 106d6). Specifically, this "*eidos*" is used in the Final Argument. We should carefully examine how Plato uses those words. However, these terms "*ousia*" and "*eidos*" can be used interchangeably in many cases, because they share the typical examples (Large and Small) and the typical character (they cannot have their opposing properties).²² I use the English word "Form" that covers those terms in this thesis. The Form is unchanging and retains its property. We can see beautiful things or people but cannot grasp the ideal existence of Beauty itself through bodily perceptions. Socrates summarises this philosopher's aiming at wisdom as follows:

Text 6.

So wouldn't the man who did this most purely be one who so far as possible used his thought in its own right to access each reality, neither adducing the evidence of his sight in his thinking nor bringing any other

²¹ Scott understands sensations' deception in the similar way by using the same passage of the Affinity Argument (83d4–7). See Scott 1995, 72.

²² Plato also uses another term "*idea*" in the Final Argument. I do not think that *eidos* and *idea* can be used interchangeably. The term "*eidos*" first appears at 102b1 and is used exclusively in the Final Argument. *Ousia* is used singularly in the arguments before the Final Argument, therefore, *eidos* and *ousia* are separated from each other. Conversely, *eidos* and *idea* share the same argument. Thus, it is salient that Plato uses two different terms in one argument. We should consider how Plato uses these two terms differently within the Final Argument. I consider the usage of the terms in Chapter 5.

sense at all along with his reasoning, but using his thought alone by itself and unalloyed, and so attempting to hunt down each real thing alone by itself and unalloyed (ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεῦειν τῶν ὄντων), separated as far as possible from eyes and ears and virtually from his entire body, for the reason that the body disturbs his soul and, whenever it associates with it, doesn't let it acquire truth and wisdom? Isn't this, Simmias, the man who will hit upon reality, if anyone will?"

'That's eminently true, Socrates,' said Simmias." (65e7–66a10, emphasis mine).

Across these three stages, Socrates shows the philosopher's attitude towards life and connects that life with the purified way of the soul's being, which is being alone by itself. This is because a philosopher needs to use his thought alone by itself in order to acquire the real thing. The appearance of philosophers to ordinary people (seeming to avoid any bodily pleasures) are by-products that only show the superficial appearance when philosophers are fulfilling their real desire. Their real goal is to obtain wisdom concerned with the Forms. From that perspective, death and the pursuit of separating souls from bodies must be understood. Indeed, this summary uses the term to suggest the philosopher's desire: "attempting to hunt down each real thing alone by itself." (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεῦειν τῶν ὄντων) (66a2–3). While ordinary people desire bodily pleasures, a philosopher attempts to obtain the real thing. Neither the pursuit of a philosopher nor death can be evaluated correctly without understanding the philosophical desire. Indeed, ordinary people cannot understand in what sense philosophers desire to die and deserve death (64b8–9). Thus, a philosopher is defined by his desire in the DD first. Moreover, a series of points regarding a philosopher's desire is agreed by the interlocutor. The goodness of death depends on this desire. Soul's separation can allow the philosopher to obtain wisdom. Thus,

the interlocutors must recognize that they have that desire, otherwise, this DD is worthless. The DD presupposes that the interlocutors have that desire.

2. The soul's separation from the body of a philosopher

These three stages show the objects with which the philosopher is concerned: corporeal pleasure, truth and wisdom, and the Forms. Socrates also shows how the soul is when it is concerned with these objects. At this point, he tries to separate his soul from his body in order to cause it to be “alone by itself” (αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτήν) (65c11–d2). However, as already mentioned, ordinary people see only a philosopher’s abstinence and cannot see what philosophers do positively. Socrates focuses on the real condition of a philosopher when he does what he should do—avoiding bodily sensations and seeking wisdom.

We must confirm the meaning of the peculiar phrase “αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτήν” (“alone by itself”) here to understand the meaning of separation as accurately as possible. This phrase is repeatedly used in Socrates’ argument to separate the soul from the body (65c7, 65d1–2, 67c7). For example, at 65c11–d2, Socrates states as follows:

Text. 7

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα
καὶ φεύγει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτήν γίνεσθαι;

So here too does the philosopher's soul particularly devalue the body and try to escape from it, seeking instead to become alone by itself? (65c11–d2)

If we try to translate the phrase literally, the philosopher’s soul seeks to be “itself by itself.” These two pronouns should refer to the soul “itself” reflexively. However, the meaning of κατὰ is opaque. How should we understand the united phrase of αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτήν? According to *A Greek-English Lexicon*, the preposition

κατὰ with an accusative word primarily means a downwards motion (B-I). It also means “distributive” (B-II), for example, “by tribes”, “by clans.” Furthermore, it also means “fitness or conformity” (B-IV), which can be translated as “in accordance with.” Socrates also suggests that a philosopher’s soul should use “thought” (*dianoia*) without using bodily perceptions (66a1–3). Therefore, his actual suggestion is that the soul should use its appropriate function without using other things. Based on this interpretation, it seems that we should understand κατὰ as “in accordance with.”²³ The translation by Sedley and Long of καθ’ αὐτήν, “by itself”, seems to allow this meaning.²⁴

However, how can we translate the phrase “alone by itself” as Sedley and Long do? The reflexive pronoun αὐτός seems to be translated as “itself,” but it is used for “alone” in *A Greek –English Lexicon* (A-I-3). However, Gregory Vlastos retains its direct translation “itself by itself.”²⁵ Thus, we should consider which translation is better. It should be noticed that this phrase is originally used in the definition of death (64c4–8. See Text 1 in section 1 of this chapter). Using this phrase, Socrates defines death as separation. Therefore, considering those contexts, the phrase itself must include this meaning of separation. In the latter part of the DD, Socrates defines “purification” as separation, in which this phrase is used again:

Text 8.

²³ Broackes claims as follows: “What is it for a person or thing to act αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτόν? αὐτός of course means *himself, herself, itself*, but also *by himself, by herself*, etc., i.e. *alone* (LSJ s.v. I.3: αὐτὸς περ ἐών, although *alone*, Il. 8.99; αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν, for we are alone, i.e. among friends, Ar. Ach. 504; usages with which LSJ lists αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτόν). When a person—or the soul—acts αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτόν or αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτήν, the force of the phrase is, then, I think, that it is acting *alone by way of itself, alone in accordance with itself*—independently following its own path, not using anything else—hence, in short, alone by itself.” (Broackes 2009, 49). My reading accords with Broackes’ claim.

²⁴ *Oxford Dictionary of English*, Second Edition Revised. 2005. ‘by’ can mean “according to” (preposition-7)

²⁵ Vlastos 1991, 261. I learned this problem of translation from Broackes 2009, 49 n.21.

And doesn't purification turn out to be the very thing we were recently talking about in our discussion, namely parting the soul from the body as much as possible and habituating it to assembling and gathering itself from every part of the body, alone by itself (αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν), and to living alone by itself (μόνην καθ' αὐτήν) as far as it can, both now and afterwards, released from the body as if from fetters? (67c5–d2, emphasis mine)

In this passage, Burnet thinks μόνην καθ' αὐτήν is a synonym of αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν.²⁶ Indeed, the phrase is used to emphasize the importance of habituation to make the soul distant from the body. Namely, the soul must be solitary. This point is emphasized clearly by the word “μόνην” which more directly means “alone.” Considering this passage and the definition of death, the phrase “αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν” should cover both a soul's intellectual condition and that of being separated from the body. Therefore, the meaning of “alone” should be also included in the translation of the phrase.

Ordinary people cannot see what a philosopher will accomplish by making his soul to be “alone by itself,” i.e. finding truth or wisdom. Philosophers recognize their purpose and the proper way to achieve it:

Text 9.

‘Then given all this,’ he said, ‘is it inevitable for those who are genuinely (γνησίως) philosophers to be struck by the following sort of belief, so that they also tell one another things like this: “You know, a sort of short cut may well be taking us with our reason towards the quarry in our inquiry, because as long as we have the body and our soul is fused with bodily evil,

²⁶ Burnet 1911, 38. Rowe seems to agree with Burnet's connection of these two phrases and translate the phrase as “alone by itself” (αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν) (Rowe 1993, 137). I agree with Burnet.

we'll *never* properly acquire what we desire, namely, as we would say, the truth...' (66b1–7)

But we really have shown that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of something, we must be separated from the body and view things by themselves with the soul by itself. The time when we will have that which we desire and whose lovers we claim to be (οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρᾶσταί εἶναι), namely wisdom, will be when we are dead, as the argument indicates, and not while we are alive. (66d7–e4, emphasis mine).

These passages also make remarkable points. First, Socrates mentions that a belief strikes those who are genuine philosophers. This belief tells them of the disturbance of the body in acquiring wisdom (φρονήσις). Curiously, Socrates does not clarify how the belief comes to them, or at least, he does not say that it comes through discussion. Conversely, it seems that the discussion between the philosophers takes place after the belief has struck. Furthermore, Socrates dares to mention genuineness in being a philosopher. Does he presuppose the possibility of there being true and fake philosophers? If so, who is a genuine philosopher? At this stage, Socrates does not clearly define who the genuine philosopher is. However, in my view, the second remarkable point is concerned with this genuineness: Socrates characterises wisdom as what “we desire and whose lovers we claim to be.” Wisdom is not only truth or pure knowledge, but also the target of people who claim to be lovers of wisdom. Indeed, in the last part of the DD, Socrates claims that he has tried to be one of those “who have pursued philosophy correctly” and to do his best “in every way” (69d1–4). If this claim is a falsehood, that claimant would not be a genuine philosopher but a fake one. Following this interpretation, a belief warning of a bodily disturbance and encouraging separation from the body strikes genuine philosophers who love wisdom as they claim.

The philosopher despises corporeal desires, desiring truth and wisdom as his absolute purpose. To this end, he makes his soul alone by itself. What is the concrete condition of the soul's being alone by itself? Socrates identifies abstract concepts in stage 3, namely, "each real thing" that can be also called the Forms, and says that a person who uses his thought alone by itself and hunts down real things "alone by itself" will hit upon reality (66a1–8). We also realise that we understand these objects without perception when we are not disturbed by corporeal desires and sensations. Therefore, it is possible for us to achieve a purified condition in certain situations only. Plato seems to suggest that the cognition of the Forms is limited to these situations. Therefore, only a philosopher has the necessary experience to cause his soul to be alone by itself. While he will acquire wisdom through causing the soul to be alone by itself, he will have no reason to make the soul to be in such a condition without the desire to obtain wisdom. Indeed, ordinary people would not need to do that as far as they desire bodily pleasure.

Remarkably, Socrates does not clarify how intellectual desire comes to a philosopher. However, this does not mean that having such a desire is a brute fact for a human being which does not need any explanation. Ordinary people are only concerned about bodily pleasure; therefore, they cannot understand the true conditions of a philosopher. Socrates just suggests that a belief comes to a philosopher, which leads him to separate the soul from the body, without clarifying its origin. As far as someone is a true philosopher, he would have intellectual desire. But Socrates seems to remain epistemically modest about the origin of the desire, and we do not know in *Phaedo* how that desire is given to a human being either. In that sense, while Socrates says that the philosopher discusses the belief after being struck by it in Text 9, we cannot say that the desire comes from those discussions. It seems that the discussion takes place after the belief's striking. Socrates says that wisdom is a target "which we desire and whose lover we claim to be." (66e2–3). He seems to presuppose that at least he and

Simmias have that desire. If Simmias agrees, death would be good for him as a way of making his soul to be alone by itself. Thus, I think Socrates presupposes a desire for wisdom that cannot be reduced to the products of discussion. It exists within the participants of the arguments before the discussions.

3. Virtue and wisdom

Socrates defends the idea that death separates the soul from the body and causes the soul to be alone by itself so that it can acquire wisdom. In this case, wisdom is the true goal of a philosopher. In the DD, he also presents a remarkable example of the relationship between virtue and wisdom. He explains the philosopher's attitude towards pleasure, pain, and fear by contrasting it with that of ordinary people in the "exchange metaphor" (69a6–c3).

Socrates first introduces the concept of "so-called" virtue regarding courage and temperance. These virtues mostly belong to philosophers (68b8–d1). Even when ordinary people appear abstemious, they are merely acting out of fear of being deprived of other pleasures; therefore, they abstain from one set of pleasures out of desire for another (68e2–69a5). A philosopher, however, is concerned with pleasure and other sensations in a different way. Here, I must make use of a comparatively long quotation with its original Greek text, since many scholars suggest various ways of reading the text to interpret its problematic contents:

Text 10.

For I suspect, my good Simmias, that for the purpose of virtue this is not the correct exchange, the exchange of pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains and fear for fear, greater for less, like currencies, but that just one thing is the correct currency, in return for which one must exchange all these: I mean wisdom. Now when all things are bought and sold for this

and with this—with wisdom—they really are, I suspect, courage, temperance, justice and in sum true virtue, regardless of whether pleasures, fears and everything else like that are added or removed. But when they are kept apart from wisdom and exchanged for one another, that sort of virtue is, I fear, a kind of illusion: it is really fit for slaves, and contains nothing sound or true. The reality is, I suspect, that temperance, justice and courage are a kind of purification from everything like this, and that wisdom itself is a kind of rite to purify us. (69a6–c3)

Original Greek Texts

[69a6] ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μή γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς
[69a7] ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς
[69a8] λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, μείζω πρὸς
[69a9] ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα
[69a10] ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις·
[b1] καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ
[b2] πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἡ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ
[b3] δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθοῦς ἀρετῆ, μετὰ φρονή-
[b4] σεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ
[b5] ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων·
[b6] χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων
[b7] μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἡ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδρα-
[b8] ποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς
[c1] τῷ ὄντι ἡ καθαρόσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφρο-
[c2] σύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρόνησις
[c3] μὴ καθαρμός τις ἡ.

Scholars have suggested two serious problems in this passage related to the philosopher's way of life:

1. How does a philosopher use the true currency, wisdom? According to the text (69b1–4; “Now when all things are bought and sold for this and with this—with wisdom—they really are, I suspect, courage, temperance, justice and in sum true virtue [...]”), he seems to buy or sell all these things (pleasures, pains, fears) with or for wisdom. However, it seems strange if he should buy sensations with wisdom since the sensations are what he despises. On the other hand, wisdom should be his target. In that case, is the true currency spent and diminished?²⁷

2. Is wisdom a means or a goal?²⁸ In *Phaedo*, wisdom is frequently mentioned as the object of the philosopher’s intellectual desire. However, in this metaphor, wisdom seems to be a kind of means or medium to be virtuous, since a philosopher must exchange something with wisdom. Is it possible for him to already have wisdom as a means of exchange, although it is his goal? In other words, how can a philosopher possess wisdom, which is his final purpose, while Socrates says that we acquire wisdom when we die, not when we are alive (66e1–6)?²⁹

Many scholars have suggested interpretations of these problematic sentences. One of the most drastic solutions was suggested by John Burnet.³⁰ He deleted καὶ

²⁷ cf. Bluck 1955, 155–156. He suggests that we should not read the metaphor so strictly. According to him, Plato intended “τούτου καὶ μετὰ τούτου to suggest ‘if they are bought and sold for this or perhaps with the aid of this’ (i.e. under the guidance of wisdom).” (Bluck 1955, 156.)

²⁸ cf. Hackforth 1955, 193.

²⁹ “The time when we will have that which we desire and whose lovers we claim to be, namely wisdom, will be when we are dead as the argument indicates, and not while we are alive” (66e1–4).

³⁰ Burnet is mainly concerned with the grammatical problem of ὠνούμενα and πιπρασκόμενα having a passive meaning: “I think it certain that this sentence is interpolated. [...] it is hardly credible that Plato should use ὠνούμενα as a passive, or that he should use πιπρασκόμενα at all. For ὠνεῖσθαι in a passive sense, the grammars can only quote Xen. Eq. 8.2 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐὼνεῖτο, πειρᾶσθαι ἐκελεύομεν εἰ δύναιτο ὁ ἵππος ταῦτα ποιεῖν, but there it is clearly active, ‘at the time he was buying it.’ As to πιπρασκόμενα, Cobet’s remark is true: *Neque Iones neque Attici ea forma utuntur, sed apud sequiores protrita est* (Nov. Lect. p.158). It occurs only in one other place (*Soph.* 224a3), where

τούτου μὲν πάντα (69b1) and τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα (69b1–2), which correspond with “Now when all things are bought and sold for this” from the translation. This reading ignores the fact that this text is supported by the main manuscripts that constitute *Phaedo*. Furthermore, “ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα” (“all things are bought and sold”) is exactly answered with “καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων” (69b4) (“[...] pleasures, fears and everything else like that are **added or removed**”). Considering these points, those phrases should not be deleted as Burnet did.

Other scholars have tried to understand this passage without any deletion, which seems to be a more reasonable way to read the text. J. V. Luce adds the word “ἀλλατόμενα” to the sentence at 69b1.³¹ In this reading, τούτου depends on that ἀλλατόμενα, and therefore it has its genitive form. Following this interpretation, the translation of 69b1–2 will be as follows: “When all things are exchanged for wisdom and are bought and sold through the medium of wisdom ...” Luce thinks that there are two steps in this exchange:³² Step 1, Exchanging sensations for wisdom (this is different from the bartering of pleasures by ordinary people; wisdom is acquired in this step), and Step 2, all transactions are done with wisdom.

also it seems to be interpolated.” (Burnet 1911, 42–43). However, Luce criticizes Burnet’s suggestion efficaciously (Luce 1944, 60–61): Luce also admits that “there is not, it is true, any parallel in the passive sense.” (p.60). Both in *Sophist* 224b1 and *Protagoras* 313e1, the participles of ὠνεῖσθαι are active in sense. However, he points out that “both these participles are *masculine* and therefore naturally active in sense.” (p.61). This ὠνούμενά in *Phaedo* is neuter. Luce claims as follows: “If the neuter form of the participle were found more often, one would expect it to be passive, for ‘things’ cannot buy, but can be bought. For instance the perfect participle ἐωνημένα is found in the passive sense (it was conjectured here by Stallbaum), and in *Laws* 850a we find τὸ ὠνηθέν.” (p.61) As Luce claims, the last instance is important, since Plato uses the word ἀλλάττεσθαι (849e6) at a few sentences before “τὸ δὲ ὠνηθὲν ἢ πρᾶθὲν” (850a1) (“the object bought or sold.” This translation by Trevor J. Saunders in *Plato Complete Works*) in the context of explaining “monetary transaction” (p.61) in the city.

³¹ Luce 1944, 61.

³² Luce 1944, 63.

However, this interpretation leads to several difficulties.³³ First, supplying the word seems to be a considerable change to the texts since this sentence is grammatically completed without the addition of “exchange.” Second, although the division into two steps would be a very important transition (if Luce’s interpretation is correct, and there is such a process), Socrates does not indicate this and just connects two distinctive transactions with the word “καὶ” (and).

Roslyn Weiss interprets both “all these” (πάντα) in “in return for which one must exchange all these” (69a10) and “all things” in “when all things are bought and sold for this and with this” (69b1) as sensations.³⁴ Additionally, she understands “for which” (ἀντὶ οὗ) in the meaning of “for the sake of which.” This form of exchange is preserved in sections 69b1–c3. She translates sections 69a9–10 and 69b1–c3 as follows:

(69a9–10)

... but that sole right coin, for the sake of which all these things [pleasures, pains, and fears] ought to be exchanged [with each other] is *phronêsis* ...³⁵

(69b1–c3)

... when [pleasures, pains, and fears are] bought and sold for *phronêsis*, and with *phronêsis* [as one's value, aim, or concern], then is there really courage, temperance, justice, and, in sum, true *aretê*, that is, with *phronêsis*, whether pleasures and pains and all other such things are increased or diminished...³⁶

In her interpretation, sensations are bought and sold with each other, for the sake of and with *phronêsis* (wisdom). In other words, wisdom is outside the barter of

³³ Weiss has already suggested the following difficulties (Weiss 1987, 61). I agree with her criticism.

³⁴ Weiss 1987, 58.

³⁵ Weiss 1987, 58.

³⁶ Weiss 1987, 59.

sensations, which is the purpose of the barter. In this case, a philosopher does not have to spend wisdom as a currency to buy or sell sensations, as this set of buying and selling means simply an exchange of sensations. Thus, a philosopher also exchanges sensations as ordinary people do, but he does so for the sake of, and with, wisdom, not to obtain other sensations. In this case, true *aretê* (virtue) consists in *phronêsis*. Moreover, Weiss suggests an interesting solution to the problem of whether wisdom is a means or goal, stating, “*Phronêsis* is indeed the means to *aretê* by being that for the sake of which all pleasures, pains, and fears are exchanged with each other, i.e., by being the goal of all transactions of pleasures, pains, and fears.”³⁷

Weiss’ interpretation seems to be efficacious, as it appears to solve the two problems mentioned above. According to Weiss, wisdom as the true currency does not have to be spent or diminished. It is both a means and goal at the same time. However, an issue arises in her reading that relates to the meaning of “for” (ἀντι). This “for” (ἀντι) is apparently linked with “to be exchanged”(καταλλάττεσθαι). We can easily find the usage of καταλλάττεσθαι as “to exchange one thing for another” in *A Greek-English Lexicon*³⁸ and, in that case, the meaning of this sentence should be that “all these are exchanged for wisdom.” The subject is exchanged for another thing. It is not certain that the verb καταλλάττεσθαι (be exchanged) can be used in a situation where the sensations are exchanged for each other. Whether her reading is consistent with the rules of Greek syntax is open to question. We also find that Plato uses the phrase ἀλλάττω+ἀντι in the meaning of “exchange one thing for another” in *Symposium* 218e4 and *Menexenus* 237a4.³⁹

³⁷ Weiss 1987, 61.

³⁸ Liddell and Scott 1940, καταλλ-άσσω, A-2.

³⁹ “εἰ δὲ καθορῶν αὐτὸ κοινῶσασθαί τέ μοι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ ἀλλάξασθαι κάλλος ἀντὶ κάλλους, οὐκ ὀλίγῳ μου πλεονεκτεῖν διανοῇ, ἀλλ’ ἀντὶ δόξης ἀλήθειαν καλῶν κτᾶσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καὶ τῷ ὄντι “χρύσεα χαλκείων” διαμείβεσθαι νοεῖς.” (*Symposium*, 218e3–219a1, emphasis mine). “And if on espying this you are trying for a mutual exchange of beauty for beauty, it is no slight advantage you are counting on –you are trying to get genuine in return for reputed beauties, and in fact are designing to fetch off the old bargain

Weiss' reading suggests a peculiar philosopher's attitude towards pleasures and pains, which should be distinguished from an ascetic reading of the text. Indeed, according to her interpretation of the text, even a philosopher exchanges pleasures or pains for each other, which does not deny the philosopher's receiving those pleasures and pains. This reading would mean a reasonable management of those pleasures and pains. Woolf also criticizes an ascetic reading of the text and evaluates Weiss' reading as follows: "Now the key phrase at A 10 (ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι) certainly fits better with the rest of the passage when translated, with Weiss (her brackets), as 'for the sake of which all these things [pleasures, pains and fears] ought to be exchanged [with each other]', the sense being (roughly) that the passions are a given and one's 'traffic' in them should be whatever most conduces to the acquisition of wisdom."

⁴⁰ However, he also explains that the phrase "in isolation" is "more naturally translated 'ascetically' as 'in return for which [i.e. wisdom] all these things should be exchanged', and I suspect that one reason for the linguistic murkiness of the passage as a whole is precisely Plato's desire to avoid closing off the possibility of an ascetic reading."⁴¹ While Woolf agrees with Weiss' general understanding of the metaphor, he also sees a problem with her interpretation of the phrase including ἀντὶ.

I argue that we should not read ἀντὶ in the phrase (ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι) as meaning "for the sake of." This passage aims to draw a contrast between important things for ordinary people and a philosopher. For ordinary people, pleasures, pains, and fears are important things. Currency

of "gold for bronze"." (Translation by H. R. Lamb, 1925, emphasis mine). "ἢ πόθεν ἂν ὀρθῶς ἀρξάμεθα ἀνδρᾶς ἀγαθοὺς ἐπαινοῦντες, οἱ ζῶντές τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἠϋφραϊνον δι' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν ζώντων σωτηρίας ἠλλάξαντο;" (*Menexenus*, 237a1-4, emphasis mine). "Or how could we rightly commence our laudation of these valiant men, who in their lifetime delighted their friends by their virtue, and purchased the safety of the living by their deaths?" (Translation by R. G. Bury 1929, emphasis mine)

⁴⁰ Woolf 2004, 99. n.3.

⁴¹ Woolf 2004, 99. n.3.

(*nomisma*) is a symbol of importance to ordinary people, characterised as “a money lover” (68c2). However, for a philosopher, those things have no importance. Wisdom is the only valuable thing for him. Therefore, if it is required, he should exchange those bodily affections for wisdom.

However, we need to attend carefully to several points in this exchange. First, throwing away those affections does not mean immediately attaining wisdom. As we have seen in 65e7–66a8, a philosopher must use thought alone by itself to hunt down real things. Just giving up bodily sensation is not the core of his required action. Second, this exchange between sensations and wisdom does not mean ‘asceticism’ if asceticism means abstinence from sensual pleasure since Socrates says “all those” which include pains and fears should be exchanged for wisdom. Is it possible to be free from any pleasures and pains in this life? If we try to avoid the pleasure of eating, some pains of hunger will come to us. Indeed, when Socrates rubbed his fettered legs, he was interested in the peculiar relationship between pleasure and pain. He felt that there was a pain in his fettered leg, but pleasure comes “in its train” (60c7). He does not attempt to avoid feeling pleasure and pain. By experiencing them, he understands an interesting fact about pleasure and pain and evaluates them. Considering his statement about the pleasure and pain in his leg, it is not a focal point in this metaphor to throw away all sensations to obtain wisdom. Rather it suggests that only wisdom can be valuable while bodily affections can never be so.

Bodily sensations are understood as currencies in this metaphor, and the currencies are usually understood as a tool for exchange. However, wisdom as a currency seems to lose this characteristic after 69b1. Rowe interprets τούτου as the genitive of price in “καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα”⁴² All those things are bought and sold for the price of wisdom. However, this meaning “wrongly suggests that our store of wisdom will be either

⁴² Rowe 1993, 150. See also Smyth 1984. *Greek Grammar*, p.325, section 1372.

decreased (in 'buying') or increased ('in selling') [...]”⁴³ Therefore, this must be immediately “corrected by ‘in the company of this’.”⁴⁴ Based on his reading, wisdom is not used as a consumable currency, but as a kind of measurement, and this meaning is emphasized by a phrase “μετὰ τούτου” (in the company of this). In this sense, the function of wisdom is different from bodily sensations. Bodily sensations as currencies are objects that are spent in transactions. On the other hand, wisdom as a true currency works as a measure. Therefore, wisdom can never be spent for bodily affections, which solves the first problem in this metaphor.

However, the second problem remains. If wisdom can be used as a measure, has a philosopher already acquired that wisdom? Wisdom is the target of the philosopher. Thus, he desires to be dead, because wisdom can be acquired when we are dead, not while we are alive (66e1–6). According to this exchange metaphor, if a philosopher cannot acquire wisdom, he cannot be truly virtuous in this life. How should we understand the relationship between wisdom and virtue? There are three different ways to interpret this relationship:

1. A philosopher cannot acquire wisdom in this life, but he can be fully virtuous (Weiss)⁴⁵
2. A philosopher can acquire wisdom; so he can be fully virtuous (Bobonich)⁴⁶
3. A philosopher cannot acquire wisdom; so he cannot be fully virtuous (Vasiliou)⁴⁷

According to Weiss, virtue is not wisdom but the love of wisdom; hence, one can be virtuous without being wise by devoting one's life to the pursuit of wisdom. The truly virtuous man of the *Phaedo* is not said to be wise, but to love wisdom. He is contrasted with the lover of the body, money, or honour (68c1–2). However, in

⁴³ Ibid., 150.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 150.

⁴⁵ Weiss 1987, 62–63.

⁴⁶ Bobonich 2002, 34–36.

⁴⁷ Vasiliou 2012, 21–26.

the section Weiss refers to, Socrates does not necessarily state that the philosopher is truly virtuous, but instead suggests that so-called virtues belong to a philosopher (68c5–6, 68c8–12)⁴⁸:

Text 11.

‘So, Simmias,’ he said, ‘doesn’t that which is called “courage” (ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία) also belong most to those with this attitude. (68c5–6)

And temperance as well — that which even ordinary people call “temperance”, namely not being in a flutter about one’s desires, but rather being disdainful towards them and staying composed—doesn’t that belong only to those who particularly disdain the body and live in philosophy? (68c8-12).

In the exchange metaphor, the virtue that comes with wisdom is called “true virtue” (ἀληθὴς ἀρετή) (69b3). Therefore, this point does not prove that a philosopher is truly virtuous.

On the other hand, Bobonich explains the criteria of wisdom and accepts that a philosopher has wisdom and is fully virtuous. Wisdom is the knowledge of the Forms in the Defence as we see in section 1. Bobonich mentions that Plato admits that some people knows the equal itself (the Form of Equal) while never adequately or purely attaining wisdom. Based on that example, he defines a person who knows the Form of F by using these three criteria: ⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Vasiliou suggests this counterargument (Vasiliou 2012, 21).

⁴⁹ Bobonich 2002, 35.

1. A person who knows the Form of F “recognizes that the Form of F is not identical with sensible things or properties.”

2. A person who knows the Form of F “is able to give an account of the Form of F.”

Additionally, Plato thinks the following thing is “a very basic fact”:⁵⁰

“All sensible Fs are F in virtue of participating in the Form of F.”

Bobonich thinks that a philosopher will have fulfilled these criteria in terms regarding the Equal itself. Indeed, Socrates and the interlocutors admit that they know the Form of Equal in the following Recollection Argument (74b2). However, as Vasiliou correctly mentions, even if we admit that a philosopher could fulfil these criteria with regard to the Form of Equal, we cannot say that he can do the same regarding other Forms.⁵¹ Specifically, it seems difficult to fulfil the second criterion concerning justice and good. Would Socrates say that he knows the Form of Justice, Beauty and Good? It seems improbable. At least, the Form of Justice and that of Good are hard targets of investigation in Plato’s *Republic*. How can a person be truly virtuous only by the knowledge of the Form of Equal, if he does not know any other ethical property?

Considering these defects in the first and second interpretations, it seems that a philosopher cannot be truly virtuous as Vasiliou claims. Thus, neither a philosopher nor ordinary people are truly virtuous. Then, is there any difference between them? Regarding virtue, can a philosopher distinguish himself from other people? While Plato does not explicitly state this, the following difference can be assumed: true virtue with wisdom is an ideal state that a philosopher can ultimately achieve after death. If a philosopher acquires wisdom that he has desired through all his life, he would evaluate any sensations correctly with that wisdom and keep himself purified from them. The achievement of this ideal state is possible only for a philosopher since ordinary people cannot realize that their

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Vasiliou 2012, 23–24.

virtue is slavish and fake. A philosopher recognises both this ideal state and slavish virtue, which prevents him from participating in the wrong type of exchange. His acknowledgement of the ideal state will help him to live his life well and progress towards wisdom, which is the characteristic feature of a philosopher.

However, if this assumption based on Vasiliou's interpretation is correct, true virtue can only be accomplished by acquiring true wisdom, that is, after death. This appears to be a strange idea because it would not seem that courage and temperance are used in the afterlife.⁵² Moreover, why must the soul manage sensations even after death, even though it is distant from the body? However, Socrates also adds the following mythical explanation to the exchange metaphor:

Text 12.

The reality is, I suspect, that temperance, justice and courage are a kind of purification from everything like this, and that wisdom itself is a kind of rite to purify us. So it actually seems that those people who established the rites for us are no ordinary people, but in reality have long been setting a riddle when they say that whoever comes to Hades without initiation and the rites will lie in filth, whereas someone who arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with gods. (69b8–c7)

According to this mythical theory, virtue and viciousness seem to be preserved even after death, at which time they are truly significant. In that sense, Plato retains the possibility that true virtue is effective even after one has left this world and truly acquired wisdom. In the Affinity Argument (78b4–84b7), Socrates mentions that the soul's tendencies or activities in this life have effects on its conditions even after death. As we have already seen in the explanation of the deceit of the body, sensations pin the soul to the body: "Because each pleasure and pain rivets and pins it to the body as if with a nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be

⁵² Vasiliou also points out this problem (Vasiliou 2012, 25).

real the very things that the body says real.” (83d4–7). Moreover, the polluted soul “fall[s] quickly back again into another body” even after death (83d10–e3). Thus, sensations affect the soul even after it is distant from the body. After considering the bad effects of the body over the soul, Socrates inquires as follows: “So Cebes, it is for these reasons that the proper lovers of learning are composed and courageous. It is not for the reasons for which most people are so. Or do you think it is?” (83e5–7). At first glance, this passage seems to support Weiss’ reading since it clearly says the lovers of learning are courageous. However, this inquiry is stated after the passages in which Socrates explains that the bodily sensations affect the soul even after death. Additionally, he has also discussed that the purified soul “go[es] off into what is similar to it” and “can be happy, separated from wandering” (81a4–8). Thus, these virtues in the lovers of learning are stated after considering the soul’s conditions after death. Therefore, true virtues including courage and temperance have actual effects after death, which decide the destinations of the souls. Thus, a philosopher will find out whether he has really lived correctly after his soul departs from the body. A critical difference between a philosopher and ordinary people cannot be easily found in their virtues in this world. A philosopher’s distinctive feature is that they can recognize the difference between true and fake virtues and keep pursuing wisdom and aim at acquiring true virtues after death.⁵³

After this metaphor, Socrates concludes his defence of death. Remarkably, Socrates shows his epistemic modesty about his life. According to him, he does not know whether he has philosophised correctly:

Text 13.

⁵³ My interpretation accords with that of Vasiliou. He also finds the philosopher’s virtue in their striving to become wise and the possibility of becoming wise after death. Vasiliou 2012, 24.

For in fact, as those involved in the rites put it, “many carry the fennel-wand, but few are inspired”. The latter, in my opinion, are none other than those who have pursued philosophy correctly. In trying to become one of them I left nothing undone in my life, at least as far as I could, but did my utmost in every way. Whether I did so correctly and achieved anything, I’ll know for certain when I’ve got there, god willing, and I don’t think it will be long. (69c8–d7, emphasis mine).⁵⁴

Socrates believes that he has practised philosophy as far as possible, however, he is not sure about its absolute correctness. Whether he has improved himself or not will be clarified after his death. In that sense, the true evaluation of his life can be known only to Socrates. He has attempted to be a philosopher as far as possible and advanced discussion about the good life of a philosopher with the interlocutor. However, this result is not clarified within the discussion and will be known to Socrates alone.

Conclusion of Chapter 1

In the DD, we see the significance of self-discovery of intellectual desire. A philosopher desires wisdom, and therefore wishes to be dead, because he needs to separate his soul from the body in order to obtain wisdom. In other words, he must make his soul “alone by itself.” Thus, death as soul’s separation from the body is defended on the basis of the desire for wisdom. If the interlocutor agrees that he also has the desire, the DD is meaningful. If he does not desire for wisdom, the DD

⁵⁴ “εἰ δ’ ὁρθῶς προϋθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡγύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.” (69d4–7). εἰσόμεθα should be translated as “we will know.” Rowe states: “By the end of the following main clause, however, ‘we’ has become virtually equivalent to ‘I’, since it is natural in the context to take ὀλίγον ὕστερον as applying at least primarily to S [ocrates].” (Rowe 1993, 151)

loses its foundation, because it cannot suggest any advantage of death for the interlocutor.

We also see that the DD also suggests a highly thoughtful way of argument regarding the goodness of death, which is not simply reduced to objective discussions. There are two subtle suggestions. First, the DD displays subjective or individual recognition of the desire. Second, Socrates retains epistemic modesty regarding wisdom. This epistemic modesty implies that the goodness of death is not suggested dogmatically.

Regarding the first point, Socrates mentions an occasion in which a philosopher is encouraged to separate his soul from the body (section 2 in this chapter). That occasion is depicted as a belief's striking that encourages the philosopher to separate his soul from the body (66b1–67b2, see Text 9). While Socrates does not explain the origin of the belief, the possession of philosophical desire is a critical criterion of receiving the belief. Moreover, it is remarkable that discussion is not the origin of the desire, but discussions about the belief arise after that belief's striking (67b1–2). Thus, Socrates presupposes the individual possession of the desire for wisdom in the DD. Regarding the second point, Socrates retains epistemic modesty about wisdom and his conditions as a philosopher. A philosopher can obtain wisdom only after death (66e1–4), therefore, death can be defended as a method to obtain wisdom. Socrates also says that he will see soon whether he philosophises correctly or not (69c8–d7, Text 13). In other words, he retains epistemic modesty about whether his life is truly good or not. This point is concerned with the exchange metaphor (section 3). A philosopher does not have wisdom in this life, thus, he cannot be truly virtuous. However, he can recognize that ordinary people merely have fake virtues. He understands that wisdom is the final goal and that the true virtue can be obtained only by wisdom. By that understanding, he makes effort to get wisdom and live his life better than ordinary people.

The self-discovery of intellectual desire offers a guiding principle for a philosopher. However, it does not easily give wisdom in this life. Thus, the philosopher must do his best continuously to obtain wisdom following the desire. The DD suggests that requirement of a philosopher's continuous effort by depicting subjective forms of recognition of desire and Socrates' epistemic modesty regarding wisdom.

Chapter 2. The Soul and Self-discovery in Recollection

—The Recollection Argument (72e1–77a7)—

Introduction to Chapter 2

We have seen that the philosopher is defined by his desire to know the Forms. It is also important for the interlocutor to recognize that desire. We will see a similar importance in the Recollection Argument (hereafter shortened to RA). The RA is usually understood as an argument demonstrating our prenatal knowledge and the immortality of the soul based on the existence of such knowledge. However, we should note that the RA also suggests the importance of the actual practice of that recollection. We hear at the beginning of Simmias' argument that he needs to experience recollection for himself (73b6–10). I. N. Robins interprets Simmias' statement as signifying self-understanding.⁵⁵ I agree with Robins' interpretation of Simmias' request. Moreover, I argue that the discovery of intellectual desire within the self is found by experiencing recollection.

The RA employs two critical points in order to demonstrate the soul's immortality. The first point is that the agent of recollection begins recollecting from sensible things, but the object of recollection cannot be obtained by the senses alone. The second point is that the sensible things have some insufficiency compared to the objects that the agent recollects. Based on these two points, Socrates proposes that the soul has knowledge that is independent of the body's senses and that it must have acquired this knowledge before birth.

In terms of these two fundamental grounds, this chapter asserts that there are three implicit but notable ideas in the text which support the presence of the theme of self-discovery in *Phaedo* and furthermore bring out a specific means of this self-discovery.

⁵⁵ Robins 1997, 438.

One is that Socrates, by offering the examples of recollection, defines the character of the person who recollects y from x as a “lover” (73d6–11). The agents can potentially recollect anything they have previously known it before. For example, when people see the portrait of Simmias, some recollect Simmias himself, but others recollect other person or things which are related to Simmias. However, I assert that if the person greatly loves Simmias very much, he would tend to recollect Simmias. The “love” in an agent influences his recollection. Moreover, a person recollects the original of the portrait because of his love of the original. A philosopher is such a lover of the original.

Second, Socrates seems to inquire into Simmias’ experience in terms of finding the difference between sensible things and what is recollected from the sensible things (74b4–c2). The equal things can sometimes appear as unequal; conversely, “the Equals themselves” never appear unequal. Socrates asks whether those cases emerge in Simmias’ experiences: “Well, have the Equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal, or has equality ever appeared as in equality?”⁵⁶ (74c1–2)

Third, Socrates states that the sensible things “are eager to be” the Forms as if things have willingness (75b4–9). The agent of recollection realizes that the particular perceptible things are inferior to the recollected object, and thus “are eager to be” like the recollected object. To what does this “eagerness” refer? Some scholars think that it refers to the teleological or cosmic structure of this world. However, David Sedley attributes it to the agent’s motivation in recollection.⁵⁷ I think the latter notion more correctly adheres to the context of this discussion; however, it is also necessary to explain why Socrates uses phrasing which gives the sensible things a kind of willingness.

⁵⁶ τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;

⁵⁷ Sedley 2006, 326.

These three points suggest that practising recollection reveals not only our intellectual ability to do so, but also our own subjective desire to make use of the ability. This revelation is a process of self-discovery.

This chapter is divided into the following four sections:

1. Practice of Recollection: what is Simmias' intention in the RA?
2. Conditions and examples of recollection.
3. The willingness of sensible things to be the Forms.
4. What aspect of our souls does exist before we are born?—The demonstration of immortality of the soul in the RA.

1. Practice of Recollection: what is Simmias' intention in the RA?

The RA is introduced by one of the two main discussants, Cebes, (72e1–73a3). He posits that Socrates' previous claim in the Cyclical Argument (69e–72d), that living people emerge from dead people and the souls of the dead exist, is in accordance with the RA which defines our learning as recollection. According to the RA, we have learned in the previous time what we recollect, which suggests that we exist before we are born. Answering Simmias' request to help him to remember the idea of recollection, Cebes adds further points that are similar to recollection as it is depicted in Plato's *Meno*. When people are questioned appropriately, they answer accurately. If the knowledge was not in them, they would not be able to do so (73a7–b2).

Socrates proposes a further argument supporting the claim that learning is recollection since Simmias seems to doubt Cebes' explanation. However, Simmias' answer is different from Socrates' assumption:

Text 1

‘No, I don’t doubt it, ‘said Simmias, ‘but I need to undergo the very thing that the theory is about: recollecting.’ (73b6-7, emphasis mine)

Ἀπιστῶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ἣ δ’ ὅς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. (73b6-7, emphasis mine)

Remarkably, Simmias divides recollection itself from the argument, and he wants to experience (παθεῖν) recollection himself. As Robins points out, Simmias differs from Meno, the main discussant in the dialogue *Meno*, who does not attempt recollection despite witnessing Socrates demonstrating it in a conversation with a slave boy (*Meno* 82b–86d).⁵⁸ This actual experience of recollection is important because it will persuade him that his own soul might have had the function of recollecting and therefore might have existed before this life.

The Greek text in the Oxford Classical Text quoted above replaces μαθεῖν (to learn) at 73b7 with παθεῖν (to experience) following Heindorf, although μαθεῖν is supported in the main manuscripts of β, T, and δ. The translation of the original main manuscripts would be “I need to learn the thing itself that the theory is about, recollecting.”⁵⁹ This reading also retains the important point that Simmias himself needs to recollect for himself, although it does so quite subtly. Socrates (and Cebes’ summary of Socrates’ RA) claims that the so-called “learning” is “recollection” (73b5), that learning is identical to recollecting. If this is correct, in order to “learn” the argument of recollection, Simmias must “recollect” the argument, since learning *is* recollection. Thus, if we adopt μαθεῖν in this passage, Simmias must do the recollection. If the RA is correct, Simmias already has knowledge of it. Merely listening to the argument and gaining the knowledge of

⁵⁸ Robins 1997, 438–439.

⁵⁹ Dixsaut adopts this reading. She says Heindorf’s correction flattens the text and make the irony disappeared (“... mais elle aplatit le texte et en fait disparaître l’ironie”) (Dixsaut 1991, 345. n.129).

recollection as new information will not suffice to persuade him. He must recollect it himself and confirm that he already knew it.

Considering Simmias' request, we should note that the dialogue implies that the RA must not be just a castle in the sky, but something that Simmias himself can experience himself and that he must confirm for himself through the recollection. This individual and direct experience seems to be external to the discussion.

2. The conditions and examples of recollection

Socrates originates his new version of the RA. In this section, I argue that the RA also suggests the internal conditions of an agent of recollection by analysing the conditions and examples of recollection. Specifically, I will propose that the agent of recollection has the desire to recollect the Forms. In the previous section, we find the importance of Simmias' experience of recollection. If he is to truly achieve recollection, he must have the desire as the suggested agent does. Simmias serves as a principal example of recollection in the RA. In this sense, it must be examined whether Simmias himself can be the agent of recollection.

This reading prescribes a specific condition for the agent of recollection. Therefore, it rejects a reading asserting that the RA demonstrates learning of general concepts by everyone (e.g. equality).⁶⁰ Dominic Scott also rejects such a reading. He claims the recollection belongs to philosophical thought and the agent of recollection is limited to philosophers.⁶¹ I agree with Scott that this recollection

⁶⁰ Lee Franklin calls this type of reading "ordinary interpretations" (Franklin 2005, 289). The following commentators traditionally adopt this reading: Hackforth 1955, 75. Ackrill 1973, 177. Bostock 1986, 67–68. However, Bostock carefully deals with this problem. He understands two possible answers, one is that everyone will know that the equal itself, the other is that only a philosopher can know that. He points out several interpretative problems in the latter reading and chooses the ordinary interpretation.

⁶¹ Scott 1995, 53–73. Specifically, he claims as follows: "I hope to show that recollection is only involved in philosophical thinking, that the 'we' are the philosophical earnest and that

is not for ordinary people. However, I must also point out an additional aspect in the RA. Simmias seems to be a student of mathematics (or a Pythagorean)⁶² and follower of the theory of Forms, therefore, he is not an ordinary person. However, he is depicted as not fully understanding recollection and doubting Socrates' argument for the soul's immortality. Simmias discovers his intellectual ability and desire through doing accomplishing recollection. Moreover, he needs to speculate whether he can agree with the process of recollection suggested by Socrates through practising recollection by himself.

The main argument of recollection is roughly divided into the following parts.

- The conditions and examples of recollection 73c1–74a8
- The Recollection in the case of equal: 74a9–75a4
- The relationship between the equal things and the Equal itself (or the Equals themselves): 75a5–75b9
- The demonstration of the pre-existence of the soul 75b10–77a7

Moreover, 73c1–74a8 can be divided into four subsections:

- First Condition of recollection (73c1–4):
If a person recollects y from x, he knew y before.
- Second Condition of the Recollection (73c5–d2):
When a person perceives x, he notices y and knowledge of x and y are different.
- Examples of the Recollection (73d3–74a1)
- Third and Fourth Conditions (74a2–8):

there is a double origin theory at work in the *Phaedo*. I shall end by discussing the way in which the theory of recollection is epistemologically pessimistic." (ibid., 54).

⁶² He seems to be a student of Philolaus, who was a Pythagorean philosopher (61d6–7). See Sedley and Long 2010, xxiii and 47. n.10.

Third Condition: Recollection emerges both from similar and dissimilar things.

Fourth Condition: Whenever a person recollects from similar things, he considers whether x falls short of y in terms of similarity.

I analyse these conditions and examples and emphasize the importance of intellectual desire in a philosopher.

2-1. First Condition of recollection

Text 2

We agree, I take it, that if someone is going to recollect something, he must know it at some earlier time. (73c1–3)

This first condition is the most general one that Socrates gives to the idea of recollection. Recollection is not obtaining new information. The agent of recollection must have known it before. However, if knowing x includes knowing y, recollection cannot claim his earlier obtaining of y. Thus, Socrates sets out further conditions that specify the recollection in our epistemic acts.

2-2. Second Condition of recollection

Socrates establishes the second condition as follows:

Text 3

Now do we also agree that whenever knowledge comes in the following sort of way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? ⁶³ I'll tell you. Suppose

⁶³ Socrates' asking himself such a question might seem strange. Why does he need to ask himself what he knows, and is now attempting to tell? Indeed, Gallop suggests a different reading of the text following Verdenius: "I mean in some such way as this" (Gallop 1975,

someone sees or hears or has some other perception of one thing, and not only recognizes that thing, but also comes to think of something else which is the object not of the same knowledge but of a different one: aren't we right to say that he recollected this second thing, the one of which he had the thought.⁶⁴ (73c5–d1)

This second condition includes distinctive steps of cognition. When we perceive a thing, we do not only recognize the sensible object, but also notice the other object. In addition, knowledge of the recognized object is different from that of the noticed object. Thus, there are two distinctive steps that begin from perception, namely, “to recognize” (γινώσκειν) and “to notice” (ἐννοεῖν). The objects of these two distinctive kinds of cognition must belong to different kinds of knowledge. The recollection must include a transition, both in the form of cognition and the object of that cognition. Socrates uses the word “whenever” in considering this condition of recollection. If cognition fulfils the condition, we can always call it recollection. Thus, it seems a sufficient condition for recollection. However, the meaning of this condition is not so clear to Simmias, who consequently asks “what do you mean?” (73d2), and Socrates provides some examples.

2-3. Examples of recollection

Socrates uses the following examples to explain those two kinds of cognition and different items of knowledge according to the second condition.

20, 229). However, this self-asking rather fits the topic of recollection. Socrates needs to check his ideas in his mind by asking himself, recollecting correctly, and then telling it to his friend. The correct answer is not always at the front of our minds. Sometimes we need to search it within ourselves.

⁶⁴ “ἐάν τις τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ’ ἄλλη, ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔλαβεν;” (73c7–d1)

Example1. The knowledge of a person is different from that of a lyre. (73d3–4). When the lovers (οἱ ἐρασταί) of a boy see the lyre that their beloved boy regularly used, they experience the following. The lovers see the lyre and the boy's appearance comes to mind. (73d6–10)

Through this example, the second condition appears clearer. In Example 1, they use two kinds of cognition: perceiving the lyre and having the beloved boy's appearance in their mind. Furthermore, the lyre and its possessor (the beloved boy) belong to different kinds of knowledge; we cannot gather any information about the possessor from perceiving the lyre. If someone sees the lyre and imagines the strings of the lyre, it is not recollection, because the strings are perceived as the lyre is observed, we cannot say that they belong to different kinds of knowledge.

These explanations not only clarify what is implied by the first and second conditions, but also add a new factor. Socrates states that the lovers have the appearance of the beloved boy in their mind from the perception of the lyre. This example fits the first two conditions: first, the appearance is not seen directly by the agents, and instead is seen in the form of memory. It is possible because the lovers knew the beloved boy. Second, seeing the lyre and imagining the boy are different both in terms of the contents of information and the epistemic form. The lyre and the boy are clearly different kinds of things, and the perception differs from the image in the memory. Furthermore, the example defines the subject of recollection as the lover, which is a new factor that is not included in the two conditions. If someone unconcerned with the boy sees the lyre, he would not necessarily recollect the boy. It is more probable that he will recollect, for example, his own lyre. We can recollect anything based on our perceptions when we follow the first and second conditions. However, by defining the subject of recollection as lovers, Socrates suggests the probability that those people will recollect the

specific object, namely, the appearance of the beloved boy.⁶⁵ In this sense, this example does not merely exemplify the conditions; it rather offers a new factor that specifies recollection: the subject of recollection has a tendency to recollect a specific object because of his love for what he recollects.

Socrates suggests additional examples of recollection:

(The object of perception) —> (The object of recollection)

Example 2. Simmias—> Cebes (73d10–11)

Example 3. The picture of the horse and the lyre—> The picture of the person (who possesses them) (73e5–6)

Example 4. The picture of Simmias—> Cebes (73e6–7)

Example 5. The picture of Simmias—> Simmias himself (73e9–10)

Furthermore, Socrates adds two more conditions:

Third Condition: Recollection “happens from similar things” and “dissimilar things” in all of those examples.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Koike (2007) calls this kind of recollection an erotic linking recollection, positing that the agent of recollection has an erotic intention that link the paradeigma (or the absolute) with the image (138–142). My idea follows his thought. Koike also seems to see some erotic and dynamic power of recollection in the agent. Nightingale also emphasizes the importance of erotic desire in understanding the self in Plato’s concept, although she focuses on *Phaedrus*: “In order to attain self-knowledge, in sum, Socrates must not only examine his own arguments and actions (as in early dialogues) but also understand the nature of the soul and its cosmic peregrinations and transformations. To grasp the nature of the soul, Socrates must apprehend its erotic desire for the Forms (and feel this desire in his own soul) and also contemplate the Forms themselves” (Nightingale 2010, 23).

⁶⁶ “So, in view of all these, doesn’t it follow that recollection happens from similar things, but happens from dissimilar things too?” (74a2–3).

Fourth Condition: When one recollects something in the case of recollection within similar things, it is necessary that he thinks whether that thing falls short of the thing that he recollected.⁶⁷

Considering all the examples, Socrates suggests (in a form of question) that recollection happens from both similar and dissimilar things. As far as we see those examples, only the Example 5 (The picture of Simmias—>Simmias himself) can belong to recollection from similar things. Recollection of Simmias from his picture of Simmias is based upon the similarity between those two objects. Alternatively, the other examples emphasize that the catalyst of recollection is the difference between the things perceived and the object of recollection.

At first glance, Simmias' picture seems to always provoke people to recollect the original (Simmias himself), since the picture was originally created for that purpose. However, as Socrates has suggested in the case of recollecting Cebes from the picture of Simmias, some might instead recollect Cebes from the picture of Simmias. The appearance of Simmias must be provoked once in that person who recollect Cebes, yet the direct object of his recollection appears as Cebes. Even if the starting point of recollection is the same (the picture of Simmias), the direct objects of the recollection can be different for each person (some recollect Simmias, others recollect Cebes). Thus, the source of the difference of the objects recollected belongs not only to the thing provoking recollection, but also to the state of the recollecting person. Socrates' definition of the agent of recollection as "lovers" in the example of recollection of the beloved boy by observing the lyre is concordant with this assertion. When people look at the picture of Simmias, some

⁶⁷ "But whenever it is from *similar* things that one recollects something, is it not true that one inevitably has the following experience as well: that of thinking whether or not in its similarity it in some way falls short of the thing one has recollected?" (74a5-7).

"Ἀλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐδ' ἀνεμνήσθη;" (74a5-7)

may recollect another person, but some may recollect the original of the picture, Simmias.⁶⁸ The latter people are concerned with the original when they look at the portrait; in other words, they have a motive to recollect the original.

The fourth condition—that the agent of recollection necessarily thinks shortcomings in the perceptible things—has caused many commentators’ queries. Is it really “necessary”(ἀναγκαῖον) that the agent thinks the shortcomings?⁶⁹ In order to make this fourth condition intelligible, we must make some presumptions. First, this condition focuses on recollection from similar things, specifically here, Simmias’ image or portrait. If the object of perception is a portrait or a copy made to resemble the original, the agent will compare the copy with the original.⁷⁰ However, it is not necessary that the observer perceives the copy’s shortcomings, because, as Socrates suggested, another agent might recollect Cebes from the Simmias’ image. Yet, when the agent is eager to have the originals, he tends to see everything based on that motivation. As far as he desires for the originals, any images of them appear as shortcomings, because images are never identical to their originals. If we assume, for the fourth condition, that the agent of recollection is

⁶⁸ Some people might tend to recollect Simmias because of their love for Simmias, not because of love of the original. This interpretation seems to fit the example of recollection of the beloved boy from the lyre. However, in the case of a picture, the relationship between an original and its copy is also emphasized except the character of Simmias. I think the phrase “Simmias himself”(not just Simmias) in the Greek texts of Example 5 emphasizes a meaning of ‘original’ more than that of a specific person: “οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι;” (73e9-10, emphasis mine)

⁶⁹ cf. Ackrill 1973, 184–185; Gallop 1975, 118; Bostock 1986, 65.

⁷⁰ Dixsaut expresses a different viewpoint. She thinks the example of portrait and the original belongs to the case of recollection from similar things. In this case, according to Dixsaut, the difference is not evident. Therefore, it might not fulfil the second condition. So in order to see the difference, the lack of resemblance must be sought (Dixsaut 1991, 345. n.134). Indeed, according to the second condition, the perceived objects and the recollected objects must be different. Dixsaut seems to claim that the differences in the case of the portrait appear as shortcomings. This interpretation is plausible. However, it is not clear yet whether we can use this interpretation in order to explain that necessity. According to the second condition, the agent must see differences between the two objects. But can we say that the difference necessarily shows shortcomings? I also think that the shortcomings originate from the differences. I consider together the role of agent’s love in his recollection of the original, which causes shortcomings to appear when comparing the different things.

motivated thus, and that only the cases of recollection of originals from copies are considered, we would observe a high probability that the agent thinks about shortcomings.⁷¹ Such shortcomings can be investigated when there exists a standard or original by which to evaluate its copy. After establishing these four conditions and asserting the agent of recollection's motivation, Socrates moves on to discuss the example of equality.

2-4. The Recollection in the case of equal 74a9–75a4

Recollection is investigated through the example of equal things. Socrates first sets forth a confirmation as follows:

Text 4

Socrates:

So, in view of all these, doesn't it follow that recollection happens from similar things, but happens from dissimilar things too?

Simmias:

Yes, it does follow. (74a2–4)

Socrates divides recollection into two kinds; that from similar things and that from dissimilar things (the Third Condition). To what does Socrates refer by the distinction? This confirmation follows from the examples of recollection, recollecting Cebes from the picture of Simmias, and recollecting Simmias himself from the picture. We must concede that Simmias' picture is similar to the original (Simmias), and that the picture of Simmias is dissimilar to Cebes. Thus, we can say

⁷¹ I must admit that it is not sufficient yet for "being necessary." I need to weaken the meaning of "ἀναγκαῖον." Rowe comments on this passage as follows: "Whether in such cases [...] we always, and necessarily, think consciously 'is this a good likeness?' seems doubtful. But all that the argument will require is that we *can* do so..." (Rowe 1993, 167).

that recollection from similar things refers to the type of recollection of an original from its copy.

Socrates suggests an additional experience in the case of recollection from similar things, which is the Fourth Condition.

Text 5

Socrates:

But whenever it is from *similar* things that one recollects something, is it not true that one inevitably has the following experience as well: that of thinking whether or not in its similarity it in some way falls short of the thing one has recollected."

Simmias:

'Yes, inevitably,' he said." (74a5–8)

In the case of recollection from similar things, it follows necessarily that we consider whether the things by which we recollect something has some shortcomings with respect to its similarity to what is recollected. Indeed, when we see Simmias' picture, we would expect to be aware of the picture's shortcomings in its similarity to Simmias himself, since any picture cannot be perfect as far as it is a copy of its original. Confirming this additional experience in recollection from similar things as the Fourth Condition, Socrates introduces the example of equals.

Text 6

Socrates:

'Consider then,' said he, 'if this is the case. We say, I take it, that there is an Equal—I don't mean a stick equal to another stick, or a stone equal to a stone, or anything else of the kind, but something else besides all these, the Equal itself. Should we say that there is such a thing or not?

Simmias

‘Indeed we should,’ said Simmias, ‘emphatically so!’ (74a9–b1)

Socrates introduces the Equal itself which scholars also refer to as the Form of Equal.⁷² The term “the Equal itself” is not the same kind of equality as that found in equal sticks, stones or other such things. The Equal itself is something else besides all the equal things. We can say that the Equal itself is different from the equal things, and difference is the criterion in the second condition of recollection; thus it seems that Socrates asserts this case in order to fulfill the condition as a recollection. In the following short question and answer session (74b1–2), Socrates and Simmias admit that “we” know what the Equal itself is. This agreement addresses to the first condition, which asserts that we must know the object of the recollection when we recollect something.

Socrates then explains the difference between the Equal itself and the equal things in the following sentences, requiring us to consider the Greek texts because of their grammatical difficulties and his use of an unusual term “the Equals themselves.”

Text 7

Socrates:

Having got the knowledge of it from where? Wasn’t it from the things we were just mentioning? Upon seeing that either sticks or stones or some other things were equal, wasn’t it from them that we came to think of it, different as it is from them? Or doesn’t it appear different to you? Consider it in this way as well. Don’t equal stones and sticks sometimes, despite being the same ones, appear at one time equal, at another not?”

Simmias:

Certainly (74b4–10, emphasis mine)

⁷² See Burnet 1911, 55; Gallop 1975, 119.

Socrates:

Well, have the Equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal, or has equality ever appeared as inequality?

Simmias:

No, not yet any rate, Socrates. (74c1–3, emphasis mine)

Greek texts of Text 7

Socrates

Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἅττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὃν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆδε. ἄρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίστε ταῦτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ;

Simmias

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. (74b4–10, emphasis mine)

Socrates:

Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;

Simmias:

Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. (74c1–3, emphasis mine)

The reason that the difference emerges is that equal things can be unequal in some conditions but the Equals themselves never appear to be unequal. However, we must confront one of the most problematic texts in *Phaedo* in order to clarify the conditions. The sentence I have emphasized in Text 7 have two different possible readings. The Oxford Classical Text adopts the manuscript β, and the texts are suggested as (a) “τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ” (74b8). However, manuscripts T, W, P, Q, and Λ suggests the text as (b) “τότε ἴσα φαίνεται, τότε δ' οὐ.”

If we adopt the first text (a), there are two possible readings:

The first reading, (a)-1, asserts that equal stones and sticks, while remaining the same, appear to one person to be equal and to another person to be unequal ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ as a masculine personal pronoun).⁷³

The second reading, (a)-2, asserts that equal stones and sticks, while remaining the same, appear to be equal to one thing and not-equal to the other thing ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ as neuter pronoun).⁷⁴

Conversely, adopting text (b) offers one reading:

(b): equal stones and sticks, while remaining the same, appear to be equal at one time and unequal at another (Replacing $\tau\tilde{\omega}$ with $\tau\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$, sometime or at that time).⁷⁵

All of the readings are grammatically possible and are supported in the manuscripts. In the passages above, Socrates also explains the characteristic of the Equals themselves to which those of the perceptible things are compared. Through the comparison, the difference between them is suggested. The text shows, in a very short sentence, that the Equals themselves “never” appear to be unequal.

Considering the contrast between the equal things and the Equals themselves, I claim that the third reading (b) is the most apt. First, I suggest that there are problems in the first reading, (a)-1, which presumes different observers of the sensible things. Considering that the Equals themselves never appeared to be unequal for Simmias, he is fixed as the observer of the characteristics of the Equal themselves. Conversely, in the statements of the characteristic of sensible things, at first glance, Socrates does not seem to mention “you,” namely, Simmias. However, Socrates begins this question by asking, “Or doesn’t it appear different to you?” (74b6–7) Then, when describing both kinds of characteristics, Socrates supposes that Simmias is a fixed observer of the characteristics. Moreover, in the reading (a)-1, a significant problem arises when contrasting the sensible things and

⁷³ Grube adopts this reading in his translation of *Phaedo*. *Plato Complete Works*.

⁷⁴ Rowe 1993, 169.

⁷⁵ Sedley 2007, 78–9.

the Form. If the characteristic of the sensible things is in disagreement amongst the observers of the property, the characteristic of the Form should also be evaluated using the same standard. That is, ‘everyone’ must unanimously admit that the Form of Equal never appears unequal in order to make a contrast. How is it, then, that Simmias alone can represent the unanimous agreement?⁷⁶ It is possible that he just represents the one view of the opposing appearances of the sensible equal things.

Reading (a)-2 does not have the critical problem found in (a)-1, which causes the contrast to malfunction. Some sticks seem to be equal and unequal depending on the length of the sticks to which they are compared. However, as David Sedley notes, there is a different problem in the reading (a)-2.⁷⁷ When we say “equal sticks” or “equal stones,” we assume that (at least) two sticks are equal to one another. If someone compares these equal sticks to additional items, the equality within the set still remains. The further item can be equal or unequal to each set of sticks, but their primary equality to one another does not cease.

Considering these defects, readings (a)-1 and (a)-2 should be rejected. Reading (b) has an advantage concerning this contrast. In terms of the characteristics of the Equals themselves, Socrates clearly asks Simmias whether the Equals themselves “ever” (ὅτε) appear as unequal, and Simmias answers, “No not yet at any rate” (οὐδέπω ποτέ). Socrates’ central point is the possibility of an occasion in which the Form accepts being its opposite. If we adopt reading (b), we can see a clear contrast: the sensible equal things sometimes appear to be equal and sometimes unequal, changing their properties in each occasion, which reveals their lack of stability. Conversely, the Equals themselves “never” appear to be unequal.

⁷⁶ Sedley has already pointed out the similar problem (Sedley 2007, 78).

⁷⁷ Sedley 2007, 76.

It should be noted that Socrates asks about Simmias' own observations of the characteristics of the sensible things and the Form in Text 7.⁷⁸ Simmias certainly has seen that the equal sticks and stones easily can appear as unequal. However, the Equals themselves never appear to him to be unequal. This contrast between the sensible things and the Form is understood exactly in Simmias' thought, not just as an objective theory. Based on his own admission, Simmias understands the difference between them. Yet, although that admission includes personal commitment, the stability of the Equals themselves is not just experiential. Simmias and other people can be persuaded objectively that Simmias will never experience the Equal itself appearing unequal, because such an occasion would demolish the definition of the Equal itself. It is like assuming a spherical triangle: even if we draw millions of triangles, we will never see a spherical one.

Moreover, there have been controversies about the Equals themselves. Why does this argument describe them in the plural form? The Just itself, the Good itself and the Beauty itself are introduced as the targets of a philosopher's search (65d4–d7); the Equal itself should be considered on par with these entities. Indeed, within this RA, Socrates says that the argument is concerned with the Equal itself, the Beauty itself, the Just itself and the Piety itself (75c10–d2). In the passage at 75c10–d2, each of these entities is described in the singular form. Therefore, the plural form of the Equals themselves at 74c1 is conspicuous.

Some scholars think that this plural term indicates some special entity which is distinguished from the Form; for example, the mathematical objects (Burnet, Hackforth),⁷⁹ and the immanent forms or Form copies, which is introduced in the later argument of *Phaedo* (Bluck).⁸⁰ However, Socrates does not

⁷⁸ "Having got the knowledge of it from where? Wasn't it from the things we were just mentioning? Upon seeing that either sticks or stones or some other things were equal, wasn't it from them that we came to think of it, different as it is from them? Or doesn't it appear different to you?" (74b4–7). "Well, have the Equals themselves ever appeared to you unequal, or has equality ever appeared as inequality?" (74c1–2)

⁷⁹ Burnet 1911, 56. Hackforth 1955, 69.

⁸⁰ Bluck 1959, 5–11.

hint at introducing such new concepts in his compressed argument here. We should focus on the point he clearly expresses in the RA, which is Simmias' experience of thinking about the difference. Simmias has certainly seen many equal things, for example, equal sticks, stones and so on, as Socrates suggests. Simmias might recollect the Equal itself on each occasion. However, these occasions have never shown him that the Equal itself appeared unequal and they will never do so. Thus, following Kurihara's claim, I think this plurality of experience or occasion is best described in the plural form.⁸¹ The term "the Equals themselves" refers to the examples of the Equal itself which have been recollected from equal sticks, stones and other things. The Equal themselves are found in plural cases, sticks, stones and so on. However, on each occasion, they recollect the Form itself that can never be unequal. The metaphysical status of the Equals themselves is not different from that of the Equal itself, because the Equals themselves still belong to the kind of the Form. However, Socrates asks Simmias' experiences to consider the Form, then, that context depicts "the Equals themselves" in the plural form.

Socrates and Simmias have confirmed the difference between the sensible equal things and the Equal itself, but they have also admitted that the knowledge of Form comes from the sensible things: "'But still,' he said, 'it's from these equal things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have nonetheless thought of and got the knowledge of it?'" (74c7–9).

They move to the next step, in which they discuss the deficiencies of the sensible things. Socrates suggests that they see shortcomings in the sensible equal things when they compare them with the Equal itself:

Text 8

Socrates:

⁸¹ This interpretation follows Kurihara's idea (Kurihara 2013, 142).

‘Well then,’ he said, ‘do we experience something like the following as regards what happens in the case of sticks and, more generally, the equal things we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same manner as what Equal itself is? Alternatively, do they in some way fall short of it when it comes to being like the Equal? Or in no way?’

Simmias:

‘They fall *far* short,’ said Simmias. (74d4–8)

In what way do they agree on the shortcomings? This is not clear from a literal reading of the text. This argument regarding the shortcomings immediately follows Socrates’ clarification of the differences between two kinds of equality (equal things and the Equal itself). Thus, as Nakagawa suggests, we should find the reason for the shortcomings in the argument about the difference.⁸² As we have already seen, Socrates says that equal things appear to be equal sometimes, but at other times they appear to be unequal. Conversely, the Equals themselves never appear to be unequal. In that sense, the equal things lack the stability to maintain their equality. As we see in Text 7, the equal things can easily become unequal. Furthermore, they depend on the Form of Equal for being equal (this point is not discussed in the RA. We will examine this causality in Chapter 5 of this thesis that analyses the Final Argument of *Phaedo*).

Socrates depicts the thought in the mind of the person who find the shortcomings. It shows a kind of inner subjective speaking about the relationship between the sensible things and the Form. Socrates illustrates that thought as follows:

Text 9

Socrates:

⁸² Nakagawa 2000, 61.

Now do we agree that whenever someone, upon seeing something, thinks “What I am now seeing wants to be like some other real thing, but falls short and can’t be like it, and instead is inferior”, the person who thinks this must presumably have actually known beforehand the thing he says it resembles but fall short of?

Simmias:

Yes, he must. (74d9-e6, emphasis mine)

Socrates:

Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὁ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;

Simmias

Ἀνάγκη. (74d9-e6, emphasis mine)

In this statement, Plato remarkably depicts a subjective thought or inner discourse in a person. This person thinks or realizes the shortcomings by himself, and he knows beforehand the Equal itself. This recognition of the shortcomings is the touchstone for deciding whether that person had prior knowledge of the Form.

Christopher Gill interprets internal dialogues or monologues in Greek thought from the “objective-participant view”:⁸³ the monologues of heroes in Homeric works (i.e. those of Achilles and Hector) are presented as means-end deliberation.⁸⁴ They are not concerned about self-awareness nor “I” as the locus of self-awareness, as Cartesian thought suggests.⁸⁵ Gill also reads the internal dialogue of the soul in the *Republic* from the objective-participant view point. He

⁸³ Gill 1996, 59.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 53–55.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 58.

claims "... the *Republic*, as we have seen, presents intrapsychic activity as an internal dialogue: one part (or the person himself) 'rules' or 'persuades' other parts, which do or do not 'agree' with this rule. As elsewhere (in Homer as well as Greek philosophy), there is no reason to take this as indicating the (quasi-Cartesian) assumption that all intrapsychic activity is accompanied by a conscious inner dialogue."⁸⁶ Therefore, Gill will not admit that the fact there is a monologue here is an evidence of a subjective aspect in *Phaedo*.

However, in this text, it is important that Simmias admits that the agent of recollection thinks "What I am now seeing wants to be like some other real thing" (74d9–10), because this passage is a part of the demonstration of recollection that supports for the immortality of the soul. If Simmias is concerned about his own soul's immortality, he must seriously consider whether he is really persuaded that he himself does have such a thought process in recollection. This is a specific context in *Phaedo* that is different from that of the *Republic*, although death and immortality can be an absolute topic for any human beings. It is important in this passage that Simmias considers whether the process in the agent of recollection is applied to Simmias himself. Simmias himself, as we have already seen in Section 1 in this chapter, wants to experience recollection. The recognition of that what 'I' see "wants to be some other real thing" is also a necessary experience for him if he is to thoroughly experience recollection.

Moreover, it is important to note here that this discourse subtly introduces an important additional point that the perceptible thing "wants to be" (βούλεται...εἶναι) like the Form (or the real thing). Socrates continuously addresses this willingness in the following concluding passage about the pre-existence of knowledge:

Text 10

⁸⁶ Ibid., 252–253.

In that case, we must have known the Equal before the time when we first, upon seeing equal things, came to think: “All these are seeking to be like the Equal, but fall short of it.” (74e9–75a3, emphasis mine)

Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὁρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. (74e8–75a3, emphasis mine)

Socrates states that all equal things are “seeking to be like the Equal” (ὁρέγεται...εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον). In the previous argument, Socrates demonstrates the difference between the equal things and the Equals themselves, based on which he also suggests that the agent of recollection finds their shortcomings as compared to the Equal itself. We find that Socrates develops his argument about the relationship between the sensible things and the Form (or the object of recollection), through three steps: 1. Awareness of the difference between the sensible things and the Form. 2. Awareness of the shortcomings in the sensible things; and 3. Awareness of the willingness in the sensible things. However, the shortcomings do not necessarily suggest that kind of willingness. We can say that three is inferior to four by one, but cannot say that three is necessarily seeking to be four. Therefore, there must exist an implicit thought connecting the shortcomings and the willingness. How should we understand this willingness?

3. The willingness of sensible things to be the Form

Socrates explains the relationship between the perceptible things and the Form with describing their insufficiency:

Text 11

Then before we started seeing and hearing and using the other senses we presumably must in fact have possessed knowledge of what the Equal itself is, if we were going to refer perceived equals to it, thinking that all such things are eager to be like it but they are inferior to that.⁸⁷ (75b4-8, emphasis mine)

Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τᾶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ' εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. (75b4-8, emphasis mine)

What does it mean that the equal things are “eager to be” (προθυμεῖται... εἶναι) the Equal itself? Can things have such eagerness? There are at least three interpretations:

1. The dynamic kinship between the sensible things and the Form in the cosmic structure (D. White). White says as follows:

One answer, which must remain speculative at this point, is that if all sensible things are either alive or, if not alive, exist in relation to something fundamental that is living. If, that is, all things exist and interact with one

⁸⁷ In terms of only Text 11, I follow Sedley’s translation in 2006, which applies “thinking” (he probably applies the participle of ἐννοεῖν [to think]) before ὅτι (that) at 75b7 (Sedley 2006, 323). Franklin reads ὅτι as ‘because’ without adding any verb (Franklin 2005, 312). In this translation, the agent of recollection does not need to consciously compare those two kind of existence. The content in the ὅτι clause is the conclusion of “the philosophical discussion in which Socrates and Simmias compared sensible equals and Equality.” (ibid., 313). However, even considering Franklin’s claim, I retain my reading emphasizing the importance of recognition of the shortcomings, because I also claim the importance of Simmias’ own practice of recollection. As far as Simmias compares two kinds of equality following Socrates arguments, Simmias recognizes shortcomings in the sensible things in his experience of recollection.

another because of cosmic mind (*nous*), then all sensible things “strive” to reach a level of being—the Forms—which is much closer to the source of all activity—*nous*—than that occupied by the sensible things themselves.⁸⁸

2. Description of tendency of things (Burnet)

Burnet comments on the Greek word “wants to be” (βούλεται...εἶναι) at 74d10, as the phrase used to express a tendency.⁸⁹ Furthermore, he sees ὀρέγεται at 75a2 as equivalent to βούλεται.⁹⁰ In terms of προθυμεῖται, he says that it is “‘do their best,’ a still more picturesque way of expressing *tendency* than βούλεται and ὀρέγεται above.”⁹¹

3. The striving resides in the purposive agent in the case of geometry and portrait-painting (D. Sedley)⁹²

Thus, there are two general directions taken in the interpretation of the words that suggest things’ willingness. The first and second options attribute the cause of the willingness to the perceptible things: the first option, in particular, more positively admits the idea of a universal cosmic structure, based on which the sensible things have dynamism to strive to be the Form. The second option also admits that things has tendency to be the Forms, although this option determines the cause of the things’ tendency less than the first option does so. On the other hand, the third option attributes this willingness to the agent’s intention in recollection.

⁸⁸ White 1989, 93.

⁸⁹ Burnet 1911, 57.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 57.

⁹¹ Ibid., 58. C. J Rowe also seems to take this interpretation. He understands προθυμεῖται as a variation of βούλεται at 74d10. He translates βούλεται as “‘aims to be’, i.e. ‘tends towards being’” (Rowe 1993, 172).

⁹² Sedley 2006, 325–326.

The first and second options do not seem to correctly follow the context of *Phaedo*. In this RA, Socrates does not definitively address the cosmic structure that shows that sensible things want to be the Form, although, in the later part of *Phaedo*, he does suggest his ideal cosmology by criticizing the causal theories of natural science, including that of Anaxagoras (97d–99c). That cosmology should explain every phenomenon based on the idea of Goodness: “... they do not suppose for a moment that what is good and binding truly does bind and keep anything together” (99c5–6). However the theory that Goodness organizes everything is not necessarily identical to the claim that individual perceptible things want to be the Form. It is possible that the whole of universe is organized to be “good” while the individual, perceptible parts remain in an unstable condition without aiming to be good.

The second option seems to be a slightly weaker claim compared to the first because it does not consider the theory of cosmology that is not mentioned in the RA. However, do equal things really strive to be the Equal itself? Socrates explains in detail that the core concept distinguishing sensible things from the Form is that equal things easily appear as unequal.

The third option has an advantage when we review the passages in which the words suggesting the willingness are placed (Texts 9, 10, and 11). The phrase “wants to be” (βούλεται...εἶναι) at 74d10 in Text 9, “seek for being” (ὀρέγεται) at 75a2 in Text 10, “strive to be” (προθυμεῖται... εἶναι) at 75b7 in Text 11 are all placed inside the conjunctive ὅτι-clauses, and thus all of the clauses are the objects of the verb “to think.” Therefore, those kinds of willingness are captured in the agent of recollection’s thought. When we consider the insufficiency of things, those things seem to us to be willing to be the Form. Our comparison makes them appear to have willingness in our thought. Considering that, the third option appears most appropriate in the contexts of this argument.⁹³

⁹³ Sedley emphasizes the fact that Plato uses the equal: “As I have emphasized, because equality functions for him as a size relation, geometry is the most obvious discipline in

However, one problem still remains. If we attribute the willingness to the agent, why does the dialogue depict the things in a way that they ‘want’ to be something? We might be able to consider the problem in this way: the willingness cannot emerge without the intention of the agent. However, in the context that the agent investigates the recollection through the sensible things and the Form, he finds his own intention in their appearance. In other words, the cause of willingness is in the agent, but that willingness appears in the form of the relationship between the sensible things and the Forms. To use an analogy, the agent is a kind of projector and finds his own intellectual function and willingness to acquire the knowledge through the appearance of the things and the Form on the screen. In this sense, the agent clearly recognizes his own intellectual function and desire for knowing the Forms. The shortcomings of sensible things will appear vividly to one who espouses the Forms, revealing his own intellectual desire in a more persuasive way. As far as Simmias is an enthusiastic follower of the theory of Forms, this revelation would be persuasive to Simmias. I assert that this depiction of willingness suggests a conglomerate emergence of the insufficiency of the sensible things and the agent’s intellectual desire for knowing the Forms. Both the insufficiency and the agent’s desire can emerge individually. The sensible equal things usually lose their property of being equal, and a philosopher enthusiastically wants to know the Form. Recollection is a peculiar occasion in which the insufficiency of sensible things and the philosophical desire for the Forms can emerge at the same time in a philosopher or a candidate for the philosopher.

4. What of our souls exists before we are born?

—The immortality of the soul as demonstrated in the RA—

which it would be studied” (Sedley 2006, 325). He also says as follows: “The reason why ‘striving to be like’ makes sense in a context like geometry as well as in portrait-painting is that in both alike the striving resides in a purposive agent, working with or on a would-be likeness of some original.” (ibid., 326)

Socrates continues demonstrating the immortality of the soul after confirming the conditions of recollection, the difference between the sensible things and the Forms, and the shortcomings of the things. First, Socrates suggests the prenatal acquisition of the knowledge of the Forms based on the fact that we perceived things from the moment that we were born. From the first condition, the object of recollection must be acquired before the perception. Therefore, according to Socrates, “it seems that we must have got it [the knowledge of equal] before we were born” (75c1–2).

Here, Socrates seems to indicate a pre-existence of intellectual function within the soul that is independent from the body. However, he does not conclude the argument here, but instead expands upon it. We must have acquired not only the knowledge of the Equal itself but also that of all of the Forms, the Beauty, the Good, and the Just itself.

In terms of these Forms, Socrates suggests a question with two choices:

Alternative I. If we have not forgotten the knowledge after having obtained it, we must be always knowing it and must know it throughout our life. (75d7–e1)

Alternative II. If we have acquired the knowledge and lost it when we are born, but later acquire the knowledge of the Forms, restoring our own knowledge would be what we call learning. That restoring is called as recollecting. (75e2–8)

Simmias cannot choose one of these alternatives by himself. Socrates says that if we know things, we can offer an “account” (*logos*) of those things (76b8–9). But Simmias wonders whether he will have anyone capable of doing so “tomorrow”⁹⁴ (76b11), he does not think that everyone knows the Forms. Socrates and Simmias choose the alternative II, and agree that our souls acquire the knowledge before human beings are born (76c6–10). Socrates then reaches a conclusion:

⁹⁴ Probably, it means that Simmias cannot see such a person after Socrates dies.

Text 12

In that case, Simmias, our souls existed earlier as well, separate from bodies, before they were in human form, and they had wisdom. (76c11–12)

Ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. (76c11–12)

Why does Socrates suggest choosing between the alternatives to reach this conclusion, although he seems to have already demonstrated the existence of the prenatal knowledge at 75c1? In other words, what is the significance of the supposition that the knowledge has been forgotten? I think there are two important points in this conclusion which suggest that it is more than merely a demonstration of the existence of prenatal knowledge.

First, Socrates' conclusion is not concerned only with the immortality of the soul. It suggests that the soul exists before the body and has wisdom (*phronesis*) separate from the body. *Phronesis* appears 11 times before the RA in *Phaedo*.⁹⁵ Ten of those cases appear in the part of Socrates' Defence of Death (63e8–69e4), and the 11th is in Cebes' demand for proof that the soul is immortal and has "some power and wisdom" (70b3–4). In the Defence of Death, *phronesis* is clearly a target for philosophers. Moreover, Cebes needs both the immortality and wisdom of the soul in order to defend Socrates' initial claim that death is good for human beings. Therefore, their mission to demonstrate the soul's immortality cannot suggest only the continual existence of the soul, but it must show that the soul itself can originally have its own intellectual ability independently from the body. The argument of forgetting shows us that our having physical bodies deteriorates the soul's original abilities. In this context, the argument about forgetting teaches us that we had wisdom which we have lost, but that we should improve ourselves in order to eventually obtain wisdom after death.

⁹⁵ *Phaedo* 65a9, 66a6, 66e3, 68a2, 68a7, 68b4, 69a10, 69b3, 69b6, 69c2, 70b4.

The second point is that this conclusion distinguishes the soul from us or the human being, which is closely connected with the first point.⁹⁶ The soul itself differs from a human being, since it existed prior to entering into a human form. Thus “we” lack some innate ability, and forget the knowledge of the Form by gaining the body. It is through recollection that we become aware that our original soul is distinguished from our current disposition, and we are forced to improve ourselves or separate some part of us from another. The argument of forgetting is beneficial to promoting such self-awareness and self-improvement.

Simmias yet again objects to this conclusion regarding the existence of prenatal knowledge:

Text 13

Unless, perhaps, we get these items of knowledge at the time when we are being born, Socrates—that time is still left. (76c13–14)

Socrates rebuts Simmias’ argument by stating that “Well, my friend, in what other time do we lose them? Because of course we are not born with them in our grasp, as we just agreed.” (76d1–3): if they admit Simmias’ suggestion, they cannot see in what time the soul loses knowledge. So Socrates inquires as follows: “Or do we lose them at the very time when we get them? Or can you tell me some other time?” (76d3–4). Simmias answers, “Not at all, Socrates—I didn’t notice that there was nothing in what I was saying.” (76d5–6). However, he could cling to the former option.⁹⁷ For example, he can claim that we receive the knowledge at the moment of birth, and immediately forget it. We can recollect it after the forgetting. This claim is still possible. However, as Socrates says, it is still troublesome to explain the manner by which we forget the knowledge. Socrates attributes this to birth,

⁹⁶ Dorter correctly claims that there is a sharp distinction between us and our souls (Dorter 1982, 63).

⁹⁷ Some scholars point out that Simmias too easily gives in. Gallop 1975, 134; Dorter 1982, 64.

namely, soul's coming into the body. This accusation against the body coincides with the statements of the disturbance of the body that are suggested repeatedly within the discussions both in RA and the Defence of Death. Thus, the argument of forgetting is required to enable Simmias to re-acknowledge the detrimental effects of the body and the original intellectual ability of the soul.

Conclusion of Chapter 2

The RA offers the interlocutor remarkable self-awareness. Simmias recognizes his soul's intellectual ability and desire to know the Forms. This recognition is as important as the demonstration of soul's immortality. That point is also supported by the RA's introduction in which Simmias says that he wants to experience recollection: it is thus implicitly inquired of him as to whether he agrees with the process of recollection. Socrates also mentions the love in the agent of recollection when he establishes the conditions and examples of recollection. The agent's desire is presupposed in recollection of the Forms from sensible things.

Socrates also describes an occasion where the agent recognizes the shortcomings of perceptible things, which is remarkably expressed in a form of internal dialogue. As I argue in this chapter, that internal dialogues suggest the agent's self-awareness of the shortcomings. This point is emphasized by Socrates' use of the word 'I' (ἐγώ) in the passage. This recognition is also depicted in the line of thought asserting that sensible things want to be the Forms. I argue that this willingness should be understood as belonging to the agent of recollection. In these ways, the process of recollection suggested by Socrates requires the agent's desire for knowing the Forms.

The conclusion of the RA shows Simmias both the soul's original intellectual ability and the body's disturbance of it. If Simmias experiences recollection and agrees with the argument, he must also admit that he himself has the intellectual desire and ability in his soul. Self-discovery of one's own soul's

intellectual desire has an indispensable element in the RA. Simmias is required to have that desire. Through his experience of recollection, Simmias is prompted to discover that desire in his own soul.

Chapter 3. The Encouragement of Self-improvement in the Affinity Argument (78b4–84b7)

Introduction to Chapter 3

We have seen in the Recollection Argument (RA) that the philosopher has a peculiar intellectual desire, and that the interlocutor Simmias actually experiences recollection and recognizes the desire. The RA is also persuasive to the interlocutors as a demonstration of the soul's prenatal existence. However, as they point out, the argument does not show the soul's post-mortem existence. Socrates sees their fear of soul's dissipation after leaving the body, and offers the Affinity Argument (hereafter shortened to AA) in reply to the interlocutors. The AA posits the immortality of the soul based on its similarity to divine and indestructible existence. Some scholars have pointed out that similarity is not enough to connect the soul and immortality.⁹⁸ Even if the soul is similar to divine existence, this does not necessarily ensure its immortality.

In this chapter, I argue that the AA is not simply a demonstration of the soul's immortality, but rather entails a pursuit of the essential characteristics of the soul and an encouragement of the interlocutor's self-improvement. The interlocutors are required to make their soul's conditions to be the essential characteristics. Furthermore, the AA also suggests recognition of distance between the characteristics and one's own actual conditions.⁹⁹ Namely, it establishes the ideal conditions of the soul and shows that the soul can be either good or bad depending on how it makes use of its intellectual ability and manages the body.

⁹⁸ Rowe 1991, 165. Elton claims that the Affinity Argument is "to illustrate the pitfalls of analogical reasoning" (1997, 316). On the other hand, Apolloni claims that the Affinity Argument is a "deductive argument whose conclusion follows from its premises—premises whose truth Plato would have thought he had established" (Apolloni 1996, 7).

⁹⁹ In this sense, I also agree with Robins' interpretation of the AA that emphasizes "the reflections of philosophers on the goals of the philosophy and the differences the pursuit of philosophy has made to the souls." (Robins 2003, 1).

Thus, the success of the AA depends on agreement about the soul's essential characteristics and on responding to that encouragement. In that sense, we should not underestimate the AA simply because of its weakness as a demonstration. Through the AA, Socrates and his interlocutors are trying to find better conditions of their soul. Immortality, however, is not the exclusive main topic in the AA.

In considering self-improvement, we also notice another peculiarity of the AA compared with the RA and the Defence of Death (DD). This argument is concerned with the soul's conditions after death. Even after death, according to the latter argument in the AA, the bodily habit clings to the soul, which makes it fall down to the earth (81d6–e4). If a philosopher has made his soul to be alone by itself, his soul would go to the divine realm (81a4–10). On the other hand, the RA and the DD are mainly concerned with the state of the soul and body before death. The soul's good and bad conditions after death are considered as a focal topic in the AA.

Socrates' encouragement of self-improvement presents another fundamental problem concerning the objective of this argument, which is concerned with the general topic of this thesis, self-discovery: what is the soul of which Socrates attempts to offer the essential characteristics? Is that soul identical to the soul of Socrates and his interlocutors? According to Socrates, the purified, immortal soul is separated from the body and bodily functions, even though many people might tend to think of specific or personal emotion and memory as essential to life.¹⁰⁰ However, the difference between the purified soul and the individual is not problematic to the AA, because Socrates recognizes the difference between the two, and thus proposes a way by which a person can make his soul close to that purified soul. In other words, Socrates encourages the interlocutor to agree that the purified soul should be their true soul. However, this process is not easy, because no precise definition of the soul is shared among Socrates and the interlocutors. They must start by examining themselves, in whom the soul and

¹⁰⁰ *cf.* Bostock 1986, 35–39.

body are combined. As we have already seen in Chapters 1 and 2, they evaluate the soul's good conditions in the DD and the RA according to their goal of obtaining wisdom. This direction is retained in the AA, but the argument also states more ontological characteristics of the soul. The AA suggests a division of existence between the *ousia* that is always the same and particulars that always suffer change. The soul's good or purified conditions make it close to the divine and eternal existence; and moreover, the soul's good or bad conditions acquired in this life affect the soul even after death. The soul's conditions determine where the soul goes after leaving the body. In this sense, the AA also attempts to show the soul in a wider perspective than those in the DD and RA.¹⁰¹

In this chapter, I will first address the peculiar introduction to the AA (77b1–78b3), which suggests that those present need to chant away their childish fear of the soul's dissipation. This section reveals that the AA needs to improve the interlocutors' disposition. The demonstration of soul's immortality is not the only mission of the AA. Second, I focus on Socrates' division of existence and the detailed description of the soul's characteristics (78b4–80c1). He establishes a division between *ousia* and particulars, in which he considers the soul's position. He suggests an ideal state of the soul, which also accords with essential characteristics found in the *ousia*. He also offers a way of transforming the souls into the ideal purified ones. When the soul considers the Form alone by itself, that intellectual act also improves the soul's conditions. Third, I examine Socrates' statements that the soul goes to different realms depending on its way of living. A purified soul goes to the divine realm, while a polluted soul goes back again to the earth. This story explains two things: (1) the soul's conditions in this world affects itself even after death; (2) based on the first claim, Socrates encourages the interlocutors to separate their soul from the body. Fourth, I analyse philosophy's encouragement of the soul's separation. Lovers of learning are "aware of" the

¹⁰¹ I agree with Woolf's following evaluation of the Affinity Argument: The Affinity Argument is "after all, the only one of the arguments for immortality in the *Phaedo* aimed at showing how the soul may commune with Forms after death." (Woolf 2004, 118. n.38.)

encouragement of “philosophy” (82d9–83b3). This “philosophy” affects the soul as if it were another entity. Thus, it seems that the soul needs some aid to improve itself. However, it is not clear whether that philosophy is a kind of internal love of wisdom or an opportunity liberating the soul from outside. I think it important that Socrates defines those who recognize that encouragement as “the lovers of learning” (82d9). Moreover, we will also see that the philosopher’s soul judges a good life by itself after receiving philosophy’s liberation.

The purpose of the AA is wider than simply to offer a theory of the soul’s immortality, since it also appears to encourage the interlocutors to improve themselves in line with Socrates’ suggestion. Furthermore, we see that Socrates depicts the philosophers’ self-recognition of goodness of their soul’s separation.

1. Introduction to the AA (77d–78b)

After the Recollection Argument (RA), both Simmias and Cebes are concerned that it has not yet been demonstrated that their souls will exist after they have died (77b10–c5). This is because the RA suggests only that their souls existed before birth. However, Socrates contends that the existence of the soul after death has already been implied by the combination of the RA with the Cyclical Argument (CA) (70c–72d) in which they agree that “living people have come to be from the dead no less than dead people from the living.” (72a4–6). Socrates observes that they want to examine the argument because they have childish fear: that the wind dissipates the soul when the soul leaves the body:

Text 1

So what you both mention has been proved already. But none the less I think that both you and Simmias would gladly persevere with this argument too even more thoroughly, and that you fear what children fear—namely that what really happens is that when the soul leaves the body the

wind blows it apart and dissipates it, especially when someone happens to die not in calm weather but in a strong wind. (77d5–e3) ¹⁰²

Cebes replies in a peculiar jocular manner with laughter: ¹⁰³

Text 2

‘Try to convince us, Socrates,’ he said, ‘as if we do have that fear. Or rather, not as if *we* have the fear—maybe there’s a child actually inside us who’s afraid of things like that. So try to convince that child to stop fearing death as if it were the bogeyman. (77e4–8).

It is ambiguous whether or not Cebes admits to this fear. Yet, at any rate, he asks Socrates to convince Simmias and himself, or a child within them. Socrates replies “Well, you must chant spells to him every day until you manage to chant it away.” (77e9–10). The fact that Cebes laughs at Socrates while mentioning the childish fear seems to imply that he does not seriously believe that either he himself or this “inner child” truly entertains such fear. This fear of the soul’s dissipation is suggested originally by Cebes before starting the demonstration of the soul’s immortality (69e5–70a7). He suggests it as a possible fear that people might have in light of Socrates defence of death. In that sense, Cebes does not say this fear is his own but rather a possible apprehension against Socrates’ argument. However, Socrates suggests the fear is actually in Cebes and they must chant the childish fear

¹⁰² ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν. ὅμως δέ μοι δοκεῖς σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τοῦτον διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παίδων, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾶ καὶ διασκεδάννυσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχη τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμία ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνήσκων. (77d5–e3)

¹⁰³ In the Defence of Death, Simmias also says laughingly that Socrates’ saying is that most people realize that death is just what a philosopher deserves (64a10–b6). However, Socrates immediately denies that people realize that correctly. He also starts the argument about how a philosopher tends to be misunderstood by people (64b7–c2). Simmias’ laughter consequently emphasizes his serious ignorance of the misunderstanding. Cebes also seems to be ignorant of the serious result when he preserves his childish fear.

away. Cebes is also concerned that they would lose the enchanter after Socrates leaves them. Socrates replies that they must try to find the enchanter in any place at any cost, and recommends that they find the enchanter among themselves (78a3–9). Contrasting with Cebes' jocular attitude, Socrates seems to strongly encourage him to remove that fear at any cost.

Socrates' encouragement is beyond the demonstration of the soul's immortality. Indeed, as far as believing Socrates' words, they have been given a demonstration of both soul's pre-natal existence and its existence after death, in the combination of the RA and the CA. The AA shows the more detailed characteristics of the soul, and if Cebes and Simmias are persuaded that the soul really has those characteristics, being dissipated will appear to be an inappropriate characteristic for the soul. As far as they adhere to the idea of the dissipation of the soul, they recognize the soul as a kind of physical thing that can be blown away by a strong wind. Thus, the introduction to the AA suggests a more subjective improvement in the interlocutors. Socrates manages to eliminate inappropriate fear of soul's dissipation. This task goes beyond merely receiving the objective demonstration of the soul's immortality. He must continue the effort and find an enchanter to take away that fear.

Socrates starts by examining whether dissipation is a correct way to describe the soul's destruction (78b4–80c1), which is examined in the next section.

2. The meaning of soul and its destruction (78b4–80c1)

2.1 A first setting of the inquiry

To begin, we follow the development of Socrates' argument using the concept of affinity. The main argument of the AA starts with the following problem suggested by Socrates:

Text 3

‘Well then,’ said Socrates, ‘should we ask ourselves a question along the following lines? What kind of thing is liable to undergo this—that is, to be dissipated? What kind of thing, I mean, is such that we should fear that it will be dissipated, and what kind of thing is not like that? And should we then consider to which of the two kinds soul belongs, and on that basis be confident or fearful on behalf of our own soul? (78b4–9, emphasis mine)

This starting point includes two important factors. The first is that Socrates attempts to examine the meaning of dissipation, replying to the childish fear that lies in the interlocutors. In the fear, the soul seems to be a kind of physical existence, which is dissipated by a strong wind as exhibited in Text 1. His proposal to examine this dissipation means that they should investigate whether the soul can undergo such suffering. Thus, Socrates must suggest two kinds of existence, one of which can undergo dissipation and the other cannot. The soul is considered in comparison with the two kinds of existence. The other important factor is that Socrates is concerned with “ourselves.” They must ask themselves about the soul’s dissipation. As a result of the inquiry, they must decide their attitude towards their own soul on considering to which of the two types of existence their soul should belong. This argument is not an empty theory or a thought experiment, but deals with the souls of Socrates and his discussion partners. This makes sense when we consider that his purpose in the AA is to chant away the inner child’s fear, based on the examination of the soul. On the other hand, if their fear is appropriate, it would be no longer childish.

Socrates proceeds with his argument in this way:

- Anything that is a composite and compound by nature is liable to be divided into its component parts. That which is a non-composite is not likely to be divided (78c1–5).
- Things that always remain the same and in the same state are most likely not to be composites, whereas those that vary from one time to another, and are never the same, are composite (78c6–9).

Socrates gives examples of the two kinds of existence. The first is “*ousia*” (οὐσία), the existence of which they are giving an account of in their questions and answers on what things are (78c10–d7). According to his explanation, this kind of existence embodies the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, and other such kinds of existence. The other is the particulars, which include, for example, individual people, horses, or clothes (78d10–78e4). The *ousia* is always the same and is never affected by changes, but the particulars cannot remain the same. Individual beautiful things, for example, are subject to changing perceptions and opinions. On the other hand, Beauty itself cannot be ugly and is always beautiful.

After describing the division of existence and the criteria upon which this division is based, Socrates attempts to apply the division of existence to a human being. He asks his interlocutors to confirm that one part of a person is the body and the other part is the soul, and they admit that this is so (79b1–3). However, the essential point of this question rests not just on the fact of this division, but also on how the division is made. The meaning of body and soul depends on where the division between the two takes place. Without agreeing upon this matter, Socrates and his discussants cannot share an understanding of their souls. Thus, it is important how they distinguish the soul and the body, and what characteristics they ascribe to each of them.

2.2 Three characteristics in the soul and its similarity to the *ousia*

Socrates divides the soul and body by the following three criteria:

1. Invisible or visible: The soul “is more similar to” the invisible (τῷ ἀιδεῖ) than the body and the body “is more similar to” the visible (τῷ ὁρατῷ). (79b4–c1)
2. Constant or changing: The soul is more similar to that which always exists in the same state rather than that which does not, when soul thinks alone by itself. This state of the soul (πάθημα) is called “wisdom” (φρονήσις) (79c2–e8)
3. Governing or being governed: When the soul and the body are together, nature orders the body to be subject and to be ruled, and the soul to rule and master. The nature of the divine is to “rule and lead.” That of the mortal is to be ruled and be the subject. The soul “resembles the divine,” and the body “resembles the mortal” (79e9–80a9).

Socrates suggests these three kinds of characteristics. Remarkably, in terms of visibility and invisibility, he does not directly say that the soul belongs to the invisible although it is admitted being invisible, but that the soul is “more similar to” the invisible than the body and the body is more similar to the visible (79b12–13). This expression involves several interrelated problems. Why does Socrates use the concept of similarity? Why is the soul not simply similar to the invisible? In other words, what is Socrates’ intention in adding “than the body”? Why must Socrates say that the body is “similar to the visible” although the body seems to be obviously visible? ¹⁰⁴ In other words, why cannot Socrates simply say that the body belongs to the visible?

First, in terms of similarity, some scholars interpret it as a mark of weakness of the argument. Dorter understands that the AA is “frequently weakened by

¹⁰⁴ Apolloni suggests this question (Apolloni 1996, 9)

qualifications and hesitancy”¹⁰⁵ : Socrates’ intention in the AA is not to offer “a rigorous deduction” but “an appeal to analogies.”¹⁰⁶ Rowe thinks that the soul can be visible and subject to change on certain conditions. Therefore, he claims “the most that it is so far prudent to assert is that the soul is more like the invisible *than the body* (in so far as it is itself invisible).”¹⁰⁷ According to these interpretations, similarity is a kind of second-best predication of the soul when we cannot claim that the soul is identified with the invisible. I disagree with those interpretations that focus on the weakness of the idea of similarity. I assume that those interpretations reflect the expectation that Plato will provide a strict demonstration of the soul’s immortality, because the soul must be exactly identical with a kind of immortal existence if we want to have a thorough demonstration. However, the body is also given a predication of similarity. While the body is visible, why cannot we say that the body belongs to the visible rigorously? Even though we admit that Plato hesitates to offer a strong claim that the soul belongs to the invisible, we cannot understand his intention in expressing the body’s similarity to the visible.

The AA clarifies several characteristics of the soul to the interlocutors, which is a different objective from the demonstration of the soul’s immortality. Considering the objective, we can interpret the similarity more positively, as expressing the soul’s peculiar condition, namely, a two-facedness that accepts two opposite kinds of characteristic.¹⁰⁸ The soul is originally invisible, unchanging and governing. However, according to Socrates’ later explanation, a polluted soul can be visible as a phantom around tombs (81c8–d4), having lost its steadfastness by being disturbed by perceptions (79c2–8) and bewitched by bodily pleasures (81b1–5). If the soul is alone by itself, it can retain its original characteristics. When it makes use of the body, it must accept non-essential characteristics. This condition is clearly different from that of the *ousia* because the *ousia* always retains its

¹⁰⁵ Dorter 1976, 295.

¹⁰⁶ Dorter 1982, 76.

¹⁰⁷ Rowe 1993, 185

¹⁰⁸ Bostock calls this condition as “a chameleon-like character” (Bostock 1986, 119).

characteristic and never suffers change. Yet, as far as the soul makes itself alone by itself, it retains its steadfast condition. For example, the soul is invisible and unchanging when it does not draw on any bodily characteristics and uses its own intellectual ability. Contrastingly, the body is usually visible and changing if it does not receive any special treatment. In that sense, the soul is clearly more similar to the invisible than the body. This interpretation of similarity also explains the reason why Socrates says that the body is similar to the visible, not that the body belongs to the visible. A typical example of the visible is a particular thing that is contrasted with the *ousia*. The class of particular also has a characteristic of being always changing. However, Socrates mentions an example: embalming the body. The body that is correctly treated keeps its quality for a while even after death (80c2–d3). Thus, even the body has characteristics that are contrary to its natural ones. The body is similar to the visible, therefore, it should have visibility and be always changing, but it can sometimes have exceptional characteristics.

The latter part of the AA discusses the two directions of the soul depending on the soul's characters (80c2–82d8). The purified soul goes off to the divine realm, whereas the polluted one must fall down to the earth and enter the bodies of animals. Therefore, the similarity is used effectively in order to describe the soul's two-facedness.

Moreover, we should notice that Socrates has put the division of existence before the discussion of similarity and enumerates these three characteristics here. He suggests several examples of the *ousia*, the Equal itself and the Beautiful itself, and generalizes those kinds of entity by a phrase "what each thing itself is" (78d3–5). In the RA, Socrates emphasizes that they are not perceptible; in other words, they will never be visible. He also says that a philosopher looks to attain the non-perceptible existence. In that context, invisibility must be a characteristic of the *ousia* that is mostly valuable for a philosopher, and therefore it is not a neutral predication. In the AA, he explains the *ousia* as a kind of existence that remains the same and never changes. This specific invisible existence is also unchanging. The

ousia is a real object with which the soul should be compared. Invisibility is a sign of *ousia*, although it is not a sufficient characteristic for being the *ousia*. Thus, invisibility is not a value-neutral attribution, and is a sign of the most valuable entity, *ousia*.

Invisibility and being the same (or being constant) are both found in the *ousia*. The *ousia* cannot be attained by perception. It can be obtained when the soul considers them when being by itself, namely, when the soul uses its intellectual ability. As suggested in the RA, the Form or *ousia* never suffers the change that perceptible things do: equal things always can become unequal. However, the Equal themselves never become unequal and always are equal. The soul's condition when the soul thinks of the *ousia* by itself is called "wisdom."

However, it is not clear that the *ousia* has the third characteristic, governing character, which is also called "divine." The soul should naturally command the body, and the body naturally follows the governing soul. Can we find such a governing characteristic in the *ousia*? The third characteristic shows that the soul actively and dominantly works upon the body as nature orders. It does not seem that the characteristic is found in the *ousia* in the previous arguments. However, Socrates claims in his latter arguments that only the Forms can be causes of things: beautiful things come to be beautiful because of the Beauty itself (100e2–3). Large things are large because of the Largeness itself (100e5–6). These arguments suggest that the Form as causes makes things have specific characteristics. In that sense, we can say that the Form or the *ousia* governs things or particulars since they depend on it for their properties.¹⁰⁹ Simmias and Cebes probably have not yet

¹⁰⁹ This interpretation accords with that by Apollni (1996, 27–29). Specifically, he states as follows: "In a sense, it is also possible to think of the Forms as doing more than just this. Sensible objects cannot be what they are without being equal and unequal, large and small, thick and thin, beautiful and ugly in some way and in some degree. How could a stick have any of the other properties which sticks have if it could not be equal to other sticks and unequal to still others? How could it be a stick if it was not large in comparison with some things, small in comparison with others? If so, Plato might have thought that sensible objects like sticks are totally dependent for what they are upon the Forms, even though there are no Forms for sticks *per se*." (ibid., 28)

understood this characteristic of the *ousia* that is called “divine” in the AA. Indeed, Simmias seems to have a different or ambiguous understanding of divinity in his next argument, the Harmonia theory, in which he describes the sound in a tuned lyre as “divine” (85e6). Conversely, the sound is governed by the material instrument. Therefore, we must admit that the meaning of divinity in the AA is not yet clarified in Simmias’ Harmonia theory.

Considering those three kinds of characteristics in the soul, those are also found in the *ousia*, at least in Socrates’ interpretation. Thus, Socrates asserts that the soul is most similar to divine existence that arguably reflects the nature of the *ousia*:

Text 4

‘Consider then, Cebes,’ he said, ‘whether from everything that has been said our results are as follows: that soul is most similar to that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, and incapable of being disintegrated, and which always stays in the same condition and state as itself; but that body, on the other hand, is most similar to what is human, mortal, resistant to intelligence, multiform, able to be disintegrated, and never in the same state as itself. (80a10–b5)

The soul’s indestructibility is demonstrated as well:

Text 5

If all this is the case, isn’t body the sort of thing to be quickly disintegrated, but soul, on the other hand, the sort to be altogether incapable of being disintegrated, or nearly so? (80b9–11)

We should notice that the divine existence that the soul is most similar to has not only immortality but also some other characteristics. Those characteristics exclude

the destructibility of the soul and at the same time clarify the meaning of the soul's immortality. The immortality of the soul is not only a matter of continuity but also a circumstance in which the soul can be a better and intellectual existence. This quality is implicitly illustrated by way of comparison with the embalming of bodies in Egypt (80c2–d3). Embalming gives the human body a kind of perpetuity, but it is completely different from the immortality for which Socrates longs. The soul has divine characteristics other than immortality. It is “most similar to that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, and incapable of being disintegrated, and which always stays in the same condition and state as itself” (80b1–3). Thus, the purified soul, arguably, must have those characteristics. This explanation of the soul is advanced compared with that of the RA, because it is concerned with many features of the soul, while the RA focuses on its recollecting ability and intellectual desire.

However, in order to obtain immortality, Socrates and his interlocutors must agree to give up the aspects of their lives that are in conflict with the divine characteristics, because those aspects do not belong to the divine and immortal existence and therefore are not given immortality. Kenneth Dorter claims that the AA is persuasive since “Perhaps the most significant and fundamental reason why people have continued to believe in the non-finality of death and in their personal immortality is the sense of something eternal within us.”¹¹⁰ Indeed, this argument will have such a good effect on Simmias and Cebes as far as they admit the soul's intellectual ability and governing function are essential for their being. However, it also means that the AA is persuasive only for those who are prepared to make themselves purified without excessive attachment to the desires of the body or other bodily functions. Thus, it is appropriate in the AA that Socrates depicts the two directions of the soul after death, beginning with the preferred state of the soul. Consequently, his argument might make people to believe that they can be better even after death. In that sense, the argument forces the interlocutors to examine

¹¹⁰ Dorter 1982, 76.

their understanding of themselves. They need to understand that the essential core of the soul should belong to the intellectual and divine conditions and make themselves to be close to that core. If they think other things are indispensable for them, the AA never offers immortality to those changing things. As far as they admit the essential characteristics of the soul, the argument of the soul's immortality is worthwhile and enables them to chant away their childish fear of the soul's dissipation.

3. The two directions of the soul after death (80c2–82d8)

The latter part of the AA shows the two directions of the soul after death. Socrates depicts both purified and polluted souls and the corresponding directions they take after death.

Text 6

Socrates:

First, take a case where a soul is separated in a pure condition, bringing with it nothing from the body, because it did not associate with the body at all in its life, at least when it had the choice, but instead avoided the body and stayed gathered together alone into itself, since that was its constant practice. Such a soul is doing nothing but pursue philosophy correctly and practise to be ready for really being dead. Or wouldn't this be practice for death?

Cebes:

It certainly would.

Socrates:

So does a soul in this condition go off into what is similar to it, the unseen, the divine, immortal and wise, where after its arrival it can be happy, separated from wandering, unintelligence, fears, savage sorts of love and

the other human evils, and just as is said of the initiates, does it truly spend the rest of time with gods? Is this what we should say, Cebes, or something else?

Cebes:

‘We should indeed say this,’ replied Cebes (80e2–81a11)

This discussion implies an important point. As some scholars have noted,¹¹¹ only the purified soul can reach the divine existence to which it is similar and thus be happy. If we cannot make our souls pure and good in this world, we cannot get to a better world after death. Significantly, it is pursuing philosophy and being ready for death that make us happy after death. Insofar as we purify our souls in this life, we are able to achieve a better existence after death. Yet, Socrates does not merely import a religious dogma from outside, because he refers to pursuing philosophy and the practice of death in this discussion. Philosophical activity in this world is a way to get close to eternal existence. He explains it as follows:

Text 7

Socrates:

But that whenever the soul considers alone by itself, it gets away into that which is pure, always in existence, and immortal, and which stays in the same condition; that the soul, because it is akin to this, always comes to be with it whenever alone by itself and able to do so; that the soul is then at rest from its wandering, and in relation to those entities stays always in the same state and condition, because the things it is grasping have the same kind of stability; and that this state of the soul is called “wisdom”?

Cebes:

‘That's completely right and true, Socrates,’ he said. (79d1–9)

¹¹¹ Bostock 1986, 35–39. Woolf 2004, 115.

Interestingly, wisdom is described as the soul's state (παθήμα) while it is a purpose of a philosopher or the target of acquisition in the DD. In that sense, wisdom is no longer an object that the soul aims at, but is a condition within the soul. The soul can be alone by itself and therefore is in the same condition as the *ousia* that is always the same. Gail Fine thinks that the soul can be in this condition when it is incarnated based on her interpretation of this passage about wisdom.¹¹² If we follow Fine's interpretation, when the soul has not been completely separated from the body, it can escape into that "which is pure, always in existence" (79d1–2). The soul can conceive of eternal existence, namely, through Forms, even in this world. Thus, the soul itself can become stable and be drawn close to eternity.

However, I think the AA addresses the soul's condition on a wider view than that suggested in Fine's interpretation. The AA considers the soul's condition after death, which differentiates the argument from the DD and the RA. A philosopher attempts to separate his soul from the body as far as possible. If he could correctly pursue that separation, the soul would be truly free from bodily disturbance and alone by itself after death. This condition can be called wisdom. A philosopher cannot obtain true wisdom while he is alive as it is suggested in the DD. However, he must make his life focused on getting that wisdom. Without that pursuit, his soul cannot be in the condition that is called "wisdom" even after death.

Therefore, philosophy is a sort of "practice of death," serving as a junction between an individual person and his destination. This assertion means that philosophy helps people get to the divine world. Through philosophy, human beings can examine themselves and realize that they become better.

Thus, what must philosophers do to achieve immortality and reach the divine realm? According to Texts 6 and 7, they must think about the Forms and be

¹¹² Fine 2016, 565. "There is, however, an important difference between 65–7 and 79c-d: the wisdom at issue in 65–7 – at least, the wisdom described by the genuine philosophers – is attainable only when we are discarnate. Here, by contrast, Socrates describes a sort of wisdom we can have while incarnate. That this is so is suggested by the fact that he speaks of a soul considering forms 'whenever it may do so', which seems to imply that it cannot always do so."

separated from the body as far as possible. To do so, they must seek to make their soul purified and give up all other things, for example, bodily desire. The polluted soul cannot stay apart from the body, and that soul is weighted down and drawn back into the visible region (81b–d). The soul of an individual may enter the body of an animal which accords with the quality of the life they have lived (81d6–82a10). Remarkably, the souls of people “who have pursued the common virtue of ordinary civic life” which “has come about from habit and practice without philosophy and intelligence” may enter the bodies of ants, bees or human beings again (82a11–82b3). However, this is not the target for philosophers, since it is not permitted (οὐ θέμις, 82c1) for those people to arrive at the divine as it is for the lover of learning (82b10–c6).

Only after the interlocutors are persuaded that their true or better condition is in the purified soul, can they admit Socrates’ proof of the immortality of the soul as applicable to their own soul. However, as long as they live in this world, they cannot completely do away with our sensations and desires. So what does that separation mean in actuality?

4. The Separation of Soul and Body—Encouragement of Philosophy—

In the AA, Socrates encourages the interlocutors to separate their soul from the body as he does in the DD. How can they separate the soul from the body when they live in this world with both the body and soul? In other words, what kind of life is the interlocutor required to live? It seems easy to interpret Socrates’ advice as advocating an asceticism wherein they should separate themselves from any bodily desire or sensation in order to devote themselves to thinking about the *ousia*. As some scholars affirm, an ascetic reading of the AA seems appropriate.¹¹³

¹¹³ Hackforth 1955, 48–49; Bostock 1986, 30. Gallop also mentions asceticism in the dialogue (Gallop 1975, 88). On the other hand, Bluck and Weiss reject the ascetic reading (Bluck 1955, 149—150; Weiss 1987, 58–59).

However, Woolf points out several problems with this reading.¹¹⁴ First, the separation of body and soul includes bodily sensation as its object in the *Phaedo*. We cannot escape our sensations entirely and, even to the extent that we can, such an effort is itself different from philosophy. In the first part of the *Phaedo*, Socrates himself talks about the pain and pleasure of his shackled feet and examines those sensations (60b1–c7). Second, as we can find in some of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates does not avoid occasions that bring about pleasure and pain. He drinks wine in the *Symposium* and has children. Therefore, separation does not mean simple asceticism. Woolf suggests an “evaluative reading” of *Phaedo* with regard to this issue: “The evaluative reading makes a weaker claim. Here the point is not that the philosopher refrains (or should refrain) in any strikingly austere way from those activities that require association with the body. It is, rather, that he should adopt a certain evaluative stance towards those activities.”¹¹⁵ In order to investigate this problem, we should examine the bodily problem against the soul in the text of the AA.

Socrates explains the relationship between soul and body in this way:

Text 8

[...] the lovers of learning are aware (οἱ φιλομαθεῖς γινώσκουσι) that when philosophy takes over their soul, the soul really is bound thoroughly in the body and stuck to it, and is forced to consider the real things through it as if through a cage, and not on its own through itself, and that it drifts in utter ignorance. And philosophy observes the cleverness of the prison—that it works through desire, the best way to make the prisoner himself assist in his imprisonment. [...] Philosophy, they are aware, persuades the soul to distance itself from the senses, except to the extent that use of them is necessary, and encourages the soul to collect and gather itself alone into itself, and to trust nothing but itself, concerning whichever real thing, alone

¹¹⁴ Woolf 2004, 101–102 and 104–105.

¹¹⁵ Woolf 2004, 98–99. Yet his main claim is that “we are not supposed to make a firm decision between” the ascetic and the evaluative reading (ibid., 98).

by itself, the soul has intelligence of, when the soul too is alone by itself.
(82d9–e7, 83a5–b1, emphasis mine)

Furthermore, Socrates explains the reason why the soul is especially bound tight by the body when it feels that most intense pleasures and pain are mostly clear and true (83c5–d2) as follows:

Text 9

Because each pleasure and pain rivets and pins it to the body as if with a nail, and makes it corporeal, since it believes to be real the very things that the body says are real. Since it has the same belief as the body and enjoys the same things, it is forced, I think, to come to have the same ways and the same sustenance, and to be the sort of soul never to enter Hades in a pure condition... (83d4–10)

In Text 8, 'Philosophy' observes the real problem of the body. The body as a prison makes its prisoner (the soul) "assist in his imprisonment" through desire. It encourages the soul to "distance itself from the body" as suggested in the DD. Text 9 shows that the body affects the soul's way of thinking: the soul cannot think by itself and is driven to think through the body. Furthermore, the soul is forced to regard as true whatever the body perceives to be true. Text 9 includes revealing true and fake objectives of the soul, which shows us that one should be attentive to his way of thinking and the object of their thought. However, when a man merely devotes himself to controlling his desires and sensations but never thinks about the Forms, it seems that he can never be a philosopher or achieve a better life after death.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Bluck also rejects the asceticism in the *Phaedo* on similar grounds (Bluck 1955, 150). Russell claims a conditional goodness of pleasure in a positive way. He claims, "Plato is not a hedonist, then, because pleasure is conditionally good, depending on what place one

The philosopher's purpose is to make his soul think alone by itself and attain wisdom; separating oneself from desire and sensation is one way to do so. Socrates vividly feels the pain and pleasure from his shackled feet, and he can understand the vanity of sensation by observing the pleasure that came to his pained feet when they were freed from the shackles (60c). Therefore, according to the AA, the real way to make the soul purified is to keep thinking about the Forms, whatever desire or sensation we may be experiencing. Separation is not killing those sensations, but continuing to pursue philosophy within any distracting circumstance.

Text 8 suggests a curious expression of encouragement of "philosophy." The passage has remarkable points for my project to emphasize self-discovery in *Phaedo*: firstly, Socrates states that as the "lovers of learning" recognizes philosophy's encouragement. This presupposition of the intellectual love or desire in the agent is also found in the DD and RA as we see that in Chapters 1 and 2. Moreover, the lovers of learning are "aware" (γινώσκουσι) that "philosophy" takes over and quietly encourages their soul as if philosophy is a separate entity (82d9, 83a1–3). The soul realises its miserable situation as the prisoner of the body

gives it in one's life, and happiness depends on the unconditionally good—wisdom and intelligence—that brings the direction that a good human requires" (Russell 2005, 101). However, Plato is not ascetic either "since he clearly does believe that pleasure can be given the right sort of place in one's life; and so there must be a form of pleasure that is reasonable, since the pleasures of a distorted sense of priorities can never take the right place in one's life. And this, of course, is the joy that we see particularly in the Socrates of the *Phaedo*: he is joyful in the face of death because he recognizes that the goodness of his life consists in the goodness of his soul, which no one can take away. His joy, his contentment, his gladness—these are not the source of the goodness of his life, but rather his appreciation in his affective nature of the goodness" (101–102). We cannot find anything in the AA indicating that pleasure directly contributes to philosophical activity or encourages it. Socrates admits intellectual pleasure (114e3). However, it seems to be a result of the philosophical activity, not the cause or motivation of the activity. It is not clear whether we can call that kind of pleasure "good" even though it is conditional as Russell does. All we can say is that pleasure is not harmful by itself. Distortion of the mind is harmful, which can be caused by clinging to pleasure. However, I do not think merely ascetic attitudes (avoiding pleasure) can rescue the mind from that kind of distortion.

through philosophy's encouragement. The cage cleverly forces the soul itself to assist in its own imprisonment through desire (82e5–7). That situation is explained again in the statement of the most extreme of all evils: "It's that the soul of every human being, when it experiences intense pleasure or pain at something, is forced to believe at that moment that whatever particularly gives rise to that feeling is most self-evidently real (ἐναργέστατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον), when it isn't so" (83c5–8). The soul is forced to think of wrong things as the truth.

It seems that a human being cannot free his soul from his body unaided by philosophy, because of the cleverness of the prison.¹¹⁷ However, it is not clear where that "philosophy" comes from. In the metaphor, philosophy seems to be another person or entity that affects the soul. Yet philosophy (φιλοσοφία) also means "love of knowledge." Thus, it is difficult to decide whether philosophy is a kind of internal motivation or another person or entity who liberates the soul from outside. However, as discussed earlier, we should not ignore that Socrates defines the subjects recognizing that encouragement as "lovers of learning." Without that love, the soul, arguably, cannot obtain or recognize the encouragement. In that sense, whether the encouragement comes from inside or outside, the internal intellectual desire for wisdom is still essential. Moreover, the lovers of learning are "aware" of philosophy's encouragement. Even if the first occasion of the soul's separation from the body seems to be from outside of the soul, the self-recognition of the lovers of learning is also salient. This awareness shows that the lovers of learning should reflect the ideas that are offered by philosophy's encouragement.

¹¹⁷ Woolf also mentions this point: "It is noteworthy that the soul is also pictured as passive when it comes to intellectual operations (at least in the initial phase). [...] How can a soul which (thanks to its embodiment) encounters only the corporeal come to be aware that there is something more? [...] In more generalized form, it bears some resemblance to Meno's paradox; and there is an overt parallel to be explored in the way the prisoners are portrayed in the Cave analogy of *Republic* 7. In that book information provided by the senses apparently helps to turn the soul towards Forms [...] ; but the text is clear that the prisoners neither free themselves nor infer a world outside from their own circumstances (515C–E). Philosophical inspiration (perhaps prompted by a good educator) must strike a soul that could otherwise make no progress." (Woolf 2004, 118. n. 40.)

After the statements on philosophy's encouragement, Socrates explains how the bodily sensations affect the soul badly (83c5–e4), and confirms that “proper lovers of learning” are virtuous for a different reason from that which many other people virtuous (83e5–7), as is also suggested in the DD (68b8–69a4), specifically by the idea of “shadow-painting” virtue (69b7). Thus, Socrates offers a concluding statement, which remarkably suggests a kind of self-judgement on life by the soul of a “philosophical man”:

Text 10

No, indeed. But that is how a philosophical man's soul would reason. It would not suppose that, its own release being a job for philosophy, while philosophy is doing that the soul should of its own accord surrender itself for the pleasures and pains to bind it back inside again, and should undertake a Penelope's interminable task by working at a sort of web in reverse. Instead such a man's soul secures a rest from these things, following its reasoning and being always engaged in reasoning, viewing what is true, divine and not an object of opinion, and sustained by that, and supposes both that it should live in this way as long as it lives, and that when it meets its end it will enter what is akin and of the same kind, and will be separated from human evils' (84a2–b3, emphasis mine).

Οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἑαυτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἶεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ

τοιούτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. (84a2–b3, emphasis mine)

The philosopher's soul¹¹⁸ "would not suppose" that "its own release" is "a job for philosophy" and it "should surrender itself for pleasures and pain" while philosophy is doing that releasing. The soul would suppose that it should live following philosophy as long as it lives, while (1) securing "a rest from" those sensations, (2) "following its reasoning," (3) "being engaged in reasoning," (4) "viewing what is true," and (5) "sustained" by that true and divine existence. Those soul's actions are expressed in present participles: ((1) γαλήνην παρασκευάζουσα, (2) ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ, (3) ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὔσα, (4) τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη, and (5) ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη). Therefore, it seems that the soul's actions and suppositions are simultaneous.¹¹⁹ The philosopher's soul should suppose that purification is required in its living while indeed doing that at the same time.

In that action, the soul depends on "reasoning" (λογισμός). This noun appears three times in this dialogue including this passage (66a1, 79a3)¹²⁰ and is closely connected with another similar meaning noun "thought" (διάνοια) in those passages. A philosopher's soul makes use of reasoning and thought without perceptions in order to obtain wisdom (65e7–66a7). Furthermore, Socrates states in the previous passage of the AA as follows:

¹¹⁸ Socrates changes the subject in the concluding part from the lovers of learning to "a philosophical man's soul." When he depicts philosophy's encouragement, "the lovers of learning" are aware that philosophy encourages the soul. In this concluding part, the soul can judge how it should live according to philosophy's encouragement. Therefore, it seems that the philosophical man's soul shows some progress from the condition of the soul of the lovers of learning. Considering the different conditions of their souls, a philosopher might be superior to a lover of learning.

¹¹⁹ Smyth. 1984. *Greek Grammar*, 419. n.1872a. "The action set forth by the present participle is generally coincident (rarely antecedent or subsequent) to that of the leading verb..."

¹²⁰ Its verb, λογίζομαι, (including participles) appears 9 times (62e1, 65c2, 65c5, 83b8, 83c3, 84a2, 85a6, 91b1, 97d6).

Text 11

Now isn't it true that these you could touch, see and perceive with the other senses, but that when it comes to those that stay in the same state, you could never get hold of them with anything other than the reasoning of your thought (τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ), such things being unseen and not visible. (79a1–4, emphasis mine)

Socrates presupposes that one should make use of intellectual ability (λογισμός and διάνοια) in order to obtain invisible things. Socrates does not explain those functions in detail, but in *Republic* Book 6, both terms are used for the cognition of mathematical objects (510c3, 511d3). Mathematical cognition is placed in the second level in the divided line analogy (509d–511e), which falls under the dialectical knowledge. Also in *Phaedo*, both intellectual functions seem to be in the class that is inferior to wisdom. The soul must use such intellectual functions to accept philosophy's encouragement. Thus, that acceptance is not completely passive; rather it involves a kind of intellectual judgement.

After the soul has received philosophy's encouragement of separation, it supposes an appropriate way of life according to the encouragement. Text 10 suggests that the philosopher's soul does not think that it can submit its release to "philosophy" and make itself to be imprisoned again (84a2–7). Thus, it voluntarily decides to accept philosophy's encouragement and independently supposes how they should live. In that sense, the soul does not just receive philosophy's encouragement passively but voluntarily chooses good life. The judgement of good life is built in the soul. In other words, it has internalized the encouragement of philosophy. Such philosopher's development is suggested to the interlocutor. If he agrees with the AA, he is required to digest the arguments and live his life following the argument. This requirement will lead him to discover his own actual conditions and improve himself by making use of his intellectual ability. However,

Simmias and Cebes do not agree with the AA and develop their counterarguments. We will discuss their counterarguments in Chapters 4 and 5. Nevertheless we should notice that the AA includes the philosopher's voluntary decision of a good life.

Conclusion of Chapter 3

The AA depicts self-discovery as a dynamic structure which includes various aspects of the soul's activities. Each point emphasizes the soul's dynamic transition to the better state. First, Socrates establishes an ontological map that has two poles, *ousia* and particular things. The soul is originally similar to the *ousia*, while it can be sometimes dragged to have non-essential characteristics when being polluted by the body. When the soul considers the Forms alone by itself, it can avoid being in an unstable state. Second, Socrates describes two directions of the soul depending on its way of life. As far as one pursues wisdom, his soul can be purified and go to the divine realm. Third, the soul of lovers of learning can be released from the body by philosophy's encouragement. The body is a formidable prison since it makes the soul itself support its own imprisonment disturbing its judgement of what is true. Eventually, the soul of a philosophical man agrees with the encouragement of philosophy and chooses to live a good life following the encouragement. Socrates advocates this guidance for the soul's dynamic improvement to the interlocutor. The interlocutor must remove his childish fear of the soul's dissipation following the guide, as the introduction to the AA suggests.

Socrates also offers a cognitive method of self-improvement. He suggests several cognitive features in self-improvement: the lovers of learning should be "aware" of philosophy's encouragement. Furthermore, a philosopher's soul must accept that encouragement through its reasoning. As a whole person, the lovers of learning recognize the process of releasing from the bodily disturbance through philosophy. This situation is considerably contrasted with his soul's imprisoned

condition. The imprisoned soul could not realize even that it was in a bad situation and supported its own imprisonment. The philosopher's soul accepts the encouragement and chooses the good life by its own reasoning. Thus, the soul's own decision is accomplished by the supports of the intellectual functions.

Self-discovery contributes to dynamic self-improvement. That process of self-improvement requires one's self-recognition of philosophy's encouragement and self-decision to accept intellectually the encouragement. Thus, the AA implies a complex method of self-improvement that presupposes individual self-awareness and self-decision, which cannot be reduced only to objective discussions.

Chapter 4. Removal of the false theory in the soul
—Criticism of the Soul-Harmonia Theory (85e3–86e5, 91c6–95a3)—

Introduction to Chapter 4

Socrates attempts to chant away childish fear in the interlocutors in the Affinity Argument (AA), and after that “a long silence” arises (84c1). Socrates is absorbed in what has been discussed. Thus, does Socrates accomplish his goal? No, he does not. The interlocutors suggest counterarguments against the AA. Yet they are reasonable arguments, not just the childish fearsome images. In that sense, the interlocutors have been changed by the AA and now have a more intellectual apprehension.

Simmiias suggests the Harmonia theory of the soul, which recognizes the soul as an attunement (“*harmonia*” [ἁρμονία] in ancient Greek) composed of the body’s elements (85e3–86d3). This theory presents a counter argument to Socrates’ proof of the immortality of the soul and represents the first definite view of the soul suggested by Socrates’ discussants. Socrates and Simmiias agree in the AA that the soul is similar to divine existence, and therefore it can maintain its innate intellectual and divine characteristics. However, Simmiias refutes this argument by stating that the soul can be mortal even while it has divine elements. He claims that the relationship between the soul and body is comparable to that between attunement and a tuned lyre. Although attunement is invisible, incorporeal, beautiful and divine, it cannot exist after the lyre and strings are destroyed. The soul is therefore not assured of its immortality after departing from the body. However, Socrates still attempts to criticize the Harmonia theory of the soul (91c6–95a3).

When interpreting Socrates’ criticism, modern scholars tend to concentrate on clarifying *harmonia* as a concept, as it can include a wide range of meanings. They are also concerned about the complicated structure of Socrates’ criticism that

is accompanied with the ambiguous meaning of *harmonia*. The relationship between the Pythagorean theory and this claim is also problematic, because Simmias is often regarded as a Pythagorean.¹²¹ Furthermore, one severe critique rests on Socrates' vague use of the concept of *harmonia*, which reduces the theory to absurdity in the wrong way.¹²²

These attempts to fix a distinct meaning for the concept, however, result in a lack of clarity on two important points. The first is that the Harmonia theory is abstracted not by Simmias alone, but rather in conversation with Socrates. Although Simmias abandons the Harmonia Theory as a result of Socrates' first refutation, Socrates himself attempts to interpret the soul through this theory. In a sense, they construct the Harmonia Theory together, and finally this collaboration leads to their mutual rejection of it. The second important point is that Socrates repeatedly asks Simmias if the Harmonia theory accords with Simmias' other beliefs (92c3, 95a1–2). Socrates requires not only that the Harmonia Theory should be true as an independent theory, but also that it coexists in harmony with Simmias' other beliefs. In other words, Simmias is always required to examine whether or not his beliefs concord with each other, and therefore is constrained to claim only what can coexist with his other beliefs. Because of this restriction, Simmias cannot defend his harmonia theory as the modern scholars (Gallop and C. C. W. Taylor) suggest. One of Socrates' refutations of the Harmonia theory is that the soul as *harmonia* must be equally *harmonia* and therefore the soul of all living things must be equally good although there are indeed good and bad souls (92e5–94b3). Those

¹²¹ H. B. Gottschalk investigated this topic in detail (Gottschalk 1971). He also points out ambiguous meanings of Simmias' *harmonia*: "Thus the word *harmonia* changes its meaning between the simile with which Simmias begins and the theory he develops from it, and this shift of meaning corresponds to an underlying ambiguity in his account as a whole" (ibid., 181). Other scholars also examine the relationship between Pythagorean ideas and the Harmonia theory: cf. Burnet 1911, 82, Gallop 1975, 148. Rowe 1993, 204–205. Gallop and Rowe suggest inconsistency between Simmias' theory and the Pythagorean orthodoxy. I agree with Gottschalk's suggestion and argue that Simmias has an ambiguous view that includes various inconsistent beliefs about the soul. Therefore, I do not think that his theory can be attributed solely to his Pythagorean background.

¹²² Gallop 1975, 164–165. C.C.W. Taylor 2001, 62–65. Wagner 2001, 80–82.

modern scholars refute Socrates' use of reduction to absurdity by suggesting that the soul as *harmonia* can be harmonized in one aspect and not harmonized in another aspect at the same time. This interpretation of the soul as *harmonia* is not inconsistent with the fact there are good and bad souls, which invalidates that Socrates' refutation of the Harmonia theory. However, I argue that Simmias' other beliefs does not allow him to adopt that modern scholars' way of refuting Socrates. Socrates' refutation still accomplishes his goal of making to find faults in the interlocutor's beliefs.

In this chapter, I argue that the criticism of the Harmonia theory has a purpose: to reveal an unrecognised confusion in Simmias' understanding of the soul. He thinks his Harmonia theory fulfils the criteria for the soul suggested in the AA. The Harmonia theory, however, reveals his insufficient understanding of the AA, and more importantly, implies his unconscious adoption of an incorrect perspective regarding causality, which cannot be concordant with his agreement in the Defence of Death (DD) and the Recollection Argument (RA). The criticism of the Harmonia theory reveals a hidden false belief in Simmias and suggests a process for removing it.

I argue for the importance of revealing and removing Simmias' false beliefs mainly using two points. One point is suggested explicitly in the dialogue, but the other is suggested implicitly: Socrates' counterargument appears to lack strictness because of the vague meaning of *harmonia*. Simmias, however, cannot use this lack of strictness to defend his theory because it comes from his definition of attunement, and therefore he would need to change the definition for the defence. The dialogue depicts Simmias' admitting Socrates' refutation in an explicit way to point out the inconsistency of Simmias' beliefs. Moreover, the dialogue also implicitly reveals another problem in the theory; the absence of the tuner of the attunement (*harmonia*), which is concerned with a main target in the succeeding argument of the dialogue, namely, the proper theory of causation. In both implicit and explicit ways, this dialogue inquires into the problem of the Harmonia theory.

Related to my suggestion of self-discovery in the dialogue, the criticism of the Harmonia theory shows that the dialogue includes a clever way of finding faults within the interlocutor. He has not only inconsistent beliefs but also a problematic understanding of the soul. Specifically, understanding of the soul is closely connected with a fundamental conception, that of causality. The latter problem is not solved within this argument. Yet, when it is combined with Cebes' counterargument (I will discuss that in the next chapter), the criticism ingeniously reveals a serious problem in Simmias' ideas.¹²³

1. Simmias' Harmonia Theory

Simmias' Harmonia theory responds to, and questions, the AA. Simmias says the followings:

Text 1

'In the following respect, I think,' he said. 'One might say the same thing about attunement too, and a lyre and strings: that the attunement is something invisible, incorporeal, and utterly beautiful and divine in the tuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are bodies, corporeal, composite and earthy, and akin to the mortal. (85e3–86a3)

Ταύτη ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἡ δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἂν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὥς ἡ μὲν ἀρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμωσμένη λύρᾳ,

¹²³ We cannot tell whether Simmias recognizes this problem, but *Phaedo* clearly shows that Cebes escapes that fault and thus develops a further counterargument. Socrates offers the Final Argument in reply to Cebes. In the end of the demonstration of the immortality of the soul, Simmias admits that "on the strength of what has been said I too no longer have any room for doubt" (107a8–9). Therefore, we can at least assume that Simmias eventually agrees with the causal order between the soul and the body suggested by Socrates and abandons his previous view that the soul depends on the body for its existence.

αὐτὴ δ' ἢ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῇ καὶ σύνθετα
καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῇ. (85e3–86a3)

Defining attunement (ἁρμονία) in the lyre as in the quotation above, Simmias seems to apprehend that if the lyre and strings are destroyed, attunement could perish before the mortal things do (86a3–b5). He applies this analogy to the relationship between the soul and body:

Text 2

I think that you yourself are well aware that we take the soul to be something of precisely this kind, since our body is made taut, so to speak, and held together by hot, cold, dry, wet and certain other such things, and our soul is a blend and attunement of those very things, when they are blended properly and proportionately with one another. (86b5–86c3)

Anyway, if the soul really is a sort of attunement, obviously when our body is loosened or tautened beyond proportion by illnesses or other evils, the soul must perish at once, however divine it may be, just like other sorts of attunement, both those consisting in sounds and those in all the products of the craftsmen, whereas each body's remains must last for a long time, until they are burned up or rot away. (86c3–d1)

Simmias' definition of the soul in the analogy has several problems. First, the meaning of *harmonia* is ambiguous.¹²⁴ There are several possible meanings of

¹²⁴ C.C. W. Taylor discusses this problem in detail (C.C.W Taylor 2001, 52–58). He suggests four possible meanings of the soul as “harmonia” (52–53): 1. “the ratio or formula according to which the elements are combined to form the living man;” 2. “the mixture or combination of those elements according to that formula;” 3. “some entity produced by the combination of those elements according to the formula, but distinct alike from them and from the formula itself;” 4. “a state of bodily elements, viz., the state of being combined according to that formula.”

harmonia, and Simmias does not clearly explain how he makes each attribution (invisible, incorporeal, beautiful and divine). We can see various possible meanings of ἁρμονία in *A Greek-English Lexicon*: 1. Means of joining (I-1), 2. Joint (I-2), 3. Framework (I-4) 4. Agreement (II), 5. Musical scale (IV-1), and 6. Music (generally) (IV-2). In addition, Simmias also parallels “blend” (κράσις) with “attunement.” Considering the definitions, *harmonia* can mean both an order or scale and an entity made by such ordering or scaling. For example, it can mean both (5) musical scale and (6) music made by a musical scale. In addition, it is not clear whether the *harmonia* is identical with the material constitution itself or is a different entity.¹²⁵ Is the *harmonia* identical with the constitution of parts of musical instruments or musical sounds made by instruments? In the case of the soul and body, is the soul identical with the bodily parts or a different entity that depends on the body for its existence? Simmias’ attributions to the *harmonia* do not help us fix one meaning. As far as it is “invisible” and “incorporeal,” it seems not to be a material entity but a musical scale or ratio. Yet he also says that it is “utterly beautiful and divine.” Can a musical scale be beautiful? It seems instead that music played by the scale should have that attribution. Indeed, Simmias mentions the “*harmonia* in sounds” later (86c7). However, music is a sensible thing and therefore it surely does not have the attribution of being “incorporeal” because sensibility is an essential mark of corporeal things according to the AA (79a1–2). We should consider that Simmias might see beauty in the incorporeal mathematical ratios or order on which music is based, because Simmias is a student of Pythagorean Philolaus (61d6–8). As C. C. W. Taylor points out, however, Simmias thinks that many people also hold the *Harmonia* theory.¹²⁶ Can many people see beauty in mathematical ratios? Furthermore, Simmias dares to use the example of a musical instrument. It is more probable that he finds beauty in musical sounds. Thus, although Simmias tries to give the characteristic of being

¹²⁵ In C. C.W. Taylor’s options, we face difficulty deciding between options 2 and 3. See the previous footnote.

¹²⁶ C.C.W Taylor 2001, 54.

incorporeal to the *harmonia*, the attribution of beauty presupposes that it is a kind of sensible thing. In that sense, this analogy still retains an ambiguously materialistic understanding of the soul that is suggested in the introduction to the AA: a strong wind might “dissipate” the soul (77d7–e3).

The term *harmonia* seems finally to be replaced by “blend” (κρᾶσις) in 86b5–d3.¹²⁷ A *Greek–English Lexicon* defines the meaning of κρᾶσις in this passage as a “combination” or “union.”¹²⁸ It is not clear if the soul, as a blend of the bodily elements, is identical with the bodily conditions or is a different entity from them. When the soul is exactly the same as the bodily elements, it can also be a physical object, as when it is depicted as a fragile entity that can be dissipated by the wind in the AA. On the other hand, if the soul is a different entity, even though it depends on the bodily elements for its existence, Simmias suggests a kind of dualistic view: there are two different kinds of entity, but the soul cannot exist without the body. At any rate, Simmias’ definition of the *harmonia* is too vague for us to determine its ontological status.

Second, while Simmias initially seems to follow Socrates’ argument, there are some differences between the two arguments. One is that Simmias’ comparison neglects some of the characteristics that Socrates attributes to the entity to which the soul is most similar. According to Socrates’ AA, the soul is most similar to “that which is (1) divine, (2) immortal, (3) intelligible, (4) uniform and (5) incapable of being disintegrated, and (6) which always stays in the same condition and state as itself” (80b1–3). However, Simmias depicts attunement as “something (1’) invisible, (2’) incorporeal, and (3’) utterly beautiful and (4’) divine in the tuned lyre” (85e4–86a1). The latter attribution ignores not only immortality but also (5) and (6) in the former attributions, which is a critical problem because it violates the context of

¹²⁷ Theodor Ebert points out this replacement (Ebert 2004, 284). He also suggested the lineage of this concept of mixture to the medical theories in *Corpus Hippocraticum* and those of Alkmaion (ibid.).

¹²⁸ The primary meaning of κρᾶσις is “blending.”

the AA. Through these six points, Socrates introduces one divine existence that the soul most resembles. That kind of existence includes all of those points, and therefore, they are not allowed to omit any of the points. All six characteristics are essential to show the ideal soul.¹²⁹

Third, the causal order of the soul and the body differs between the AA and the Harmonia theory. In the AA, the soul innately governs the body and works independently. However, in the Harmonia theory, the soul can be understood as a combination or derivative state of materials in the ambiguous definition. This is emphasized by the fact that Simmias also defines the soul as a blend (86c2). The soul as a “blend” clearly depends on the bodily elements for its existence. That blend is produced when the opposing bodily elements (hot and cold, dry and wet) are blended with each other (86c1–3). Following this definition, the soul as a blend seems to be produced when things are blended. It means that the soul is passively composed by the materials. Simmias summarizes his counterargument against the AA by assuming that someone has claimed that the soul is a blend of things in the body and is the first thing to perish in the so-called death (86d1–3). In expressing this claim, he omits the word “*harmonia*” and just uses the word “blend” (κράσις) to define the soul. Therefore, Simmias’ Soul-Harmonia theory seems to eventually suggest the idea of the soul as a blend, which emphasizes the character of the soul as a by-product of a combination of things. Simmias’ idea of the soul conceived as *harmonia* cannot be independent from the body as seen in the AA. Conversely, the soul is governed by its bodily constitution.

¹²⁹ The character of (6) is especially important because it is also characteristic of *ousia* (οὐσία). Socrates starts his AA by suggesting a division of existence. One is what is composite and visible, the other is what is incomposite and invisible. He presents *ousia* as that which always stays in the same condition, and “particulars,” which can never be the same (78d–e). *Ousia* and particulars are in accordance with the division. They are foundational concepts theorized in the previous arguments (cf. 65d–e, 74a–b). Simmias also enthusiastically admits the idea of *ousia* at the end of the Recollection Argument (76e–77a).

Through these three points, we can see that Simmias does not follow Socrates' argument correctly, and that he suggests another distinct view of the soul that includes serious ambiguity in his understanding of "*harmonia*."

Socrates' criticism, however, is not directed at Simmias' lack of understanding of the AA or his ambiguous definition of "*harmonia*." Instead, he refers to a contradiction with Simmias' other beliefs, which were previously presented in the Recollection Argument (RA) (72e–77b): according to the RA, the soul exists before it enters the human body. The Harmonia theory claims that the soul's attunement comes together after all other traits, but is the first to perish. As such, those two theories cannot be compatible. Simmias agrees that this is a contradiction and withdraws his claim (92c11–e4).

Simmias not only has an insufficient understanding of the AA, but also does not properly perceive what his theory includes. As we have already seen, his definition of Harmonia can have various meanings. Furthermore, that theory suggests a causal order between the soul and the body that opposes the RA, to which Simmias agreed. He could simply provide that problematic example of the *harmonia* in a lyre. Furthermore, he used the relationship between *harmonia* and material parts in the example in order to understand that between the soul and the body. However, this usage does not seem appropriate, since it is based on Simmias' insufficient understanding of the AA; specifically he ascribes fewer features to the soul than those the AA requires. His claim did not include consistent definition or strict analysis of "*harmonia*" either. As a result of that, as we will see later, Socrates himself develops another Harmonia theory even after Simmias has given up on the theory.

Socrates reveals that Simmias' Harmonia theory is inconsistent with the RA. Simmias answers Socrates' question about which he would choose, the RA or the Harmonia theory, in an enthusiastic tone:

Text 3

The first one, Socrates', he said, 'by far. For the second has come to me with no proof but with a sort of plausibility and outward appeal, which is the basis on which most people believe it too. But I am aware (σύνοιδα) that arguments that give their proofs by means of what is plausible make hollow claims, and unless one guards oneself very well against them are utterly deceitful, both in geometry and in all other subjects. The argument about recollection and learning, on the other hand, has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. Because it was said I think that it is as certain that our soul existed even before it entered a body as that there exists in its own right the being that bears the label "what it is". And I have accepted that hypothesis, or so I convince myself, on both sufficient and correct grounds. So for these reasons, it seems, I mustn't allow myself or anyone else to say that soul is attunement. (92c11–e4, emphasis mine)¹³⁰

As we saw in section 1 of chapter 1 (the Defence of Death, 64b8–c1), ordinary people are ignorant of the philosophical motivations. Simmias' fault is different from that of the ordinary people because it comes from an intellectual motivation to obtain the truth. However, it is still problematic since it shows conflict within his beliefs between the agreements in the RA and the idea of the Harmonia theory. As he recognizes himself, the Harmonia theory "comes to" Simmias "with plausibility and outward appeal" (μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας), but the RA is demonstrated through a valuable hypothesis. Although Socrates does not point out the outward plausibility of the Harmonia theory, Simmias recognizes the danger of deceit probably thanks to his experiences "in geometry and in all other subjects" (92d5–6, see Text 3). So, what are the plausibility and outward appeal by which Simmias was deceived? He does not

¹³⁰ This passage includes a kind of self-persuasion in Simmias: "or so I convince myself" (92e1). I will discuss this point in the concluding part of this thesis, comparing my reading with a different reading by Christopher Gill.

sufficiently explain plausibility; therefore, we need to assume what he intended. The term “plausibility” (εἰκός) is frequently used in the dialogue; it usually means likeliness or probability (62c9, 62e5, and in many points in the AA: 78c7, 81e3, 82a1), yet “outward appeal” (εὐπρεπεία) appears only once in the dialogue. A *Greek–English Lexicon* defines the word as “goodly appearance” and “plausibility.” Simmias also says that those “plausibility and outward appeal” are the reason why “many people believe” the theory; therefore, that plausibility does not seem to depend on a high level of cognitive ability in philosophers or mathematicians. The Harmonia theory uses vivid examples such as the musical instrument and the blending of bodily hotness and coldness, and dryness and wetness. The theory also explains illness in a human being by reference to bodily conditions (86c3–6. See Text 2). Those sensible elements in the body (for example, a fever in the body) can be familiar and vivid to anyone. The Harmonia theory seems to be able to explain various phenomena with vivid images. However, such explanations merely depict specious reasons for the phenomena. Likely images are sometimes different from truth. In the dialogue *Meno*, Socrates interrogates a slave boy about the length of the lines in a square that has double the area of a square whose lines are two feet long (82d8–e2). The slave boy answers “Obviously double, Socrates”¹³¹ (four feet) (82e2–3), but this is wrong. As Simmias mentions geometry, it is specifically important that the subject does not depend on likeliness in producing a true answer.

On the other hand, the RA has “been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance” to Simmias. The hypothesis of the Forms or “what it is” is certain to him. Furthermore, Socrates seems to use arguments that can never be denied by Simmias; for example, the Equal themselves can never be unequal while equal things always can appear to be unequal. The RA comes from a worthy hypothesis, and reasoning from the hypothesis is also undeniable for Simmias.

¹³¹ This translation of *Meno*’s phrase is from Sedley and Long 2010.

Socrates explicitly reveals inconsistency between the RA and the Harmonia theory, to which Simmias has agreed. Furthermore, we can also see that the Harmonia theory includes critical faults: it cannot define the meaning of *harmonia*, and it does not correctly follow the AA and has a different understanding of causality. Interestingly, Socrates continues examining the Harmonia theory by defining that concept. This new version of the theory focuses on two kinds of relationship regarding *harmonia*: one is that between *harmonia* and its components; the other is that between *harmonia* and the way of harmonizing. This seems to be a more general explanation than Simmias' version, because it does not rely on specific examples. I argue in the next section that it still retains some faults that come from Simmias' original version of the theory, and we will also see that Simmias himself has inconsistent beliefs about *harmonia*. Socrates reveals the fault in the Harmonia theory in a clever way by suggesting the new version of the theory.

2. Socrates' Reconsideration of the Harmonia theory

Socrates continues examining the Harmonia theory even though Simmias has already given up on it. This examination is divided into two arguments.

(A) The relation between attunement (*harmonia*) and its components (92e5–93a10, 94b4–95a3).

(B) The relation between attunement and the way of attuning (93a11–94b3).

Socrates suggests problem (A) first and then moves on to problem (B). In the conclusion to argument (B), Socrates and Simmias deny the premise that the soul is an attunement by reducing this idea to absurdity. Socrates then returns to argument (A) and confirms that the soul governs the body, even though the Harmonia theory states the opposite. Therefore, Socrates not only denies the

Harmonia theory, but also again suggests an opposing relationship of government between the soul and body.

Argument (A) follows Simmias' problem in terms of the fact that it deals with components and what they compose. Simmias is concerned with types of attunement which we can see in musical notes, products of craftsmen or bodily constitutions (86c3–8). In argument (B), Socrates departs from using a specific example and instead investigates the general meaning of *harmonia* by asking how it comes about. Argument (B) begins in the following way:

Text 4

Socrates:

Next, isn't each attunement naturally an attunement according to the way in which it was tuned?

Simmias:

'I don't understand,' he said. (93a11–13)

Socrates asks about the general condition of attunement. Simmias cannot answer. This is a matter of course since his explanation of the Harmonia theory lacks sufficient consideration of the nature of attunement. His theory only suggests that attunement comes from its components through the examples and also includes ambiguity in the meaning of *harmonia*. Socrates criticizes the Harmonia theory by revealing its contradictions through argument (B) (93a11–94b3).

(B1) An attunement, which is tuned to a greater or lesser degree, is a greater or lesser attunement (93a11–b4).¹³² (Premise 1)

¹³² "'Isn't it the case', he said, 'that if it were tuned more and to a greater extent—assuming that this can happen—it would be more of an attunement and would be a greater one, whereas if it were tuned less and to an inferior extent, it would be a lesser and inferior one?'" (93a11–b4)

Simmiias agrees with (B1) that attunement depends on the way of tuning. Thus, one must inquire whether this applies to the soul. This investigation also examines and reveals how the soul exists, using the following premises.

(B2) No soul is more or less a soul than any other (93b5–8). (Premise 2)

(B3) One soul “has intelligence and virtue and is good”, another “has unintelligence and wickedness and is bad” (93b9–c2). (Premise 3)

These premises suggest the difference between the soul and attunement. In terms of attunement, there is a difference in degree depending on the degree of being tuned (B1). On the other hand, it is not assumed that a soul is “more or less a soul” compared to another (B2), while there are differences between the qualities of the soul; some are better, and some are worse (B3). Those who propose that the soul is attunement must explain those differences using the Harmonia theory.

Simmiias’ harmonia theory also implies a relationship between the bodily conditions and those of the soul in the example of illness: when the bodily elements are tensed or loosened “beyond proportion by illness or evils,” the soul must perish (86c4–6). However, it is not clear whether those conditions of the soul and body are identical or not. In other words, it is not clear whether the soul’s conditions are directly determined by body’s conditions. Socrates examines the quality of *harmonia* in a less ambiguous way, which shows a direct relationship between attunement and the way of tuning.

Socrates then asks Simmiias whether those making this argument might answer as follows: in terms of the soul’s virtue and vice, virtue is another attunement and vice is non-attunement. A good soul is tuned and contains another attunement, while a bad soul is not tuned and does not contain another attunement. Simmiias admits that he cannot answer this question by himself, but says that it would be the answer of those who establish the Harmonia theory (93c3–10).

According to (B2), however, there is no difference in degree in terms of the soul's being. Subsequently, the following premises emerge:

(B4) If a soul is an attunement, then the attunement is not an attunement any more nor less than another one (93d1–5). (From B2 and admission of that the soul is an attunement)

(B5) What is neither more nor less an attunement is neither more nor less tuned (93d6–8). (From B1)

(B6) What is neither more nor less tuned has only an equal attunement (93d9–11). (Premise 4)

(B7) No soul is more or less tuned (93d12–e3). (From B4 and B5)

(B8) No soul could have any greater share of non-attunement or attunement (93e4–6). (From B6 and B7)

(B9) No soul could have any greater share of vice or virtue than another, if vice were non-attunement and virtue were attunement (93e7–94a7). (From B8. The content of the conditional clause regarding virtue and attunement is agreed at 93c3–10)

Based on these premises, and since a soul is attunement, the soul does not share any vice, as attunement cannot simultaneously have non-attunement. Therefore, the following matter is concluded:

(B10) The souls of all living creatures will be good to the same extent (94a8–11). (From B9)

We can see that (B9) conflicts with (B3), in which it is agreed that there are good and bad souls. Therefore, Socrates asks Simmias the following:

Text 5

‘Do you find it acceptable,’ said Socrates, ‘that this should be said, and that such should be the upshot of the argument, if the hypothesis that soul is attunement were correct? (94a12–b2).

Simmiias denies this, and it is confirmed that there is a defect in the Harmonia theory. However, several scholars have severely attacked argument (B). David Gallop’s comments get to the heart of the problem. He claims as following¹³³:

‘Attunement’ may be taken to mean either a tuning (attunement¹) or a correctly tuned state (attunement²). It might be agreed that every attunement¹ is an attunement¹ equally, no one attunement¹ more or less so than any other. But it may also be held that some attunements¹ participate in attunement² more or less than others, and that there is no contradiction in holding that an attunement¹ participates in non-attunement², i.e. lacks attunement². Thus it could be admitted that every attunement¹ is equally an attunement¹, yet denied that every attunement¹ is equally in a state of attunement².

According to Gallop’s criticism, any attunement can have a difference in degree in a different standard while holding its position as an attunement. Any kinds of attunement¹ can be more or less attunement². Therefore, the soul as attunement can be more or less tuned in terms of attunement², although any soul exists as attunement¹ all the same. In this case, it is not necessarily that (B3) conflicts with (B9), because souls have a difference of quality in terms of attunement² although all of them hold their position as attunement¹.

C.C.W. Taylor also critiques Socrates’ argument (B) from a similar perspective.¹³⁴ He argues that ordering and being ordered are incomplete

¹³³ Gallop 1975, 164.

¹³⁴ Taylor 2001, 62–65.

predicates and can be correctly completed by specifying the elements of ordering. Namely, phrases such as "... is a *harmonia*" and "... is ordered" should be corrected to "... is an ordering of elements of type E" and "... is ordered with respect to elements of type E," respectively.¹³⁵ Therefore, there can be, for example, two types of ordering: psychic and physical.¹³⁶ It is possible for the soul to be ordered in one respect (viz. physically) but not in another (viz. psychically). Based on this view, soul can be attuned physically while it is not tuned psychically. Therefore, we can admit the difference of psychic quality in the soul as a physical attunement, and there is no necessity in contradiction between (B3) and (B9) either.

Gallop's and Taylor's points are correct in the sense that Socrates's argument is not based on a strict reduction to absurdity. However, Gallop's argument cannot be used to defend Simmias' claim, for Simmias calls the *harmonia* utterly beautiful and divine in his definition (85e4–86a1). Even if he admits that harmony is imperfect, it must nonetheless appear as ordered, beautiful and divine. Therefore, the meaning of Simmias' *harmonia* vaguely includes both Gallop's attunement¹ and attunement², and his definition of harmony would not allow their separation.

Moreover, Simmias cannot use Taylor's strict distinction of senses of attunement either. As I understand it, a focal point of Taylor's criticism is that the same thing can be ordered and not-ordered at the same time in different aspects, but Simmias' examples do not seem to allow such flexibility. In the example of the lyre, one can admit the degree of difference within attunement depending on its tuning. However, this does not entail that the sound of the tuned lyre is the diametrical opposite of the attunement— namely, some chaotic sound. Insofar as it is tuned, it tends to be "beautiful and divine," even if one can observe superiority and inferiority in each lyre. Therefore, when it is tuned materially, it must have the tendency to create a better condition. Following this example, Simmias must argue

¹³⁵ Ibid., 62.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 63.

that a human soul should have a good or divine condition after being tuned. However, his view is careless and is not based on a strict analysis; he applies the example of the lyre to the case of the soul. Therefore, he cannot realize that souls can have two opposite faces: namely, good and bad. He assumes instead that if something is tuned using a certain method, the *harmonia* in it should be better or divine as a whole. If the sound of a lyre is bad, we cannot call it *harmonia* at all. In his understanding of the soul as a blend, when the bodily elements lose proportionate blending, the soul might perish at once. Bad blending entails the soul's perishing. Thus, based on Simmias' examples, if something is ordered physically, it should also be ordered as a whole, which cannot admit the condition that the soul as *harmonia* is ordered physically but not psychically at the same time. If Simmias were to use Taylor's argument, he would have to withdraw his careless application of the example of the lyre to that of the soul and body.

Therefore, even if Socrates' argument does not constitute a strict proof, the dialogue *Phaedo* nonetheless correctly portrays Simmias as agreeing with Socrates' criticism of the Harmonia theory.

In their conclusion to argument (B), Socrates and Simmias return to argument (A) and clarify that the soul and body have a relationship that is the opposite of that between attunement and its components. They explain that when a body experiences heat, thirst, or hunger, the soul instead resists drinking or eating, as it rejects surrendering the body's affections (94b7–c1). The soul governs every affection of the body, while “conversing with the desires, rages and fears as if it were the one thing and they another” (94d5–6). This situation is understood not only through specific technical arguments, such as the RA or the Harmonia theory, but also through general human behaviour. In the earlier parts of *Phaedo* (in the DD and the AA), the self-governing character of the soul is repeatedly investigated and agreed upon. Socrates also refers to Homer's description of the sovereignty of the soul in the *Odyssey* (*Phaedo* 94d9–e1; *Odyssey* 20.17–18): “He struck his chest and spoke reproachfully to his heart: “Endure my heart. You once

endured something even more shameful"." Through the arguments, Socrates concludes his criticism of the Harmonia theory:

Text 6

In that case, my excellent friend, it isn't in any way right for us to say the soul is a sort of attunement. If we did, it seems we'd be agreeing neither with Homer, a divine poet, nor with ourselves. (94e8–95a2, emphasis mine).

Based on these considerations, I argue that the core of the criticism of the Harmonia theory exists in its discordance with Simmias' own beliefs, and does not just depend on the strictness of reduction to absurdity. Socrates asks if the Harmonia theory is in accordance with (συνάδειν) Simmias' other belief (92c3) and if it agrees with (ὁμολογεῖν) him (95a1–2). In fact, this theory cannot be compatible with either the RA or the soul's governing character, which Socrates and the interlocutor have already agreed upon. The most important factor in Socrates' criticism is the application of the Harmonia theory to their pre-existing beliefs, while its reduction to absurdity is a way to reveal the malfunction of this application. Thus, his conclusion also shows the importance of revealing the inconsistency of some beliefs about the Soul-Harmonia theory. If they cling to the theory of the soul as attunement, they cannot "agree with" themselves. Through these arguments, Socrates highlights a disagreement within themselves. In that sense, Socrates accomplishes his goal of making the interlocutor recognize his own problematic condition, namely, having inconsistent beliefs about the soul. By receiving Socrates' examination, Simmias must inquire whether his beliefs regarding the soul are consistent or not.

3. Further Problems within the Harmonia Theory

Socrates undermines Simmias' Harmonia theory by revealing its contradictions with the pre-existing beliefs held by Simmias in an explicit way. He also suggests another problem in the theory: the causal relationship between the soul and body. As we have already seen, Socrates deals with this problem in the latter part of argument (A), yet the dialogue also suggests it in a more implicit and clever way. As Dorter and Wagner suggest, the Harmonia theory is paired with Cebes' argument against Socrates' proof of the soul's immortality.¹³⁷ His argument is based on a metaphor of a weaver and a cloak (86e-88b). A weaver (soul) weaves many cloaks (bodies) and wears them out. Therefore, while a weaver (soul) survives longer than cloaks (bodies), the weaver eventually dies leaving the last cloak behind. In that metaphor, the soul is independent of the bodies. Moreover, it creates and wears them out until its own eventual death. This argument by Cebes emphasizes opposition to the causal approach of the Harmonia theory. Socrates realizes that he must more thoroughly study the cause of "coming to be" and "ceasing to be" in order to answer Cebes' question (95e9-96a1). He also confesses that he was disappointed by the causal theories of natural science and Anaxagoras (96a-99d). Socrates' Ideal Theory of causation (102a-107b) may therefore present one answer to Cebes' argument in *Phaedo*.

Moreover, I argue that Socrates suggests the problem of causation within the argument (B) of the Harmonia theory. As we have seen in section 2, Socrates defines the concept of *harmonia* (attunement) by himself in the argument (B): each attunement is naturally an attunement according to the way in which it was originally tuned. There is an implicit problem that we should recognize, which is that he never defines any agent who does the tuning, blending, or harmonizing. Specifically, in the example of the tuned lyre, one can easily assume that a tuner exists and holds the skills and maintains the standard for tuning. Even in the case of the soul as a blend of bodily elements, I think Socrates or his friends easily suppose an agent of blending (for example, gods). The agent of tuning is essential

¹³⁷ Dorter 1982, 112; Wagner 2001, 82.

to understanding attunement. For example, even if the soul is an attunement composed of tuned bodily elements, if the tuner is the soul itself, the real cause of the soul is not the bodily elements. We should say that the soul as a tuner is the real cause of its own conditions.

When looking for *harmonia* in other works by Plato, one might be concerned about the lack of an agent. For example, one can observe the harmonizing agent in the *Laches*, which is discussed as follows by the speaker, Laches:

Whenever I hear a man discussing virtue or some kind of wisdom, then, if he really is a man and worthy of the words he utters, I am completely delighted to see the appropriateness and harmony existing between the speaker and his words. And such a man seems to me to be genuinely musical, producing the most beautiful harmony, not on the lyre or some other pleasurable instrument, but actually rendering his own life harmonious by fitting his deeds to his words in a truly Dorian mode, not in the Ionian, nor even, I think, in the Phrygian or Lydian, but in the only harmony that is genuinely Greek.¹³⁸ (188c6–d8, emphasis mine)

ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περὶ τινος σοφίας ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τὸν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἀρμόττοντά ἐστι. καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι [ζῆν ἡρμωσμένος οὗ] αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἰαστί, οἶομαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστὶ, ἀλλ’ ἥπερ μόνῃ Ἑλληνικῇ ἐστὶν ἀρμονία. (188c6–d8, emphasis mine)

¹³⁸ This English translation is quoted from Rosamond Kent Sprague’s translation in *Plato Complete Works*.

According to Laches, a human should produce a harmony between himself and his words, and such a person is really a “musical” person. Laches clearly supposes an agent of harmony. Specifically, in the context of his speech, the object of the tuner is the relationship between the tuner (or speaker) himself and his words. Therefore, the dialogue supposes reflexive harmonizing here. The harmony does not seem to arise automatically or unconsciously, because Laches says that the person makes a concordance between “his deeds and words.” Furthermore, in the *Republic*, Socrates himself argues that justice allows the soul to determine its own business and govern and order itself, as well as to make friends with itself and harmonize its own three parts:

And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not concerned with someone’s doing his own job on the outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the things that are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—lowest, highest, and middle—as well as any others that may be in between. He binds together all of these and, from having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. (443c9–e2, emphasis mine)¹³⁹

In this passage, Socrates supposes that a person harmonizes three elements within himself. That person is the agent of harmonization of the soul’s three parts which

¹³⁹ Translation by C.D.C Reeve. 2004. Reeve’s translation is based on the text edited by S.R.S Slings. *Platonis Rempublicam*. 2003. Oxford Classical Texts, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

have different functions. As a result of that, he “becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious” (... καὶ παντάπασιν ἓνα γεγόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμουςμένον...) (443e1–2). There is also a difference between *Laches* and the *Republic* in terms of the object of harmonizing. While the person more holistically harmonizes his deeds in his life with his words in *Laches*, the person in the *Republic* influences or harmonizes the specific parts within his soul. Thus, the person in *Republic* approaches his inner conditions more directly. Both passages presuppose an agent of harmonization, which is clearly different from the Harmonia theory introduced by Simmias and reconstructed by Socrates.

As we can see in those two dialogues, the agent of harmonization and the way he harmonizes affects *harmonia* that is the result of harmonizing. Thus, the lack of a harmonizing agent in the Harmonia theory in *Phaedo* should not be overlooked. Indeed, we will see in the next chapter of this thesis that the life-giving agent has an important position in Cebes’ counterargument and Socrates’ Final Argument.

The character of attunement differs depending on the agents. Neither Simmias’ Harmonia theory nor the refined version of the theory can correctly define *harmonia* without considering its agent. For example, the real cause of the tuning of a tuned lyre is not the materials that the instrument is composed of, but rather the tuner. Simmias’ theory is therefore insufficient as a causal theory, and Socrates’ reconsideration also identifies that flaw. Instead, Socrates discusses tuning by introducing the concept of sharing (μετέχειν). While reflecting that Plato’s other dialogues are clearly aware of the agent in harmonizing, we should consider the absence of the tuning agent in both Harmonia theories as Plato’s indirect suggestion of their defects as a theory of causation.

Simmias could not find this problem of causation by himself. That ignorance is closely connected with his careless use of the term “divine” in his example of the attunement in the tuned lyre. This term is used in the AA in order to show the soul’s governing position over the body. Therefore, if he had followed

the AA correctly, he should have never used the term in that example since the attunement depends on the lyre. It is not a meaningless relapse that Socrates resumes argument (A) that deals with the relationship between the attunement and its components—even though Socrates has already revealed the contradiction in Simmias' theory through argument (B)—because argument (A) once again emphasizes the causal relationship between the soul and the body. The soul governs the body and rejects disturbances from bodily desires. In addition, as I mention in the penultimate paragraph of section 2, Socrates quotes Homer's work, which offers a vivid image of Odysseus restraining himself. Socrates gives Simmias, who is deceived by an outwardly plausible image of the Harmonia theory, the image of Odysseus that is endorsed by their examination of the soul. That image helps him to recognize again the soul's governing function and the correct causal order between the soul and body.

Conclusion of Chapter 4

Socrates' criticism of the Harmonia theory thoroughly reveals Simmias' problematic beliefs regarding the soul. Simmias is forced to recognize that the Harmonia theory is inconsistent with his other agreements in the DD and RA. This inconsistency arises because of his insufficient understanding of the AA and the concept of *harmonia*. Socrates reveals this problem in both explicit and implicit ways. After Socrates explicitly reveals the inconsistency between Simmias' Harmonia theory and his agreement of the RA, he clearly recognizes his own cognitive problem: he is deceived by outward plausibility and has inconsistent beliefs about the soul. Furthermore, the dialogue *Phaedo* suggests implicitly the absence of the tuner in the Harmonia theory, which may cause a critically problematic understanding of a governing order between the soul and body.

Simmias is aware of a problem of his Soul-harmonia theory in the middle of the criticism (92c11–e4. See Text 3). It depends on apparent plausibility and does

not offer proof. Thus, the Criticism of the Harmonia theory saliently depicts Simmias's self-discovery of his own false beliefs, and it also suggests a type of problematic discussion that deceives him. The criticism is specifically efficacious to Simmias, because it brings out his own experiences in geometry and all other subjects. Those experiences have taught him that arguments depending on outward plausibility are deceitful. Furthermore, Simmias recognizes that he is convinced of the RA, which is suggested by "means of hypothesis worthy of acceptance" (92d6–7). Thus, the Criticism causes him to find how he should trust arguments.

The implicit revealing of the absence of tuner in the Harmonia theory urges the interlocutor to recognize his problematic mind-set in an ingenious way. The lack of a harmonizing agent in his theory does not seem to display a salient contradiction with other beliefs. However, that absence will consequently cause a serious problem in his understanding of the self, because it can deprive the soul of its control of the body or its ability of self-decision. The agent of harmonizing must be an indispensable factor in the concept of *harmonia*, which can be understood by the fact that Plato suggests an agent of harmonizing in his other dialogues. However, it is not clear how far the implicit suggestion of the absence of tuner causes Simmias to realize a fundamental problem in causation. In the next chapter, we will see how causation is a focal topic regarding self-discovery.

Chapter 5. Examination of the soul as the cause of life
—The Final Argument of the immortality of the soul (102a11–107b10)—

Introduction to Chapter 5

In the previous chapter, we have seen that Socrates reveals that Simmias' Soul-Harmonia theory is inconsistent with his other beliefs in an ingenious way. Moreover, the soul-Harmonia theory implies a critical fault from the standpoint of causation. The tuner or agent of harmonizing should accompany *harmonia*. Both the theory and the articulated version of the theory suggested by Socrates, however, lack the agent or tuner. In other words, the Harmonia theory lacks reference to the true cause of harmony. The problem of causality is also emphasized when compared with Cebes' counterargument.¹⁴⁰ Cebes uses an analogy in which the soul is likened to a weaver and the body to a cloak (87b3–e5). An old weaver wears out many cloaks and then weaves new ones again. The weaver exists much longer than do the cloaks; however, he will eventually die, leaving the final cloak. Therefore, the soul might finally perish after many births and deaths, and the body will also quickly disappear. In this analogy, since the soul makes the body, the body depends on the soul, which is in contrast with Simmias' Harmonia theory wherein the soul depends on the body for its existence.

Cebes follows the causal order of the soul and body suggested by Socrates and admits the soul's other divine characteristics that are claimed in the AA. He seems to suggest a more reasonable understanding of the AA than does Simmias, who ignores some of soul's essential characteristics and shows an error in his understanding of causality. Cebes, however, supposes that someone might refuse "to concede the further point that the soul does not suffer in its many births and at the end perish completely during one of those deaths..." (88a8–10). This statement

¹⁴⁰ Ellen Wagner correctly points out this difference of causal order between the Harmonia theory and Cebes' analogy (Wagner 2001, 82).

suggests a specific, different viewpoint on life. Those many births and deaths might be harmful to the soul. Considering that the weaver makes the cloaks and that the body that is likened to the cloak quickly disappears after the soul's perishing, the soul arguably makes the living body.¹⁴¹ Therefore, Cebes seems to think that the soul is the cause of life. Nevertheless, the soul can suffer some damage through births and deaths. He inquires whether the soul as cause of life can suffer damage and finally perish. Socrates admits the seriousness of Cebes' problem and states that they must "study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be" (95e9–96a1). Thus, he suggests his hypothetical method via the theory of Forms (96a5–102a3) and the Final Argument (FA) regarding the soul's immortality (102a11–107b10). Socrates must reply to Cebes' view of the soul and life through those arguments.

In this chapter, I argue that Socrates tries to improve Cebes' understanding of life through the FA and his autobiography as a preliminary to the argument. The interlocutors have been greatly concerned about the soul's death; however, life has not been fully discussed since the Cyclical Argument that suggested that living things comes from dead things (70c8–d1). In the FA, Socrates discusses life from the viewpoint of causation based on the theory of Forms.

In Socrates' approach, we should notice the following two points. First, while the FA might seem to be a completely abstract and general discussion because of its acute focus on language analysis within the theory of the Forms, this argument is strongly concerned with the interlocutor's understanding of life: Socrates examines what it means to say that a thing has its own property. For example, one might say that Simmias is larger than Socrates. This expression must be corrected to be that Simmias is large by "providing to Socrates his largeness,

¹⁴¹ Socrates draws a distinction between the living body (σώμα) and corpse (νεκρός) in the AA (80c2–d3)

which exceeds Socrates' smallness" (102c12–d1).¹⁴² However, if the interlocutor accepts Socrates' perspective on life, this argument will change his understanding of life. He admits that the soul gives life to the body, but also assumes that this offering is harmful to the soul and eventually makes it perish (88a8–b2). In Cebes' understanding, the soul as the cause of life is consumable. Conversely, Socrates attempts to argue that soul's animating function for the body cannot be harmful to the soul itself. Thus, Socrates replaces Cebes' understanding of the soul and life with his version of the soul that excludes perishing.

Second, within the process of investigating life in the FA, Socrates retains his epistemic modesty both regarding the nature of the soul and the theory of Forms. This point is concerned with a method of philosophical investigation in the *Phaedo*. Socrates does not have a perfect foundation for the investigation. The hypothesis of the Forms is the strongest means for him in order to obtain wisdom; however, it still requires further examination. The soul's essential characteristics are investigated based on the hypothesis (for example, in the RA) and through its affinity with the Forms (in the AA). Thus, without knowing the Forms, participants in the discussion cannot claim to know the nature of the soul. As we see in the previous arguments, Socrates and the interlocutors discover their soul's intellectual desire for knowing the Forms. However, they do not discover the soul's nature in *Phaedo*. In the FA, Socrates and the interlocutor discover that their soul must be the cause of their life. The body is not a cause of one's life. Therefore, they must improve their soul as a real cause of their life but should not care about the body too much, since the body cannot be their core. At least, the body cannot retain its existence without the soul. Socrates' epistemic modesty implies that they must continue examining the Forms and their soul. Even though they discover some undeniable and essential characteristics of the soul (the intellectual desire and the animating function), it is insufficient to know its nature. However, based

¹⁴² Socrates says regarding this kind of expression "I seem to be on the point of talking just like a textbook, but anyway the reality is presumably as I say." (102d3–4). He recognizes that this expression sounds like a highly technical one.

on their discovery of soul's essential characteristics and the hypothesis of the Forms, they continue investigating the nature of their own soul. Socrates' epistemically modest method of investigation in the FA suggests how one should continue investigating the Forms and the soul, following one's intellectual desire.

Regarding interpretation of the FA, many scholars have considered the metaphysical status of the soul to be a focal point for the demonstration of the immortality of the soul, and the main controversy is about whether the soul is a Form or a substance.¹⁴³ However, Socrates' statements in the FA are often too vague for us to decide at the outset on a fixed status of this order. This might appear to be a weak point of this argument. Yet I emphasize that Socrates' primary objective is to investigate the soul's function as the cause of life. Socrates rather carefully retains his epistemic modesty about the metaphysical status of the soul.

This chapter develops arguments as follows. First, I analyse Cebes' counter argument and Socrates' summary of it, which form the starting point of the FA. Second, I examine Socrates autobiography that suggests how the theory of Forms comes into being. This shows that Socrates begins considering causation from his own recognition of his own ignorance. In sections 3 and 4, I clarify the meaning of

¹⁴³ Soul-Form view: Vlastos (1969, 318. n.70), Soul-substance view: Gallop (1975, 198), Frede (1978, 33-34), Rowe (1993, 261). Hackforth (1955, 165) sees a change of the soul's metaphysical status within the FA. David Sedley has a different perspective on the soul's metaphysical status. "Plato does not in this context show the slightest interest in distinguishing between metaphysically different kinds of thing: the thing considered as a candidate for the cause of some effect can just as well be a physical stuff like fire or bone, a mathematical process like addition, the good, a soul, intelligence, or a Form such as Largeness or Oddness. What determines the success or failure of the candidate cause is nothing to do with its metaphysical status, but purely, as we shall see, its logical or quasi-logical relation to the effect" (Sedley 1998, 115). Sedley's main objective in the article is to clarify the meaning of "cause" in Plato's thought. Sedley thinks it is standardly "the thing itself, rather than some fact or event involving it" (ibid., 116). I agree with his focus on the function of cause rather than the metaphysical status of those causes. Yet my main target is to clarify how Socrates changes Cebes' understanding of cause. In addition, I assume Plato recognizes the problem of status, considering the introduction of an anonymous person and Socrates' replies to him at 103a4–c4 (I will discuss this issue in section 3 of this chapter). I assume Plato intentionally makes "Socrates" not determine the metaphysical status of the soul because Plato recognizes the seriousness of the problem.

the new concepts that are introduced in the FA; “the character in us” and the bearer of the essential character. The soul is depicted as the bearer of life, and therefore Socrates suggests that the soul cannot accept death. I argue that Socrates shows a different understanding of the soul and life from Cebes’ while retaining the correct epistemic modesty about the metaphysical status of the soul. Socrates’ perspective of life requires Cebes to change his understanding of the soul and life. In that sense, it promotes a correct pathway for Cebes’ self-discovery, showing that the soul must be his core and that it can never be damaged by its function of offering life to the body. Additionally, Socrates’ epistemic modesty regarding the nature of the soul implies that one should continue investigating the Forms and the soul. The FA suggests that self-discovery is not completed but requires further investigations.

1. Cebes’ problem and Socrates’ summary

Cebes offers a counterargument against the AA (86e6–88b8). His argument is different from Simmias’ Harmonia theory in that it admits the soul’s independent position, and moreover the soul’s function to make the living body.¹⁴⁴ The last point is not clearly mentioned in previous arguments. Socrates summarises Cebes’ criticism after refuting the Harmonia theory and that summary is admitted by Cebes (95b8–e4). Compared to Socrates’ criticism of the Harmonia theory, he seems to treat Cebes’ counterargument more faithfully. Socrates immediately points out the inconsistency between the Harmonia theory and the RA, and furthermore he suggests his updated version of the theory. On the other hand, Socrates faithfully summarises Cebes’ counterargument and finds that it is a

¹⁴⁴ Sarah Broadie claims a fundamental difference between “Plato’s soul–body dualism” and Descartes’ mind–body dualism (Broadie 2001, 295); she argues as follows: “The main difference, from which others flow, lies in Plato’s acceptance and Descartes’ rejection of the assumption that the soul (= intellect) is identical with what animates the body” (Ibid.).

serious problem. In that sense, Cebes' argument appears more formidable to Socrates. Thus, we shall see the details of his counterargument.

1.1 Cebes' counterargument (86e6–88b8)

Cebes initiates his refutation as follows:

Text 1

Well, the argument seems still to be where it was, and to be open to the same charge that we were making earlier. That our soul existed even before it entered its present form, I don't retreat from saying that this has been very neatly and, if it isn't tasteless to say so, quite sufficiently proved. But that it also still exists somewhere after we have died – there I don't think the point has been proved. Now I don't accept Simmias' objection that soul isn't something tougher and longer-lasting than body, for I think it is far superior indeed in all those respects. (86e6–87a8)

Cebes admits that the soul is “tougher and longer-lasting” than the body. This is crucially different from Simmias' argument that the soul depends on the body for its existence: when the body perishes, the soul also perishes, just as the attunement in a lyre perishes when the lyre is destroyed. Admitting that the soul is tougher and longer-lasting than the body, however, does not indicate the soul's immortality and imperishability. First, Cebes uses an example of a “weaver” and “cloaks” (87b2–87e5), and then he doubts the soul' immortality from the apprehension that the soul's coming into the body is the start of its destruction (87e5–88b8). Finally, as Cebes suggests, someone might say that if a person cannot demonstrate that the soul is completely “immortal and imperishable” (ἀθάνατόν and ἀνώλεθρον), it is necessary for the person, when he is about to die, to fear that

the soul should completely perish when disjoining the body (88b4–8). His counterargument includes two interesting points:

(1) The weaver and cloak analogy (87b4–d3):

Cebes interprets the relationship between the soul and the body by comparison with that between a weaver and cloaks. An old weaver makes many cloaks and wears them out. A human being is “longer-lasting” than a cloak. However, the old weaver dies earlier than the final cloak that he made.

(2) Supposed opponent of the soul’s immortality

Cebes imagines an opponent of the AA:¹⁴⁵ the opponent admits our souls’ prenatal existence and that “after we have died, there is nothing to prevent the souls of some people from still existing and from being designed to go on existing, to be born many times and to die again, on the grounds that the soul is so tough in nature that it can endure being born many times” (88a4–8). Although granting that, he refuses “to concede the further point that the soul does not suffer in its many births and at the end perish completely during one of those deaths” (88a8–10) and says that “no one knows which death and which parting from the body make the soul perish” (88a10–b2).

This analogy suggests two important things: (1) even though the soul is longer-lasting than the body, this does not mean that the soul is eternal; (2) the soul makes

¹⁴⁵ There is a textual problem at the passage introducing the opponent: “εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλεον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἂν σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὐθις...” (88a1–6, emphasis mine). It is difficult to understand ἢ. Some editors delete it. Sedley and Long suggest two versions of the translation: “Let us suppose someone conceded even more to one who says what you are saying [...]” (ἢ is deleted). “let us suppose one conceded to someone saying even more than what you are saying.” (ἢ is retained).

the body, which arguably means that the soul is the cause of the body's being. As Gallop points out, the body "is causally dependent upon" the soul.¹⁴⁶ The analogy part also says that the body "quickly rot[s] and disappear[s]" after the soul perishes (87e3–5).¹⁴⁷ Thus, it seems that the soul animates the body and maintains its shape. In the second point, this argument admits the causal relationship between the soul and the body suggested in the AA and confirms the soul's position as the cause. Even while admitting the soul's independent and controlling position, however, Cebes suggests that the soul might perish after leaving the final body. The soul might grow old like a weaver, even though it has the characteristic of lasting longer.

The supposed opponent suggests a remarkable new interpretation of birth and death: repeated births and deaths might be harmful to the soul. Even though the opponent admits that the soul is tougher and longer-lasting, it might finally perish after numerous cycles of coming into, and departing from, the body. Cebes does not clarify how repeated birth and death are harmful. Yet we can assume the reason from the example. It states that the soul makes the body, which arguably means animating the body. In that case, the soul seems to offer life to the body, since the body quickly rots without the soul. In the AA, Socrates also says that the body is called "corpse" (νεκρός) when a human dies (80c2–3). After the soul departs, the body becomes a corpse that should be distinguished from a living body (σώμα). If life that the soul offers is finite, the soul would gradually lose it by providing life. If this assumption is correct, Cebes shows a peculiar view of the soul and life. The soul is exhausted in animating and departing from the body when the soul is the cause of life. This leads to a problem about whether the cause of life is an expendable existence.

In sum, I argue that Cebes suggests the following points. (1) the soul can be perishable although it is independent of the body and moreover the cause of

¹⁴⁶ Gallop 1975, 150.

¹⁴⁷ "And, after the soul perishes, only then does the body show its natural weakness and quickly rot and disappear" (87e3–5).

life; (2) the soul can suffer through many births and deaths. Next, we have to see how Socrates summarizes Cebes' argument.

1.2 Socrates' summary of Cebes' argument

Socrates summarises Cebes' argument after rejecting Simmias' Harmonia theory. I shall quote a long passage in order to show how faithfully Socrates summarizes Cebes' argument:

Text 2

You think it must be demonstrated that our soul is both imperishable and immortal, if it is not to be unintelligent and foolish for a philosophical man to believe confidently, when he is about to die, that after his death he will fare better there than if he had lived a different life before he met his end. As for showing that the soul is something tough and godlike, and that it existed even before we became human beings—there is nothing, you say, to stop all of that being evidence not of immortality, but of the fact that the soul is long-lasting and existed somewhere previously for an unimaginably long time, and used to know and do a great deal. Anyhow, you said, that does not make it any the more immortal: on the contrary, the very fact of coming into a human body was the start of its perishing, like a disease. On this view, the soul really suffers as it lives this life and eventually, in what is called “death”, it perishes. Now whether it enters a body once or many times make no difference, you claim, at least as regards the fear each of us has. For anyone of any intelligence *should* be afraid, if they do not know that it is immortal and cannot offer an argument to show as much.” (95b9–e1, emphasis mine)

Socrates' summary seems to follow important points in Cebes' argument faithfully, although some of his expressions are different from those used by Cebes. Specifically, as I emphasise in the text, there are three points that Socrates

apprehends from Cebes' argument. They are: (1) the soul's imperishability; (2) the tough and godlike characteristics of the soul; and (3) the soul's entering the body like disease.

(1) Cebes also admits that the soul is tougher than the body and endures numerous births and deaths. However, he is concerned that the soul could finally perish after surviving those births and deaths. Therefore, he requires the demonstration of both the "immortality and imperishability" of the soul. Socrates' summary also adopts the word "imperishable" (ἀνώλεθρος) (95c1).

(2) Cebes mentions the soul's "tougher" characteristic but does not use the term "godlike" (θεοειδής); and moreover, this word is used only once in this dialogue.¹⁴⁸ "Divine" is used in the AA and the Criticism of the Harmonia theory in order to depict the soul's governing characteristic (80a3–4, 94e5). Cebes' example of a weaver and his cloaks suggests that the soul makes the body, which emphasises that the body depends on the soul in terms of causality. The causal order in a weaver and cloaks moves in the same direction to that suggested in those previous arguments. The term "godlike" seems to refer to soul's causality that can be found in Cebes' example. Indeed, creation of a living body seems to be "godlike."

(3) Cebes' argument shows that numerous births and deaths might be harmful to the soul. Socrates grasps that point and refers to the damage as "disease." In the previous arguments, Socrates also emphasises that the soul is disturbed by bodily sensations. We have not seen, however, an argument that the soul damages itself in living or by animating the body. Socrates' mention of disease covers the point that is newly introduced by Cebes, which is the soul's suffering damage in births and deaths.

Cebes' argument and Socrates' summary shows that Cebes has a peculiar understanding of the soul and life. Even if the soul is tougher and more long-

¹⁴⁸ The term was searched for in the dialogue by *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* <http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/>

lasting than the body as well as the cause of the living body, it might perish. Therefore, Socrates must investigate whether the soul as the cause of life can perish. This is indeed a tremendous problem concerning the nature of cause. *Phaedo* presents Socrates as follows:

Text 3

Now Socrates paused for quite some time and considered something by himself, and then he said: 'What you're seeking is no small matter, Cebes; we must study thoroughly and as a whole the cause of coming-to-be and cease-to-be. So, if you like, I'll recount my experiences concerning them; then, if you see something useful in what I say, you'll use it to convince yourself about the very points you raise.' (95e8–96a3).

We cannot know directly what Socrates thinks silently. However, he is clearly concerned about cause, and his following argument's objective is to offer an assertion by which Cebes convinces himself. Contrasting with Simmias' argument, Cebes grasps focal points in the AA, especially in understanding the soul's independence and priority in its causal relationship with the body. However, he reveals a critical problem in life concerning the soul as cause. Since he shares with Socrates some beliefs regarding the soul, this problem becomes more serious. Socrates must answer this final problem in order to retain their shared beliefs that include the soul's immortality. Causality itself is a large and difficult topic; however, we should notice that Socrates is trying to offer a persuasive argument primarily to Cebes. Thus, Socrates confesses his own past problem in understanding causation in order to establish an introduction for their "Final Argument."

2. Socrates' autobiography as a review of causation

Socrates also confesses his past disappointment with the explanations of cause proffered by natural scientists, in that they did not seem to explain the true cause (96a5–99c6). He needed to investigate causation in another way, namely “the second voyage” (99c6–d2), which is an explanation of cause based on the theory of Forms (99d4–102a3).

This confession is mentioned in Socrates’ autobiography, which shows how he found the theory of Forms that is used in almost all of the arguments in *Phaedo*. The autobiography can be divided into three stages: (1) Socrates found his ignorance regarding the cause of physical phenomena (96a5–97b7); (2) his disappointment in Anaxagoras’ explanation of cause (97b8–99c6); and (3) “the second voyage,” a new explanation of causation (99c6–102a3).

2.1 Young Socrates’ recognition of ignorance

In the first stage, Socrates confesses his enthusiasm for the wisdom which people called “natural science” when he was young (96a5–7).¹⁴⁹ It seemed “quite sublime” to him “to know the causes of each thing, why each one comes to be, why it perishes, and why it is.” (96a7–9). Thus, we find that young Socrates was also concerned with cause. Furthermore, his first example of questions in natural science suggests the cause of life, which is remarkable in interpreting the FA as a reply to Cebes’ counter-argument: “Is it when the hot and the cold start to decompose, as some people were saying, that living things grow into a unity?” (96b2–3). This inquiry seems to deal with the cause of living things in a

¹⁴⁹ “ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν” (96a5–7, emphasis mine). It is problematic to translate “περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν.” I follow Gallop’s translation of “natural science” (Gallop 1975, 47 and 234). The word ἱστορία can be translated as “inquiry.” Indeed, C. J. Rowe translated “περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν” into “inquiry about nature” and Sedley and Long translate it into “research into nature” (Rowe 1993, 230; Sedley and Long 2010, 90). However, I think this phrase is a kind of label attached by other people. At least, Socrates does not define who calls this subject as “περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν.” “Natural science” seems to be the most appropriate translation.

materialistic view. From this investigation, Socrates tried to proceed to find the seat of perceptions, memory and opinion, and knowledge (96b3–9). However, he finally found himself facing a serious problem since he came to think he was “uniquely unqualified for this inquiry” (96c2–3). He states the reason why he thought that as follows:

Text 4

I was so utterly blinded by that inquiry with regard to the very things that, at least as I and others supposed, I had previously known clearly that I unlearned those very things that earlier I had thought I knew, on many subjects, but in particular why a human being grows. (96c3–8)

This confession is important for two reasons. First, it depicts the exact moment when Socrates discovered his ignorance about what he knew. This occasion is often given to many other people by Socrates in Plato’s other dialogues (e.g. *Apology*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*). While we can see Socrates’ acknowledgement of his ignorance, for example, in *Apology*,¹⁵⁰ this passage shows a specific occasion where he recognizes his ignorance about what he thought he knew. Second, Socrates dares to say that both he and other people supposed that Socrates knew something. Therefore, Socrates’ recognition of ignorance was not provided by other people. He found this problem on his own. In that sense, Socrates could not depend on other people to reveal his ignorance.¹⁵¹

He recognized his ignorance of what he thought he knew in several cases that concern growing.

¹⁵⁰ “So I withdrew and thought to myself: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know.” (21d2–8) Translation is by G.M.A Grube in *Plato Complete Works* 1997.

¹⁵¹ c.f. A. G. Long 2013, 82: “In the *Phaedo*, as in the *Hippias Major*, we see that his self-criticism has benefitted him in just the same way, for he goes on to try new lines of attack.”

Text 5

First case: Socrates thought the reason why a human being grows was “obvious to everyone” (96c8):

[...] it is on account of eating and drinking. For whenever portions of flesh have been added from food to other portions of flesh, and portions of bone to portions of bone, and so too by the same principle stuff of their own kind has been added to each of the other stuffs, it is then, I thought, that that which was a small mass has gone on to become a big one; and that is how the small person comes to be large. (96c8–d5, emphasis mine)

Second case:

I thought my belief satisfactory when a large person standing by a small one seemed to be larger because of the head itself, and so likewise when one horse was compared with another. (96d8–e1, emphasis mine)

Third case:

[...] it seemed to me even more obvious that ten was more numerous than eight on account of there being two added to it, and that two cubits was larger than one on account of its exceeding the other because of a half. (96e1–4, emphasis mine)

These three cases deal with different situations. The first case explains human beings’ growing by eating or drinking and by addition of physical materials. Thus, it is concerned with physiological growing. The second case deals with a quantitative relationship: a person is relatively larger than another person. This does not mean that the body of larger person is physically growing. The third explanation deals with a law of numbers and therefore is more conceptual than first and second cases. Dorter evaluates this difference as a progression of Socrates’

interests: "Here Socrates' interest has shifted from question of physiology to quantitative relationships [...]"¹⁵² Moreover, he suggests that "the examples are carefully chosen to reflect a progression."¹⁵³ The examples show progressions "from concrete objects [...] to abstract quantities" and "from efficient causality to material causality."¹⁵⁴ I admit that there is a shift from a topic of concrete things to that of conceptual relationship. Yet we should also notice that Socrates mentions certainty in those cases. The first is "obvious to everyone", and the second seems "satisfactory" to Socrates. Further, the third case is "even more obvious" to Socrates. Indeed, the law of numbers is undeniable. Understanding of the first and second cases arguably depends on understanding of the third case, since numerical relationships are fundamental and essential to the evaluation of largeness or smallness of both concrete things and quantitative relationships.

Socrates thought those explanations were obvious. He found, however, a critical problem on a fundamental level:

Text 6

I don't allow myself to say even that, when somebody adds one to one, either the one it was added to has become two, or the one that was added and the one it was added to became two, on account of the addition of the first to the second. (96e6–97a2)

Socrates finds a fundamental problem in growing. According to him, addition itself is a problematic concept. This concept can be applied to all of those three cases. When a particle of muscle is added to another, what becomes large? How can a person become larger than a smaller one by the head being added? If ten is larger than eight because two is added to the eight, what becomes ten? Does eight become ten by adding two? Or does two become ten? Socrates does not "allow"

¹⁵² Dorter 1982, 117.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 117.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 117.

himself to answer the problems regarding addition (Text 6). Socrates prohibits himself to think that he knows that answer. So what is the reason for the prohibition? He states his reason, in which we find that Socrates has serious difficulty finding a persuasive argument for himself:

Text 7

For I find it astonishing that when each of them was apart from the other, each turned out to be one, and they weren't two at that time, but when they came near each other, this supposedly became a cause of their coming to be two, namely the union that consisted in being put near each other. No, nor can I still persuade myself that if somebody divides one, this, the division, has now become a cause of its coming to be two. For then there comes to be a cause of coming to be two that is the opposite of the earlier cause. Back then, you see, it was because they were brought together into proximity with each other, and one was added to the other, but now it is because they are brought apart, and one is separated from the other. No, and I can no longer persuade myself that by using this approach I know why one comes to be, nor, in short, why anything else comes to be, or perishes, or is. Instead I throw together on impulse my own different kind of approach, and I don't adopt this one at all.¹⁵⁵(97a2–b7, emphasis mine).

¹⁵⁵ “θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἄρᾳ ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδὲ γε ὥς ἂν τις ἐν διασχίσει, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὥς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἢ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι. ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ' ἑτέρου. οὐδὲ γε δι' ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται ὥς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἑμαυτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐνὶ λόγῳ δι' ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκὴ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.” (97a2–b7, emphasis mine)

Socrates is concerned about several things. Why does just being in proximity cause one to become two? If dividing one makes two, this explanation is opposite of the previous one. Both “union” and “division” are taken as causes to make two, although they are opposing things. It does not seem that Socrates criticizes each explanation; rather he is concerned that there are different and opposing explanations in one object. Although he does not explicitly say so, a true explanation of the cause of one object should be one. Furthermore, Socrates suggests a more fundamental problem: he cannot “persuade” himself that he knows the cause of being “one” in these kinds of approaches. We should say that oneness is a fundamental and simple concept. However, Socrates lost his confidence that he knows its cause. It is also remarkable that Socrates repeatedly mentions persuasion of himself.¹⁵⁶ He finds the problem by himself without other people’s indication. Thus, Socrates says that “I throw together on impulse my own different kind of approach” (97b6–7).

We have seen the process of young Socrates’ self-recognition of ignorance. It does not depend on other people’s indication but on finding his doubt of his own understanding of the concept of addition. He is concerned that the opposing explanations are adopted in one phenomenon. He could not persuade himself with those explanations, and he discovers a serious conflict in his own understanding of what is so fundamental a concept that it covers many other objects of his understanding.

We will see his solitary start of his investigation in his criticism of Anaxagoras’ theory and hypothesis of Forms in the following two sub-sections.

2.2 Socrates’ disappointment with Anaxagoras’ theory

¹⁵⁶ He also mentions requirement self-persuasion in the previous argument that discusses about “haters of arguments” (*misologoi*) (89d1). He distinguishes himself from “those who have spent time dealing with the arguments used in disputation (*antilogikoi*)” (90b9–c1). Socrates says “And I think that now I will differ from them only to this extent: I won’t strive to make what I say seem true to those who are present, except as a byproduct, but instead to make it seem so as much as possible to myself.” (91a6–b1)

Socrates once had hope in Anaxagoras' theory, since he heard from a man who read Anaxagoras' book that "it turns out to be intelligence (νοῦς) that both orders things and is cause of everything" (97c1–2). Socrates was "pleased with this cause" (97c2–3) and thought it good that "intelligence should be cause of everything" (97c3–4), and supposed that "if this is the case, when intelligence is doing the ordering it orders everything and assigns each thing in whatever way is best" (97c4–6). Considering these statements, Socrates thinks that singularity and goodness are important factors for cause. These explanations of human growth in natural science are not concerned with goodness or why they should be so. Moreover, as Socrates himself apprehended, there were opposing explanations for one phenomenon. If intelligence can be the cause of everything, we do not need to establish plural and opposing causes to the one phenomenon.

However, Socrates was disappointed with Anaxagoras' book, since he saw "the man making no use of his intelligence and not laying any causes at its door with regard to ordering things, but assigning the causality to air, aether, water and the like, as well as many other oddities" (98b8–c2). According to Socrates' diagnosis, Anaxagoras' causal theory is like explaining the reason why Socrates sits in the prison by his own bodily structure, namely as the physical mechanism of bones, sinews, flesh, and skin supporting his body (98c5–d2). The true cause of his sitting, however, should be that, "the Athenians have decided that it was better to condemn me, on account of that I too have also decided that it is better to sit here, and more just to stay put and suffer whatever punishment they decree" (98e1–5). The bodily structure of a human being is not decisive in his action. Even if he does not have legs, if he decides to leave the prison, he would be able to ask someone to help him accomplish his hope. Indeed, Socrates says as follows:

Text 8

For by the Dog, I think these sinews and bones would long have been in Megaera or Boeotia, transported by an opinion as to what is best, if I didn't think it more just and honourable to suffer whatever punishment the city imposes, rather than to escape and run away. (98e5–99a4)

Following Socrates' interpretation of Anaxagoras' theory, Anaxagoras describes how Socrates is when he sits in the prison, but he does not explain why he does so. For Socrates, causation must explain why it is the best to be or do so. In the case of Socrates' sitting, the decision or opinion of Socrates is the cause.¹⁵⁷ In terms of the explanation of cause in natural science, Socrates concludes that "they do not suppose for a moment that what is good and binding truly does bind and keep anything together" (99c5–6). Socrates reflects upon his action and thinks it better to stay at prison in order to receive the death penalty. His reflection upon good action should be the real cause in this case.

2.3 The second voyage

After those investigations, Socrates found that he could not obtain that kind of cause and that he had not been able "either to find it myself or to learn it from someone else" (99c8–9). Therefore, he starts the "second voyage" (ὁ δεύτερος πλόος) (99c9–d1). He is worried that "I might be utterly blinded in my soul through observing things with my eyes and seeking to get hold of them with each of my senses." (99e2–4). This is like that some of those who watch the sun in eclipse destroy their eyes, "if they don't study its image in water or something of the kind" (99d7–e1). Thus, he must "take refuge in" theories (λόγοι) and then "look into the truth of things in them" (99e4–6). For that purpose, he hypothesizes the most robust theory and posits what harmonizes with the theory as true (100a3–5). Thus, we see

¹⁵⁷ Neither of the following "second voyage" or the theory of Forms can offer this teleological causation. Plato might plan to unite all of the Forms under Goodness or the Form of Good. We might be able to seek for this project in his *Republic*.

here that he begins a hypothetical investigation after being disappointed by the existing theories of causality. This statement of Socrates is very important in understanding his method of investigation. Specifically, it is crucial to my project of clarifying self-discovery in the dialogue, since it implies how Socrates begins his investigation from a place where he cannot neither depend on other people in order to know the cause of growing nor find it himself.

It also includes several interpretational problems.¹⁵⁸ For example, there are some terms or phrases whose meaning is not clear, for example, “the second voyage,” “take refuge in *logos*,” and to “harmonize with” the most robust theory. Now it is difficult to display all of the controversies encountered in seeking to understand these terms, but I attempt to show how the establishment of the hypothesis is connected to the FA. Beforehand, I explain the meaning of “the second voyage” in order to grasp the position of the hypothesis. First, “the second voyage” is sometimes explained as “the next-best way” (See *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Liddell and Scott, 1940). Indeed, it is introduced as the investigation undertaken after giving up direct observation of the growing phenomenon. So is the voyage the second best that is inferior to some direct understanding of causality? However, Socrates also denies the correctness of his own metaphor of the eclipse watcher in the case of his second voyage and he does not accept that “someone who, when studying things, does so in theories and arguments, is looking into them in images any more than someone who does so in facts.” (100a1–3) As Rowe points out, Plato sometimes suggests that the particulars are images of the Forms,¹⁵⁹ and, as we specifically see in Chapter 2, the particulars have deficiency compared to the Forms. Thus, images include deficiency in some way. Considering this context,

¹⁵⁸ Gallop suggests the interpretational problems in the second voyage in detail. He proposes three points: “(1)What is meant at 100a4 by ‘hypothesizing on each occasion the theory (*logos*) I judge strongest’ ? (2) How can the metaphor of ‘accord’ (a5) be interpreted in such a way that ‘putting down as true whatever things seem to me to accord with it, and as not true whatever do not’ will seem a logically defensible procedure? (3) How is this procedure related to its context, especially to the illustrations at 100b–101c?” (Gallop 1975, 178)

¹⁵⁹ Rowe 1993, 240. For example, *Phaedrus* 250b3.

Socrates seems to deny that investigation in *logoi* suffers such inferiority to the actual facts. Thus, “theories” are not just images, and this hypothetical investigation is not inferior to the direct understanding of the cause of changing things.

Socrates establishes the hypothesis as follows:

Text 9

Well, I’ll set about giving you a demonstration of the sort of cause which I’ve pursued. I’ll go back to those things that have been our frequent refrain, and start from them, first hypothesizing that there are such things as a Beautiful alone by itself, and a Good, a Large and all the rest. (100b3–7)

Here, Socrates seems to hypothesise the Forms, which has been done in the previous arguments of *Phaedo* (65d4–e1; 75c7–d4; 76d7–e4; 78d1–5). Socrates says that if this hypothesis is accepted, he has hope to demonstrate the cause and find that the soul is immortal from those Forms (100b7–9). Yet it is not clear how these Forms can explain the cause. He then proposes another idea from the hypothesis: “It appears to me that if anything is beautiful other than the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing other than its having a share (μετέχει) of *that* Beautiful” (100c4–6, emphasis mine).

Then Socrates announces his fundamental claim:

Text 10

[...] nothing makes it beautiful other than that Beautiful’s presence, or association (εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία), or whatever its mode and means of accruing may be. For I don’t go so far as to insist on this, but only that it is because of the beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful. (100d4–8)

The thesis that sharing the Beautiful itself is the cause of thing's being beautiful is not deduced directly from the hypothesis of the Form of the Beautiful. Thus, I think we should think that both establishment of the Forms and concept of sharing are hypothetical theories. The latter cannot be deduced from the former, but depends on it, because without establishment of the Forms, that sharing is impossible. Additionally, they are not inconsistent with one another. I infer that Socrates establishes two hypotheses: (1) There are the Forms; (2) things have their properties on account of sharing the Forms.

Establishing these hypotheses, Socrates does not admit existing explanations, even in a very simple case, such as that of something's being large and that of a number becoming. So he does not permit the statement that one person is larger than another because of the head. It must be said that everything larger than something else is larger because of largeness (100e8–101a3). The former explanation is rejected because the head can be used as the reason for two opposing cases (101a7–8). For example, x is larger than y because of a head; y is smaller than x because of the head. Socrates also says that “even though the head is small, the larger person is larger because of it, and that this would be bizarre, somebody's being large because of something small” (101a8–b2). Furthermore, in terms of two becoming, the cause of it is “getting share of twoness,” not the addition or division of one (101c4–6).

2.4 The beginning of the Final Argument¹⁶⁰

Socrates establishes the aforementioned fundamental hypotheses from considering the faults in natural science, namely, the Forms and that things have their properties by sharing the Forms. The initial hypotheses are further confirmed

¹⁶⁰ The rest parts of this chapter after this section are based on my forthcoming paper: Miura, T. 2018 (forthcoming). “Immortality and imperishability of the soul in the final argument of Plato's *Phaedo*”

at the beginning of the FA. Two important points are agreed upon (102b1–3): (1) “each of the Forms exists” and (2) other things participate in the Forms, and are named after the Forms in which they participate. At this initial stage, we have acquired a foundational distinction regarding the Forms and particular things that will formalise our statements about things having characters. At this point in the dialogue, Socrates begins explaining how a thing becomes large or small. He introduces a new concept, ‘the character in us’, to explain how the character of large or small is present in us.

Before moving to examination of the FA, I indicate a peculiar point in the second voyage. Socrates starts this voyage from the point where he cannot depend on himself and other people for investigating cause. This is a specific kind of puzzlement that is different from that which Socrates gives to other people. He found this difficulty and started the second voyage by himself. Furthermore, even in the process of the second voyage, Socrates implies a requirement of solitude clinging to the hypothesis: “[...] I no longer understand those other wise causes, and I can’t recognise them either. Suppose someone tells me why something or other is beautiful, and says that it is because it has a vivid colour or shape, or some other such thing. I ignore those other explanations, because I am confused when they are all around me, and I keep the following at my side, in my straightforward, amateurish and perhaps simple-minded way: [...]” (100c9–d4). Socrates proclaims that he should cling to the hypothesis of Forms (100d4–8, see Text 10) and says, “[...] and I believe that if I cling to this I could never fall, but that it is safe to reply both to myself and to anyone else that it is because of the beautiful that beautiful things come to be beautiful” (100d8–e3). His investigation starts from a peculiar point in which he cannot depend on discussion with others. This should be noticed as a background of the Final Argument. Socrates thoroughly uses dialogue to examine himself or others, but he was forced to start his investigation from a doubt of existing theories of cause. Furthermore, he must cling to the hypotheses and reply “both to myself and to anyone else” (100d9) based on them. Those

hypotheses are foundation both in introspective speculation and discussion with others.

3. The character in us

Next, Socrates investigates the following problem:

Text 11

So if that's what you are saying, whenever you say that Simmias is larger than Socrates, but smaller than Phaedo, don't you mean that at that time both of these, both largeness and smallness, are in Simmias? (102b3–6)

Cebes agrees with this. However, as Socrates says, the statement that Simmias exceeds Socrates is not true as a matter of fact (102b8–c1). Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, but because of the largeness he happens to have. On the other hand, Simmias is exceeded by Phaedo because of the largeness that Phaedo has by reference to Simmias' smallness. Therefore, Simmias is characterized as being large or small by being in the middle between them, "offering his smallness to Phaedo's largeness to be exceeded, but providing to Socrates his largeness, which exceeds Socrates' smallness" (102c11–d2). Furthermore, Socrates makes the following statement:

Text 11

For it seems to me not only that Largeness itself is never willing to be large and small at the same time, but also that the largeness in us never admits the small, and is not willing to be exceeded, but must do one of two things, either flee and retreat when its opposite, the small, is approaching it, or perish when that opposite has approached. (102d6–e2)

Socrates has introduced the concept of “the largeness in us.” We shall call this kind of character, ‘the character in us.’ Socrates recommends that the interlocutor changes their common expressions that “Simmiias is larger than Socrates” or “Simmiias exceeds Socrates” by saying that Simmiias exceeds Socrates because of the largeness that he happens to have. He has proffered a new, more appropriate statement about that Simmiias is large, in accordance with Socrates’ hypothesis.

What happens then to the largeness or smallness in us, when Simmiias is larger or smaller? Socrates avoids making a definitive declaration, and merely suggests possible options, to flee and retreat or perish. This alternative is applied to the subsequent concept of the bearer. If a thing can perish, it is difficult to admit this as a Form in the context of *Phaedo*; so this alternative is an important factor in deciding its ontological status. Hackforth claims that one of the alternatives, to flee or depart (103a1–2), is presented only to provide a case for the soul.¹⁶¹ Perishing is meant to apply to all other cases. According to Gallop, Hackforth’s interpretation would suggest that “the alternative is not meant as a real one in other cases.”¹⁶² However, as Gallop says, considering its repeated application to plural objects, this alternative must retain its status as one of two options.¹⁶³ Furthermore, we should notice that Socrates never declares which alternative occurs in any given case during the FA. In the case of both the perishability and the imperishability of the bearers, Socrates has reservations about their relationship with imperishability (106b1–c7). In the case of the soul, Socrates still suggests that an argument for its imperishability is necessary, if they cannot agree that the immortal must also be imperishable (106c9–d1). So, although this alternative retains its meaning, Socrates is undecided on whether the character in us perishes or retreats.

After introducing the character in us, an intermission occurs when an anonymous person asks a question (103a4–10): although, in the Cyclical Argument, the opposites come to be from the opposites (e.g. the larger comes to be from the

¹⁶¹ Hackforth 1955, 148. n.3

¹⁶² Gallop 1975, 195.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 195.

smaller), the FA suggests that the opposite cannot accept nor become its opposite. They seem to claim the contrary. However, Socrates claims that the anonymous person does not understand the difference between these two arguments (103a11–c4);¹⁶⁴ in the Cyclical Argument, Socrates claims that opposite things come to be from their opposites (the living thing comes to be the dead); on the other hand, the FA considers the opposite itself. In order to make the difference clearer between the opposite and the opposite by itself, Socrates adds the word “thing” (πράγμα) to the opposite to ensure that it is understood as “opposite thing” (103b3). This word, *πράγμα*, is also used in the Cyclical Argument (71a9–10): “‘So,’ he said, ‘we have a satisfactory grasp of this: all opposite things come to be in this way, from opposites?’”¹⁶⁵ This one word (*πράγμα*) is important in implying that this section of the dialogue is not about opposite thing, but about opposites as they exist by themselves

This intermission highlights Socrates’ characterisation of the peculiar character of the FA. In the argument, Socrates investigates the true cause of things, “the character in us” (e.g. heat, largeness, life), and this method differs from the Cyclical Argument. While the Cyclical Argument deals with living and dead things, the FA focuses on the true cause of life that makes things living. This difference suggests another problem regarding life and death. The definition of death is given in Socrates’ Defence of Death, as soul’s separation from death (64c4–8). In this case, the separation happens in living things containing the soul and body. However, Cebes’ argument suggests another level of death. In his analogy of a weaver (86e6–88b8), Cebes admits the continuity of the soul after death as the

¹⁶⁴ “Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου *πράγματος* τὸ ἐναντίον *πράγμα* γίνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα” (103a11–c1, emphasis mine)

¹⁶⁵ “Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίνεταί, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα” (71a9–10, emphasis mine)

separation; however, he points out the possibility that the soul can suffer destruction even after surviving the separation. In other words, Cebes' counter-argument suggests two levels of death whether he acknowledges that or not. One is the soul's separation from the body, and the other is the destruction of the soul itself which is independent of the body.

Socrates has already shown the soul's endurance of separation through the three demonstrations of the soul's immortality (the Cyclical Argument, the Recollection Argument, and the Affinity Argument). Then, he must deal with the second level of death and demonstrate the immortality to which it corresponds. In the Cyclical Argument, the dead and living things form a cyclical structure, and within it, the soul retains its continuity, enduring the separation. In the FA, Socrates deals with life itself which makes things live, and a central problem regards whether this life itself can accept death.

Socrates introduces the character in us and suggests an accurate statement of things' having some properties based on the hypothesis of Forms. If this part is considered carefully with the intermission, we understand how Socrates' suggestion replies to Cebes' problem concerning life and death. In addition, Socrates carefully retains his epistemic modesty in stating the ontological status of the characters in us, while Plato implies his recognition of the topic in the intermission. His argument about the characters in us replies to Cebes with studious care.

4. The bearer of the essential property

Socrates introduces the notion of the bearer of the essential property that shares the same feature as the character in us: Socrates and Cebes agree that something is called hot and something else cold, and that these differ from what they call fire or snow (103c10–d4). Fire and snow are different from their relative qualities of hot and cold. However, fire cannot accept the cold, and snow cannot

accept the hot, as the hot and the cold do not accept their opposites. Snow retreats or perishes when heat approaches (103d5–8), and fire does the same when cold approaches (103d10–12). Socrates summarises the matter as follows:

Text 12

‘So is it true,’ he said, ‘concerning some things of this sort, that not only does the Form itself merit its own name for all time, but there is also something else that merits it, which is not the same as the Form, but which, whenever it exists, always has the feature (μορφή) of that Form.’ (103e2–5, emphasis mine)

Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἣ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἑνία τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν αἰεὶ, ὅταν περ ᾖ. (103e2–7, emphasis mine)

This definition compares the bearer to “the Form itself.” The Form itself always retains its name, while the bearer retains its name only so long as it exists. It seems that the bearer cannot be a Form since the bearer is not the same as the Form. However, this definition is not decisive in terms of the ontological status of the bearer. This definition does not compare the bearer with any Form but with the Form itself. For example, the Form of hot itself can neither lose its character nor perish. Although fire is not the Form of hot itself, it retains the feature of the hot as a bearer of the hot. This statement does not say that a bearer is not a Form, but that it is not the Form itself that it bears.

To clarify this definition, Socrates adds the example of threeness. Threeness is always called by its own name and by that of the odd, and likewise with twoness or fourness and the name of the even (104a5–b2). Socrates then proffers another summary of the nature of a bearer:

Text 13

[...] not only do those opposites evidently not admit one another, but there are also all those things that are not opposites of one another, but always possess the opposites, and they too seem not to admit whatever form is opposed to the form (ἰδέα) inside them; instead, when it attacks, evidently they either perish or retreat. (104b7–c1, emphasis mine)

It is noteworthy that in this passage “form” is referred to by the term ἰδέα, which is different from the term εἶδος that had been used in the general hypothesis. According to Gallop, these words can be used interchangeably.¹⁶⁶ However, considering that Socrates had already used the saliently different term “feature” (μορφή) to refer to the character of a bearer, we should not identify the two terms so easily.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the alternative used in the character in us is retained here (i.e. to perish or retreat). Although we tend to say that snow perishes when it meets heat, Socrates maintains his stance of retaining the alternative possibility for the bearer. In that sense, the ontological status of the bearer is still undecided.

At the conclusion of his summaries (104c11–d3) Socrates defines the bearer by its important function: occupation.

4.1 Occupation

Socrates declares that a function of the bearer is to occupy other things, as given below:

Text 14

‘Now Cebes’, he said, ‘would they be the following: those that, whatever they occupy, compel it not only to have their own form in each case, but

¹⁶⁶ Gallop 1975, 236. n.72.

¹⁶⁷ These terms can have different meanings: the term ἰδέα is the immanent character and is perishable, while εἶδος refers to the eternal Forms. See Devereux 1994, 70–71.

also, invariably, the form of some opposite of something as well?' (104d1–3)

The bearer gives things not only its Form (ἰδέα) but also some opposing Form. For example, fire gives not only its own Form but also the Form of hot in opposition to the cold. Since the bearer seems to give its own Form to what it occupies, the bearer itself seems to be the Form. However, this remains indeterminate, because it can mean both that a Form gives its own Form and that a thing which participates in a form does the same.¹⁶⁸ Socrates' further explanation refers to the Form's occupation: "[...] whatever the form of the three occupies, must not only be three but also be odd" (104d5–7). The Form (ἰδέα) of three, as a bearer of the odd, brings its oddness to things by its occupation. The reason that things become three and odd seems to be attributed to the Form of three. This example shows that the bearer at least can be a Form, but it does not follow that the bearer must be a Form. The Form can be given to the things even if the bearer itself is not a Form. This is because the bearer can give a Form that it participates in.

Socrates then offers his second definition of the bearer:

Text 15

Not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but there is also the thing that imports some opposite to whatever it itself attacks, and this further thing, the one that imports it, never admits the opposite of what is imported. (105a2–5)

These bearers also have the function of denying the opposite of what they import. However, this function is not as direct as that of the Forms as the Forms never accept their opposing properties. For example, the Equal itself can never be unequal. The bearers do not admit that which is opposite to what they import.

¹⁶⁸ D. Frede offers this reading of the statement about occupation (Frede 1978, 35).

Three does not admit the even when it imports the odd that is opposite to the even. Fire does not admit coldness when it imports the hot that is opposite to coldness. Understanding what bearers import allows us to realize what they must also deny.

4.2 Being present in things

Socrates gives another explanation how things get their characteristics. Moreover, he sees “another kind of safety” in this new answer (105b8). That answer is presented in terms of the bearer being in things:

Text 16

For if you were to ask me what it is that, when it comes to be present in anything’s body, makes the thing hot, I will not give that safe, ignorant answer — namely that it is hotness — but, thanks to what we now say, a more ingenious one: that it is fire. (105b8–c2)

How can this explanation involve another kind of safety, and be called ingenious? We can see another kind of safeness in that this explanation also avoids committing some mistakes of natural science, e.g., as represented by Anaxagoras. As Fine suggests, fire cannot be used in explanation of opposite things in the same way as the head is used both for being large and small.¹⁶⁹ The structure of Socrates’ body is not enough to explain why Socrates does not escape the prison. However, as far as fire’s being present in the body is concerned, we can say that it will always be hot.

Moreover, this new answer can deal with an item that is beyond the reach of the previous one. The previous one explains the cause by which x is f . It is because of the F itself. The new one explains that something causes things to be f .

¹⁶⁹ Fine understands that this new answer provides sufficient conditions. The material explanation does not offer them (Fine 1987, 97).

Hence, it deals with a process. This is already implied in the statement about occupation. The occupying function explains how a bearer affects what is occupied by it. The function of being present explains the fact that some things are subject to change.

Socrates suggests a series of considerably abstract arguments introducing the concept of bearer. We can see there that Socrates focuses on the peculiar function of the bearer, which has potential to reply to Cebes' problem of life and death. According to his apprehension, the soul might be damaged through repeated life and death. In other words, this situation can be interpreted as meaning that the soul occupies the body and gives it life. Socrates generalizes such functions of the soul. In Cebes' understanding, the soul can be damaged in its function as the life bringer. Socrates suggests a different kind of understanding of soul's function. In the next section, we see that Socrates focuses on the soul's function of occupation and being present.

5. The soul as bearer of life

The soul is introduced in terms of its being present; it is agreed that when the soul is present in the body, the body will be living (105c8–10). Then occupation, another function of a bearer, is credited to the soul: "In that case, whenever soul occupies anything, does soul always come to it bringing life?" (105d3–4). The soul always brings life to the body, so it cannot admit the opposite of life, namely death (θάνατος). We call that which never admits death as immortal (ἀθάνατος). Therefore, the soul is immortal (105e2–7).

However, it does not simply follow from this that it is imperishable (106b1–c7): if a character in the bearer is imperishable, that bearer might also be imperishable. If odd (uneven) is imperishable, then three is also imperishable. However, the odd can perish if the even approaches it, because the uneven is not imperishable. If the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul would be

imperishable as well as immortal. Otherwise, as Socrates says, they need another argument (106c9–d1). Cebes responds that this is not required, because “there would hardly be anything else that does not admit destruction, if the immortal, despite being everlasting, will admit destruction” (106d2–4). Socrates provides some examples of immortality, including God, the Form of Life itself and other immortals, and they would also be imperishable (106d5–7). Finally, they agree that their souls are also immortal and imperishable (106e8–107a2). Although the effect of these examples on the demonstration is not clear, D. Frede’s interpretation is efficacious in considering this point:¹⁷⁰ these examples are essentially alive. That which is alive can only pass out of existence by death. However, what is essentially alive cannot accept death. Therefore, there is no way that it can perish.

We now need to confirm the position of the soul in this argument. The soul is introduced in the argument through the peculiar functions of the bearer, occupation and being present. Because the soul possesses these functions, it can be categorized as a bearer. However, the soul is introduced first from the perspective of being present, while the function of occupation is considered first in the definition of the bearer. This seems to be because of the peculiarity of the soul, which is that the essential property of the soul is not as self-evident as fire’s having hotness. Hence, they must begin examining what the soul “brings” to things. They can assume from their previous arguments that the soul’s essential function is that of imposing life: (1) an independent, governing function of the soul is agreed upon (e.g., 79a9–80a6, 94b–e). Furthermore, they assume that humans are constituted of soul and body (79b1–2). If we are constituted of those two and the soul is the governing entity, the status of being the cause of life should be given to the soul. (2) Death is defined as the soul’s separation from the body (64c5–8). If the soul’s separation constitutes death, the opposite of that (the soul’s presence in the body) must be the cause the life. Moreover, (3) Cebes’ example of a weaver and cloaks suggests that the soul as a weaver makes living bodies as soul’s cloaks. Thus, the

¹⁷⁰ Frede 1978, 31–32.

statement that the soul is a bearer having this function results from previous agreements regarding the activities of the soul.

The soul is categorized as a bearer having essential functions and is therefore declared to possess immortality. However, Socrates and his interlocutors do not know the ontological status or nature of the soul. This point seems to weaken the strictness of the FA. However, we must consider the FA's purpose. Cebes' argument to Socrates is that even a soul that undergoes separation from the body and makes the living bodies can be perishable. Socrates answers with the theory of Forms and the introduction of the concept of a bearer. By admitting the peculiar function of the soul as the bearer of life, we must also admit that the soul does not admit of death. Without death, it cannot have any way of perishing. If Cebes accepts this argument, he must give up his previous view that even a soul freed from dependence on a body must face perishing in the end. Socrates focuses on the soul's function and suggests a more appropriate view of the soul. Even though many points in it remain undecided, it is still useful to reflect on Cebes' inadequate view of the soul. Socrates' completely different understanding of the cause of life makes Cebes' presupposition in his understanding of life explicit. His perspective presupposes that the life that the soul causes might be consumable. Socrates suggests another possibility; the cause of life can never accept its deterioration.

Conclusion of Chapter 5

The Final Argument offers a theory of the soul as the cause of life that is completely different from Cebes' argument. In this theory, the soul would never be damaged by being the cause of life and giving life to the body. The FA is based on the hypotheses of the Forms and that things participate in them, which Socrates establishes because of his serious doubt regarding existing causal theory. Remarkably, Socrates recognized his ignorance of causation by himself. The

hypotheses are products of his solitary determination to investigate cause of generation and perishing.

Although this argument is frequently called “Final” one and indeed this is the final demonstration of the soul’s immortality in the dialogue, it does not offer a final answer to the theory of the Forms or the soul’s metaphysical status. Socrates explicitly encourages the interlocutors to keep examining the hypotheses regarding the Forms (107b4–6).¹⁷¹ He also implicitly shows a very careful attitude in depicting the soul’s metaphysical status.

In the FA, Socrates and the interlocutors discover that the soul should be the cause of life and that kind of life should not perish. Based on the discovery, they can agree at least that the body should not be their core because the body depends on soul’s animating function for its existence. Thus, their discovery of the soul’s function greatly affects their understanding of the core of themselves. The interlocutors had different perspectives of the soul and life, which ambiguously includes a materialistic view. Even in Cebes’ thoughtful counter-argument, the soul is an expendable type of the cause of life, which can be damaged by its offering life to the body. The soul in Cebes’ explanation looks like a kind of energy or spirit; it endures separation from the body and animates the material things, but it will perish eventually. Thus, the soul does not differ from the body regarding its necessary perishing. It seems to be a merely a stronger version of material things. Conversely, Socrates suggests a concept of the cause of life that can never accept perishing, which implies a critical difference between the soul and body. If Cebes clings to his perspective of the soul, every living thing perishes eventually. Conversely, in Socrates’ argument, the invulnerable soul requires a human being to improve continuously the soul itself even after death. Thus, the result of the self-discovery affects one’s understanding of how one should live.

¹⁷¹ : “‘Yes, not only that, Simmias,’ said Socrates, ‘but you’re right to say so, and, besides, even if you all find the first hypotheses trustworthy, nonetheless you should consider them more clearly [...]’” (107b4-6)

The theory of Forms should be a foundation of the nature of the soul, because all the other arguments regarding the soul depends on the theory of Forms in *Phaedo*. Thus, that investigation of the Forms is also essential for knowing the nature of the soul. However, Socrates retains his epistemic modesty regarding the Forms and the nature of the soul: he suggests a requirement of further examination of the hypotheses concerning the Forms and makes correctly soul's metaphysical status undetermined. When they continue examining the Forms, they also reinforce a foundation of their argument of the soul and can avoid being caught by a different perspective that presuppose a consumable type of the soul.

The FA suggests a way of self-discovery focusing on the soul's function, which is accompanied with Socrates' modest and careful attitude for the investigation. It also implies that one's way of understanding of himself suggests how he should live.

Chapter 6. Self-discovery through Socrates

— The meaning of Socrates' deeds in the ending of *Phaedo* (115b1–118a17) —

Introduction to Chapter 6

Socrates offers a way of self-discovery through the previous arguments on the soul, in which the demonstration of the soul's immortality reveals to the interlocutors (and readers of this dialogue) the intellectual ability and desire within their own souls. In that process, Socrates also reveals interlocutor's false beliefs in ingenious ways. The dialogue also portrays Socrates as a whole person, with peculiarly positive, moderate, and sometimes joking attributes. In the very first part of *Phaedo*, the listener of this report from Phaedo, Echecrates, wants to hear about Socrates' behaviour on his last day.¹⁷² He says "What then about the details of his actual death, Phaedo? What was it that was said and done, and which of his friends were with him?" (58c6–8).¹⁷³ As for Echecrates, both of Socrates' arguments and deeds are important for today's reader. How do the deeds represent the philosophical topics depicted in this dialogue? Based on the interests and interpretations in the previous chapters, this thesis must ask whether or how Socrates' deeds contribute to self-discovery.

The ending of *Phaedo* includes rich descriptions of Socrates' deeds. Yet some scholars have handled this part with indifference, seemingly avoiding addressing the text's philosophical topics.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, other scholars

¹⁷² The dialogue in *Phaedo* takes the form of report from Phaedo to Echecrates about Socrates' death.

¹⁷³ David White points out that the final part replies to Echecrates' second question, namely, what Socrates did on his last day. White 1989, 283–284.

¹⁷⁴ Specifically, three famous commentaries seem to avoid considering this section seriously (c.f. Bluck 1955, Hackforth 1955, Gallop 1975). Hackforth, for example, notes: "This final section needs neither summary nor comment" (p.187). His intention in this comment is not clear; however, I think we need to comment on that.

consider the meaning of the figure of Socrates. Should we find a kind of heroic figure in Socrates (Gill, Burger)?¹⁷⁵ Or is he a practitioner of philosophical purification (Dorter)¹⁷⁶ or “a laughing philosopher, moved by his desire for wisdom, appreciative of the pleasure brought by progress in understanding, unconvinced that there exists the need to choose between life and wisdom” (Stern)?¹⁷⁷ Notomi reads the realisation of selves in this whole dialogue by emphasizing some statements in the ending: “[...] dialogue becomes an essential medium for philosophy to enable us to realise our *selves*.”¹⁷⁸ Socrates is “made into the ideal philosopher”¹⁷⁹ in the dialogue. Therefore, Notomi claims that “By recalling Socrates we are encouraged to become philosophers like him.”¹⁸⁰

I agree with Notomi’s emphasis on the topic of the self since the ending has important implications for self-discovery. Socrates’ final encouragement to his friends is to take care of themselves (115b5–8). Moreover, the text describes the lack of understanding of the self in Socrates’ best friend, Crito (115c2–d2). In addition, Plato describes in detail Socrates’ final deeds and the reactions of his friends, family, and a servant of the Athenian officers in the prison. In this way, the ending clearly depicts Socrates’ effects on others and explains how people reveal their own conditions through Socrates.

However, it is still required to consider the position of Socrates who is the catalyst for self-revelation in the people around him. Is he an “ideal” philosopher whom other philosophers imitate? The answer cannot be so simple. This ending depicts a clear contrast between Socrates and his friends in their emotional expressions. Socrates displays a moderate attitude even at the moment of his death. In this sense, we find that he has settled himself by his own previous arguments that claim the goodness of death; thus he has internalised his understanding.

¹⁷⁵ Burger 1984, 213. Gill 1996, 320, n.316.

¹⁷⁶ Dorter 1982, 177.

¹⁷⁷ Stern 1993, 178.

¹⁷⁸ Notomi 2013, 69.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

Conversely, his friends cannot stop crying when they see him drink the poison. Through Socrates' quiet and thoughtful deeds, his friends find a deficiency within themselves as philosophers. However, this chapter claims that Socrates himself is not in the best condition as a philosopher. Socrates does not have philosophers who are his equals and with whom he can have discussions as equals.¹⁸¹ Therefore, he is in a different condition from the philosophers in the ideal city depicted in the *Republic*, who are nourished and surrounded by similar comrades (540a4–b7). Socrates has a power to examine himself. This self-examination or understanding is also required, which I attempt to emphasize in this thesis. However, at the same time, objective discussions are also required to examine our beliefs sufficiently. In other words, we need both subjective and objective approaches in order to fully improve ourselves. In terms of the objective aspect, Socrates could not be in an ideal condition. Rather, the interlocutors are fortunate to receive Socrates' examination. However, they cannot fully digest his examination nor manage their emotion. The *Phaedo* does not offer an ideal model of philosopher. We should look for a way to improve ourselves by making use of Socrates as a great stimulation, not as a perfect model.

Considering the problems in interpreting Socrates' deeds mentioned above, in this chapter, I argue that the final part suggests a way of caring for and discovering the self through Socrates' deeds. This theme is discussed by mainly focusing on two aspects. One is that self-understanding is not completed by the interlocutors in the arguments. The other is that Socrates has internalised his understanding of what he should do as a philosopher. His deeds reflect his deeply

¹⁸¹ In his *Parmenides*, Plato depicts a young Socrates and great Eleatic philosophers sharing serious philosophical discussions as equals (or rather the old Eleatic philosopher seems to confront Socrates). However, there is a kind of anachronism in the fact that that young Socrates has come up with a theory of Forms which is developed in the middle period dialogue, the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*. In his autobiography in *Phaedo*, Socrates seems to rely on his own thought after losing hope in finding a correct theory of causality in the work of thinkers of natural science (99c–d). As far as we depend only on the information within *Phaedo*, we find that Socrates must have practised a solitary philosophical investigation for some time.

examined principles, which show Socrates as a peculiarly determined philosopher and therefore drastically different from his other friends in *Phaedo*. He discusses the characteristics of the soul, encourages interlocutors to take care of themselves, and his deeds amaze his friends. However, those arguments could not offer his friends the composed attitudes or confidence that are found in Socrates. His arguments and deeds will encourage them to improve themselves through self-examination and to find their own weak points.¹⁸²

This chapter analyses the details of the ending of *Phaedo*, in order to clarify the importance of Socrates' deeds for self-discovery. I first examine Socrates' final two requests where he asks his friends to cultivate self-awareness and to take care of themselves (115b1–116a1). He says that this will benefit Socrates, his family, and his friends themselves. However, Crito asks Socrates how he should bury him. This question implies that he still understands Socrates' corpse as being Socrates himself, even though the previous arguments emphasised that the soul's essential intellectual ability is independent of, and controls, the body. Then, Socrates asks the other friends to persuade Crito that 'Socrates' will leave this world and orders Crito to use correct terms, since speaking incorrectly has a bad effect on the soul. Second, I examine Socrates' judgements in his deeds before drinking the poison (115a6–9, 115e7–116a1, 116a2–117a4), arguing that Socrates tries to do best even in small customary things. Third, I interpret the scene of drinking the poison and his last words, arguing that Socrates actively and carefully takes part in the process of his enforced suicide. His last words, asking Crito to offer a cock to Asclepius, shows gratitude for having accomplished the legal process of the death sentence

¹⁸² In Plato's *Charmides*, Socrates criticizes the definition of self-knowledge as knowledge of knowledge (*Charmides*, 169a–b). In *Alcibiades I*, Socrates instead suggests that self-knowledge is gained through seeing another soul. Just as we see ourselves through the images reflected in a mirror or another's pupil, "Then if the soul, Alcibiades, is to know itself, it must look at a soul, and especially at that region in which what makes a soul good, wisdom, occurs, and at anything else which is similar to it" (133b7–10) (Translation by D.S. Hutchinson in *Plato Complete Works* 1997). Knowing ourselves is difficult, but *Phaedo* offers Socrates to us as a kind of mirror in order to support this process.

thanks to the poisonous drug. Fourth, I discuss two different evaluations of Socrates by a servant of the Athenian court officers and Phaedo. These two different appearances of Socrates also reflect their own conditions. According to their own dispositions, the quality of understanding of Socrates becomes different. The meaning of Socrates' words and deeds are not completely or objectively clear to everyone. In order to understand Socrates, we should manage ourselves before or concurrently with that investigation. Finally, I examine Socrates' position. It will show how his friends should deal with Socrates, and then suggest that the dialogue does not simply depict Socrates as an ideal philosopher. He has peculiar mightiness and disadvantage. Other friends must try to surpass Socrates if they are to follow Socrates' encouragement to live better.

1. Socrates' two requests (115b1–116a1)

Replying to Crito's question of what he wants his friends to do for him, Socrates requests two things. One is to take care of themselves, and the other is to have a correct understanding and to make accurate statements about who Socrates is:

Text 1

'Just what I always say, Crito' he said, 'and nothing particularly new. That is, that if you take care of yourselves, whatever you do will be a favour to me and mine, and to yourselves, even if you don't undertake to do so now...' (115b5–8)

Socrates says that this legacy of taking care of themselves is not new. Indeed, through the demonstration of the immortality of the soul, Socrates claims that philosophers must make their souls "be alone by itself," which can be seen as an

encouragement to purify their souls. Moreover, Socrates also encourages the Athenian people to take care of themselves in the *Apology*.¹⁸³

Yet, why will it be a favour to Socrates? It is easier to understand that the care will be a favour to themselves or to Socrates' family, since it will make them good philosophers and good people which will benefit his family socially and philosophically. However, Socrates himself is leaving this world and parting from his friends. How does the care benefit Socrates?

One possible answer for the question lies in the fact that his friends will also die and see Socrates somewhere in the afterlife. Socrates has already suggested that he hopes to see better people and gods in the afterlife. He is not particularly confident in his hope to see good humans there, but he affirms confidently that he will see better gods (63b9–c4). Thus, Socrates' soul will look forward to doing philosophy with the souls of other philosophers. His friends' souls can be good partners for him especially since he doubts that better people are waiting for him (63c1–2).

However, this investigation will differ from their dialogues in this world, because they no longer have the body or perceptions. While Socrates does not (or cannot) clarify the actual condition of the investigation after life, his friends must continue to practise philosophy both for him and for themselves, since the purification of the soul is not completed by death alone and requires further philosophical investigation. This requirement is implied in the Affinity Argument: even after death, the polluted soul tends to come back to this world and inhabits animal or human bodies (81b–82b). Furthermore in the mythical story that vividly depicts the afterlife and the destinations of each soul, it is suggested that there are two stages even for philosophers (114b6–c6): "And of these, those who purified

¹⁸³ " [...] but I went to each of you privately and conferred upon him what I say is the greatest benefit, by trying to persuade him not to care for any of his belongings before caring that he himself should be as good and as wise as possible, not to care for the city's possessions more than for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same way." (*Apology* 36c3–d1) G.M.A. Grube's translation in *Plato Complete Works*, Hackett, 1997.

themselves sufficiently with philosophy live thereafter entirely without bodies, and enter dwellings fairer still than these, although explaining these dwellings is not easy, nor is there sufficient time in the present circumstances" (114c2–6). The souls of philosophers who live good lives will reach the upper part of the earth after death. Some who have purified themselves will go to a more beautiful place. Thus, Socrates seems to assume that there are two levels of areas for philosophers even after death.

Philosophers need to keep purifying themselves in order to enter the higher area. In the previous parts of the dialogue, Socrates suggests that wisdom can be obtained only after death. This mythical story shows that the soul requires further efforts to reach the highest level even after death. These two perspectives regarding death are not inconsistent. The philosopher's soul still needs death to be apart from the body, but also must continue purifying itself in the afterlife. Interestingly, in terms of the higher area, Socrates avoids stating any more. He cannot say anything about the conditions of the highest level for philosophers.

Hearing about Socrates' legacy, Crito asks him about burial: "And how should we bury you?" (115c3). Socrates says that Crito should do whatever he wants, "as long as you catch me and I don't escape you" (115c4–6). He reprimands Crito's statements, laughing:

Text 2

Gentlemen, I'm not convincing Crito that I am Socrates here, the one who is now holding a conversation—setting out remarks one by one. Instead he supposes that I'm that corpse which he'll shortly be seeing, and he actually asks how he should bury me. (115c6–d2)

Crito's question suggests that he does not understand Socrates' arguments at all. According to a series of demonstrations of the soul's immortality, the soul within us must be the true cause of our intellectual abilities and lives. Therefore,

the most essential part of us must not belong to the body and we should never call Socrates' corpse 'you'. In that sense, Crito still incorrectly considers Socrates' body as Socrates himself, which fundamentally violates his assertion.

We should also notice that Socrates uses a peculiar expression in text 2.¹⁸⁴ He does not say simply, for example, "I am my soul, not the body." Rather, he says that he is the Socrates who holds the conversation. The real cause of Socrates' intellectual ability must be within his soul. However, we are not sure whether the soul is identical with Socrates as a person. This reservation fits other passages in *Phaedo* since we find a distinction between the soul and the person in the Recollection Argument:

Text 3

Socrates: "In that case, Simmias, our souls existed earlier as well, separate from bodies, before they were in human form, and they had wisdom."

Simmias: "Unless, perhaps, we get these items of knowledge at the time when we are being born, Socrates—that time is still left."

Socrates: "Well, my friend, in what other time do we lose them? Because of course we are not born with them in our grasp, as we just agreed. Or do we lose them at the very time when we get them? Or can you tell me some other time?" (76c11–d4)

This passage distinguishes the soul from "we" or the human being. While the soul pre-exists, "we" are born by the soul's act of inhabiting a human form. Furthermore, in the beginning of the Affinity Argument, Socrates makes a division within ourselves as follows: "'Now,' he said, 'aren't we ourselves part soul, part body?" (79b1–2). This division suggests that "we" are constituted of the soul and the body. Thus, there is still apprehension that 'I' or Socrates has not become a

¹⁸⁴ Sorabji (2006, 33–35) interprets Socrates' mention of "I" and "me" (115c4, 115c8) as indicating Plato's interest in the individual and his recognition of "a contrast between the true self and individuality" (ibid., 35)

purified soul. Some of his personality still includes bodily factors. However, as far as Socrates makes use of his intellectual ability in having a conversation, this “Socrates” can include his core. However, his corpse can never be his own core. In that sense, what Crito is saying is absolutely wrong.

Socrates attempts to examine the soul as the true core of a human being through the demonstration of the soul’s immortality; specifically, in the Affinity Argument, the Criticism of Harmonia theory, and the Final Argument. Through those arguments, Socrates attributes the essential functions of a philosopher and the cause of life to the soul. The purified soul must be the true self that they should aim to be, since only the soul possesses the essential intellectual ability of being a philosopher. All of the personal traits of a human in this world are not necessarily identical to the characteristics of the purified soul. Some characteristics of a person can be rejected or cut out in his true self.¹⁸⁵ Socrates also encourages the interlocutors to make their souls be alone by themselves. In that sense, he advises them to make them as close to their own core as far as possible. In order to accomplish this encouragement, they must understand what their own core should be.

Socrates asks his other friends to correct Crito’s understanding. It would also encourage them to check their own understanding:

Text 4

¹⁸⁵ I think that the self is not a given and rather that the true self is the final target of our investigations. McCabe also seems to claim, from a wider viewpoint about Plato’s thought, that the true ‘person’ is not that which we can take for granted: “Socrates asked, “Who will you become [sc. if you visit the sophists]?” (Protagoras 311b). This formula, I shall suggest, captures something of Plato’s account of persons; and it shows him not lagging far behind Descartes. For he does have an account to give of the first person; but the context in which it is given pushes him toward the view that being a unified person is not something I can take for granted (once I start to focus on my own intellectual activities) but rather something to which I aspire. Being a unified person is for Plato an honorific title; hence, the proper question to ask is indeed, Who shall I become?” McCabe 1994, 264.

‘So you must give surety for me to Crito,’ he said ‘the opposite surety to the one Crito tried to give my jurors. For he guaranteed that I *would* stay behind, but you must give surety that I will *not* stay behind when I die, but will depart and be gone...’ (115d6–e1)

Text 5

‘For you need to understand, my excellent Crito,’ he said, ‘that not speaking correctly is not just a travesty of the point at issue, but also has a bad effect on people’s souls.’ (115e4–7)

Through these statements, Socrates requests that his friends correctly understand who Socrates is according to the previous arguments. They should never think that the self of Socrates belongs to his body. The second request for correct understanding of the self also supplies the first one, to take care of themselves. As Socrates warns Crito, speaking incorrectly has a bad effect on the soul. In order to take care of themselves, they should understand and characterise the self correctly.

2. Socrates’ judgement of deeds before drinking the poison

We find in this final part that Socrates has done various things before passing away. Furthermore, it should be noticed that he expresses his own judgments of traditional or customary things before his death. He does not simply ignore them, but does not follow the customs as they are either. There are three remarkable judgements: (1) the instruction to care for his bereaved family who will wash his corpse (115a6–9, Text 6); (2) a short order about how to bury him (115e7–116a1, Text 7); and (3) the decision of the timing of drinking the poison (116e7–117a3, Text 8).

Text 6

The hour has more or less come for me to turn to my bath; for it seems better to take a bath before drinking the poison, and so not to burden the women with the job washing a corpse. (115a6–9, emphasis mine)

Text 7

No, you should cheerfully say that you're burying my body, and you should bury it in whatever you like and consider most in accordance with the rules. (115e7–116a1, emphasis mine)

Text 8

'Yes, Crito, the people you mention do these things with good reason — they think that they gain from having done them, you see— and I myself won't do these things, likewise with good reason. For I think I'll gain nothing from having drunk it a little later, except making myself a laughing-stock in my own eyes by clinging to life, and by being tight-fisted when there's nothing left to keep. No, come on', he said, 'do as I say and don't refuse.' (116e7–117a3, emphasis mine)

David White correctly points out that Socrates thoughtfully chooses his actions in order to do what is good for him and other people “even if it is good only according to the fluctuating dictates of custom.”¹⁸⁶ In terms of (1), Socrates arguably knows the custom of body washing after death and he tries not to trouble his family with bathing his body by doing it himself since this seems to him to be “better.”¹⁸⁷ He admits the custom but does not follow it exactly in a traditional way, since he

¹⁸⁶ White 1989, 273.

¹⁸⁷ White says as follows: “According to custom, the body was bathed the day after death, so it would appear that Socrates’ request is somewhat unorthodox.” (White 1989, 301. n.1). He refers to *Greek Burial Customs* by Donna. C. Kurtz and John Boardman, Cornell University Press, 1971. Robert Parker also states that “The women of the household prepared the corpse for the ceremonial laying-out and viewing; it was washed, anointed, crowned, dressed in clean robes, generally white or red, and laid upon a bier strewn with branches and leaves.” (Parker 1983, 35)

wants to take away that work from his family. (2) Socrates himself does not care about his corpse, but he allows Crito to follow the custom. In that sense, Socrates does not ignore the custom nor does he intend to violate it, although he does not place much importance on the details of the burial itself. It is important that Socrates follows the customs, while he does not care about the way that his body is buried. (3) As Crito says, Socrates does not have to drink the poison for a while as other condemned people usually enjoy their final hours (116e1–6). However, he rejects Crito's suggestion since he thinks that it would make himself "a laughing-stock in my own eyes" (117a2) Socrates does not explain why he thinks that he would be a laughing-stock or ridiculous. One might think that it seems to be still worthwhile for Socrates to continue philosophical discussions even if he does not care about pleasant entertainment before his death. Yet we can assume his reason that he does not choose to cling to life or continue philosophical discussions with his friends; they have reached a conclusion in their discussions for the time being. Of course, it would require further discussion by themselves, as Socrates himself emphasizes that even the hypothesis of the Forms requires further examination. However, Socrates has argued that the soul will obtain wisdom after death in his Defence of Death and the Affinity Argument. Thus, for his own philosophy, leaving this world has an advantage, and as such it is absurd to cling to life when he is so close to being in a better place. Clinging to life would betray his own claims of the goodness of death.

Socrates' attitudes towards the customary things in (1) and (2) show that he makes all his decisions based on his understanding of goodness, even though the customs are not necessarily his main concern. His thoughtful decisions are exercised not only in philosophical topics but even in small customary things. In that sense, his friends and the readers of the dialogue can guess that his philosophical thought is present in every part of his life. As Socrates warns Crito to take care of even his short statements, all his deeds are organized and thoughtfully chosen. We can assume through the depictions of his deeds that his

arguments and his encouragement of the philosophical life are deeply internalized within him.

Point (3) shows that Socrates evaluates his own deeds in a peculiar way. Neither his friends nor any custom would rebuke him if he postponed his death for a while. However, he thinks that he would mock himself if he clung to life. A reflective thought or inner judgment is at work here, since he cannot hope to be examined by friends, customs, or laws. This decision seems to be an individual one, since the evaluation of this deed is not necessarily clear to his friends and this will not benefit other members in the prison or any other people in this world. Rather, this evaluation is based on his own hope for a better afterlife. Therefore, this series of decisions shows Socrates' concerns for both the goodness in this world and his own strong desire for departing to a better world.

3. Socrates' drinking the poison and his last words: 117a5–118a14

Socrates' deeds in drinking the poison and his last words are peculiar and mysterious, since his attitude is strangely positive, and his intentions are not clearly specified. He accomplished the process of drinking the cup of poison in an active and calm way. However, the meanings of his deeds and last words are not so clear. In contrast to Socrates' attitude, his friends' reactions to seeing him drink the poison are very intense, and the reason for this is clear. They lose control of their emotions and cannot stop shedding tears when looking at Socrates' drinking the poison. Phaedo clearly states that the reason for the outburst of emotion in his case is that he is lamenting his misfortune, not that of Socrates. Furthermore, descriptions of Socrates' symptoms after drinking the poison are not violent, as Socrates and the jailor confirm that the effects of the poison are surprisingly calm ones. Christopher Gill points out that modern and ancient reports of hemlock poisoning includes more symptoms than appears in Plato's description, for

example, nausea and unsteadiness of movement.¹⁸⁸ According to his view, Plato chooses which symptoms to describe in this scene to illuminate his argument.¹⁸⁹ Indeed, Plato seems to intentionally contrast the calmness of Socrates with the chaotic behaviour of the others. I focus on the following three texts:

Text 9

When Socrates saw the man¹⁹⁰, he said: ‘Very well, my excellent friend. You’re the expert. What should I do?’ (117a8–10, emphasis mine)

Text 10

As soon as he’d said this, he held the cup to his lips and drank it all, utterly coolly and contentedly. So far most of us had been pretty much able to hold back our tears, but when we saw him drinking and draining it, we couldn’t do so any longer, but at least in my case the tears came flooding out in spite of myself, and so I covered my head and wept for myself—not for him, you understand, but for my own fortune, that I’d lost such a friend. (117c3–d1, emphasis mine)

Text 11

By now it was pretty much the parts around his abdomen that were going cold, when he uncovered his head—as it had been covered—and said his last words: ‘Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius. All of you must pay the debt and not overlook it’ (118a5–8, emphasis mine)

In texts 9 and 10, Socrates shows his active and calm participation in the forced suicide. He voluntarily asks the jailor how to drink the poison, and finally

¹⁸⁸ Gill 1973, 25–28

¹⁸⁹ Gill 1973, 28.

¹⁹⁰ The jailor preparing the poison.

drinks it in an utterly calm manner. He seems to be interested in the process.¹⁹¹ However, faced with Socrates drinking the poison, his friends cannot hide their emotions and tears. Everyone except Socrates breaks down in sorrow (117d4–6). Phaedo directly confesses the reason for his tears, which is not for the misfortune of Socrates, but for his own misfortune in losing Socrates (117c9–d1). This confession shows that Phaedo is persuaded by Socrates that death is good for Socrates. His confidence in Socrates' happiness is also suggested at the start of the dialogue, in which Phaedo says that Socrates seemed to be happy and that he thought Socrates would "fare well" when he reached Hades (58e3–59a1). However, in terms of his own future, Phaedo cannot stop lamenting his misfortune like an orphan who loses his father. In other words, he does not have sufficient confidence that he will be able to live a good life without Socrates.¹⁹² Even after many discussions with Socrates, he could not acquire the equilibrium exhibited by Socrates. Socrates must therefore reproach his friends for their crying and urge them to have courage (117d7–e2).

These last words in text 11 make two interesting points. First it is "we" who owe a debt to Asclepius, not just Socrates.¹⁹³ Second, Socrates mentions a definite material item (a cock) that they must offer. Socrates takes the trouble to uncover his head in order to leave this final request. Therefore, Socrates seems to do so with a definite intention. There have been many controversies in interpreting Socrates'

¹⁹¹ Phaedo depicts Socrates immediately before drinking poison as follows: "Socrates took it very gladly indeed, Echecrates, without any fear and with no change to either his colour or his expression. Eying the man with a characteristically mischievous look, he said: 'what would you say about pouring a libation from this drink in someone's honour? Is it allowed or not'" (117b3–7). This "eying ... with a mischievous look" (ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας) is literally translated as "looking like a bull," which can refer to looking angry. Yet Burnet, Rowe and Sedley and Long interpret this word as mischievous (Burnet 1911, 145; Rowe 1993, 294; Sedley and Long 2010, 114). I think the latter meaning fits with Socrates' attitude, considering his positive attitude before the description of ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας.

¹⁹² David White suggests that "Their weeping tangibly evidences their lack of bravery at the prospect of facing life without Socrates." White 1989, 283.

¹⁹³ Most points out the importance of Socrates' use of the plural form of verb (Most 1993, 105–6).

last words. We can find the following interpretations: (1) Socrates was truly and historically in debt;¹⁹⁴ (2) His last words offer gratitude for Plato's recovery from illness;¹⁹⁵ (3) This shows gratitude to the god of medicine for curing Socrates from life as if it were an illness;¹⁹⁶ and (4) His last words offer gratitude for recovering from the illness of being a "*misologos*" (a hater of arguments).¹⁹⁷

I think, as Gill claims, Socrates' words and deeds are intentionally chosen by Plato based on his own purpose in describing philosophical topics.¹⁹⁸ The historical reading in (1) does not seem to be sufficient to cover Plato's intention if it claims that these details are merely to record historical facts. Similarly, reading (2) seems to claim that Plato wishes to record Socrates' actual mentioning Plato's recovery from illness at the last moment. We must ask why Plato chooses to depict those facts even if they are historically true. Moreover, against (3), death is not a specific medicine to recover from the illness of life, even though a philosopher requires death to go to the next step. According to the Affinity Argument, human souls retain their own pollution or contamination even after death. He is required to pursue death correctly and keep purifying his soul even after death. It is too early to thank Asclepius. Furthermore, regarding (4), the medicine for being "*misologos*" should be philosophy itself, therefore it does not seem to be proper to thank Asclepius for that. Socrates should thank philosophy itself. In addition, I wonder whether a cock is the proper offering to give thanks for the philosophical benefits.¹⁹⁹ This material item seems to be a customary offer.

Considering these interpretations above, I think his words convey his gratitude for the cup of poisonous medicine (*pharmakon*) which enables Socrates to execute his death sentence as a legal procedure. Here it is difficult to ignore the close relationship between the god of medicine, Asclepius, and the *pharmakon*

¹⁹⁴ Gallop 1975, 225

¹⁹⁵ Clark 1952, 146.

¹⁹⁶ Archer-Hind 1883, 180. Bluck 1955, 143.

¹⁹⁷ Crooks 1998, 117–125.

¹⁹⁸ Gill 1973, 25–28

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *Euthyphro*, 14e–15a. Socrates wonders whether sacrifice is really good for gods.

which can mean both healing medicine and poisonous drug. The *pharmakon* is mentioned repeatedly in *Phaedo*. In the first part of the dialogue, Socrates receives a warning from a jailor to stop talking so much, since talking too much increases the body's temperature which has a bad effect on the poison. If he keeps talking he will need to drink more cups of poison (63d6–e2). Socrates ignores the warning and continues his philosophical discussion. In other words, he takes a risk to endanger this legal procedure for the sake of his philosophical duty and the desire for continuing discussion. However, thanks to the help of the poison (it is probably a larger than normal amount, considering the jailor's warning and the length of the discussions), he can accomplish his death. Readers of *Crito* may find that accomplishing this death sentence is also an important task for Socrates (*Crito*, 54b–c), and indeed Socrates actively participates in the execution. Moreover, as we see in Socrates criticism of Anaxagoras' book (section 2.2 of chapter 5 in this thesis), he mentions the cause of his staying in the prison, which is that "I too have also decided that it is better to sit here, and more just to stay put and suffer whatever punishment they decree." (98e2–5). Socrates judges that following the legal procedure decided by Athenians is better and more just. Thus, following his own judgement is also important since it is concerned with goodness. At the final moment, Socrates confirms firmly that the poison offers death to his body without hindrance and that he has completed both his philosophical and legal duties. Since his friends also joined in the discussion, they were therefore accomplices in taking that risk. For that reason, they also owe a cock to Asclepius. Based on the speculation above, his last words can be interpreted as Socrates' proclaiming that he has accomplished every duty of an Athenian citizen as far as possible, while he has also had time to finish his philosophical activities in this world.

4. The final description of Socrates

Phaedo witnesses Socrates' death, and finally describes Socrates as follows:

Text 12

That, Echecrates, was the end of our friend, a man who was, as we would say, the best of those whom we came to know in those days, and also the wisest and most just. (118a15–17, emphasis mine)

Ἦδε ἡ τελευτή, ὧς Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου. (118a15–17, emphasis mine)

This is the final sentence of the *Phaedo*. It is remarkable that the dialogue is finished with an evaluation of Socrates as a whole person, considering that this dialogue is sometimes referred to with the subtitle “On the soul.”²⁰⁰ As Echecrates’ question and curiosity shows, the soul is not the only essential topic of the dialogue, Socrates himself is too.

While *Phaedo* evaluates Socrates with three superlative adjectives, a servant of the Athenian court officers, who came to bid farewell to Socrates immediately before he drank the poison, also interestingly describes Socrates with three superlative adjectives.

Text 13

I’ve come to know in other ways too during this time that you’re the noblest, kindest and best man ever to come here. And now in particular I’m quite sure that you aren’t angry with me, for you know the people to blame, and are angry with them. So now, since you know what I’ve come to tell you,

²⁰⁰ Lorenz, Hendrik, “Ancient Theories of Soul,” The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ancient-soul/>>.

This is likely based on the statements in Plato’s *Epistolae XIII*: “You are probably familiar with the name of Cebes, for he figures in the Socratic writings as taking part with Simmias in a discussion with Socrates about the Soul” (363a5–7). Translation by Glenn. R. Morrow in *Plato Complete Works*.

good bye, and try to bear the inevitable as best you can.” (116c4–d2, emphasis mine)

σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἔγνωκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναιότατον καὶ
πραότατον καὶ ἄριστον ἄνδρα ὄντα τῶν πώποτε δεῦρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ
δὴ καὶ νῦν εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπαίνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους,
ἀλλὰ ἐκείνοις. νῦν οὖν, οἶσθα γὰρ ἃ ἦλθον ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρέ τε καὶ
πειρῶ ὥς ῥᾶστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. Καὶ ἅμα δακρύνσας
μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆει. (116c4–d2, emphasis mine)

These two kinds of evaluations are different from each other. The servant’s evaluation of Socrates includes being the noblest and kindest man instead of being the wisest and most just in Phaedo’s final statement. He mentions that many prisoners curse him in anger when he instructs them to drink the poison. However, he knows that Socrates is not angry with him since he has come to know Socrates’ disposition through spending time with him and knows that he understands who is responsible for this death sentence (116c7–8). The servant focuses on how fairly and reasonably Socrates has dealt with him. His evaluation is based on the contrast between Socrates and other prisoners who have lost control of their emotions. In that sense, it is plausible that being the noblest or kindest is more important to the servant than being the wisest and most just. Socrates’ calmness of emotion and mild temper are important for the servant’s job and their relationship.

On the other hand, for a philosopher or philosopher candidate, being wise should be the most important theme. Socrates’ moderate attitude, which shows him internalizing his arguments in his deeds, is proper for the qualification of being the best. Being the best is a common adjective in both kinds of evaluations. However, their perspectives are slightly different. For the servant, Socrates’ character is revealed in the way in which he deals with the servant. For Phaedo, his goodness is revealed in Socrates’ attitudes in confronting death by following his beliefs. Thus, why does Phaedo say that Socrates is the most just? His friends

and the readers of *Crito* know that Socrates actively carries out the death sentence without escaping prison. Moreover, we can see in this ending that Socrates thoughtfully completes that legal procedure based on his notion of justice. In that sense, Socrates is mostly loyal to the judgement made by the Athenian jury and that made by Socrates himself. Phaedo knows that Socrates fulfilled his philosophical and legal duties as far as possible; thus he can say that Socrates is the most just.

Those two versions of evaluation reflect the conditions of the characters. In a sense, they use a kind of personal perspective to evaluate Socrates. They have shared their time and had discussions with Socrates. Phaedo and the servant have their own interests, based on which they try to understand and evaluate Socrates. Yet these versions of evaluation also include objective aspects. They have their own reasons for their respective evaluation, and if required, would be able to state these reasons. The servant sincerely clarifies the reason for his evaluation.

However, their evaluations still reflect their own concerns and it seems difficult that they share their different evaluations at the same time, because they seem to have different interests in understanding Socrates. The servant is concerned with Socrates' mild temper, while Phaedo is primarily interested in his philosophical arguments (although Phaedo is also impressed with Socrates' positive attitude on the last day). Can the servant be persuaded by Phaedo's evaluation of Socrates that he is the most just person? Socrates is still a criminal and in that sense is not different from other prisoners for the servant. On the other hand, Phaedo would not agree with the possibility of Socrates' being angry towards the Athenian authorities mentioned by the servant, since Phaedo understands through the previous arguments that death is good for Socrates, and they cannot harm him by the death sentence. It is therefore impossible that Socrates could get angry in his final moment, and we find that the servant does not understand Socrates' true attitude towards death.

Those people around Socrates try to interpret Socrates' deeds and arguments based on their own experiences and thought. From the viewpoint of readers who have gone through all the arguments, Phaedo's evaluation seems to show a better comprehension of Socrates than the servant's since it includes the character of being "the wisest" which is an essential characteristic for a philosopher and it does not include a clear misunderstanding as is the case in servant's evaluation. Yet Phaedo's uncontrolled emotion shows that he cannot acquire the same disposition as that of Socrates although he shares with him the same argument and belief in the immortality of the soul. Phaedo could not internalise his agreement with those arguments, which suggests a severe gap between himself and Socrates. Thus, both characters have their own deficiencies in achieving the perfect understanding of Socrates' deeds and arguments.

What kind of perspectives do the servant and Phaedo have in evaluating Socrates? Their perspectives seem to include both subjective and objective aspects. While they draw on their own experiences to understand Socrates, they will be able to explain their reasoning to others in an objective form. Indeed, the servant states partially the reason of his evaluations. However, the servant grasps Socrates' kindness and nobleness by his experience of meeting other harsh prisoners without understanding Socrates' real attitude towards death. Phaedo agrees with Socrates' arguments and evaluate him as the wisest. However, he cannot manage his emotion following Socrates' arguments regarding the soul. In that sense, he cannot sufficiently digest Socrates' encouragement to improve his soul. In other words, their understanding of Socrates is not reducible either to the subjective and first-person perspective or the objective and third-person perspective.

In recent years, the second-person perspective has been also seriously considered in the area of philosophy of psychology. According to Michael Pauen, that second-person perspective has an independent position and benefit, and it is not reducible to the first or third person perspectives. The difference between the three perspectives is defined in terms of epistemological access: "While the first-

person perspective is subjective because it is based on, and directed at, the epistemic subject's experiences, the third-person perspective, which is based on objective evidence and gives access to all kinds of entities, is objective. The second-person perspective, by contrast, is intersubjective because it is a relation between an epistemic subject and another sentient being's mental states."²⁰¹ Pauen emphasises that the second-person perspective replicates mental states.²⁰² Socrates and the servant or Socrates and Phaedo shares some arguments and experiences. Depending on their abilities, the servant and Phaedo attempt to understand Socrates. The *Phaedo* depicts their thoughts in the objective perspective. However, we can also assume that those characters would have to take up the second-person perspective in their attempts to evaluate Socrates, since they in fact confront Socrates face-to-face and have discussions with each other. This point is clear especially in the case of the servant. According to his own experiences, he assumes that Socrates is not angry with him and must be angry with the authorities. Readers of *Phaedo* might easily find that this assumption is wrong. Socrates' thoughts and organised emotional disposition are beyond his understanding due to his own limited experiences with other prisoners. This is the servant's attempt to understand Socrates.

When looking at Socrates, his friends see his peculiar characteristics and how he differs from them. This can be a step of self-discovery. In his arguments, Socrates shows the interlocutors that there are divine and intellectual abilities within their own souls. Although they share Socrates' thought, his friends do not control their emotions and as such they are able to recognise Socrates' peculiarity. Understanding this gap between themselves and Socrates will be beneficial to them as it reveals their own conditions, and this process comes from their sharing Socrates' arguments and observing his behaviour.

²⁰¹ Pauen 2012, 33.

²⁰² Ibid., 38–41.

5. The position of Socrates

Socrates' deeds show us his peculiar power as a philosopher. Does it mean that he is an ideal philosopher? Moreover, is he the best example that philosophers should directly imitate? The answer to this question is not simple. I think *Phaedo* depicts both Socrates' peculiar power and his disadvantage as a philosopher. He has himself recognised his ignorance, received divine orders in dreams, and has steadfastly held onto his belief in examining everything, all of which makes him a powerful philosopher. However, he has also had misfortune in that he does not have a "Socrates" or someone who is equal to him. He cannot live and practise philosophy in conditions that are as good as that of the philosophers depicted in the *Republic*, who have organised education and comrades.²⁰³ He is a powerful but solitary philosopher. This solitude is not merely emotionally problematic. It represents a real problem in that it might lead to the danger that Socrates cannot undertake a sufficient examination of himself. *Phaedo* laments that he would lose Socrates. However, from the beginning, Socrates cannot have Socrates as a discussion partner. His rebuke of his friends for losing their emotions also implies his solitude.

One might claim that Socrates can practise the perfect examination of himself on his own. Indeed, we find that he has a prominent ability to recognise his ignorance in *Phaedo* (Chapter 5, section 2). As we see in chapter 5, Socrates confesses his experience of becoming ignorant about what he had thought he knew in the natural science (96c), namely, how a human becomes large. In a more

²⁰³ *Republic*, 540a4-b5: "Fifteen years. Then, at the age of fifty, those who have survived the tests and are entirely best in every practical task and every science must be led at last to the end and compelled to lift up the reading eye-beams of their souls, and look toward what itself provides light for everything. And once they have seen the good itself, they must use it as their model and put the city, its citizens, and themselves, in order throughout the remainder of their lives, each in turn. They will spend the greater part of their time doing philosophy, but, when his turn comes, each must labor in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as something fine, but rather as something compulsory." Translation by C.D.C. Reeve. *Republic*. 2004.

conceptual form, he inquires how one becomes two by being added with one. He could not find sufficient explanation of the cause (96d–97b). No thinkers of natural science, including Anaxagoras, could offer Socrates any correct and sufficient theory of causation (99c–d). Therefore, he started his own investigation. He started his “second voyage” by putting the strongest hypothesis, namely, the hypothesis of Forms. Raphael Woolf says that “No one interrogated *him* to reveal that his pretensions to knowledge were misplaced. The challenge to his supposed wisdom was provided by himself.”²⁰⁴ However, Woolf also refers to the problem of first-person authority and suggests that Plato was willing to convert it into the third-person perspective. He calls that problem as the “problem of distance,” namely, that self-examination requires distancing oneself from one’s own beliefs.²⁰⁵ These beliefs are sometimes what constitute the self.²⁰⁶ Indeed, we find in *Phaedo* that Socrates himself admits that his strongest hypothesis requires further examination and that he has been pleased with the counterarguments from the interlocutors in this dialogue. Socrates could, uniquely, execute his investigation in the first-person perspective. However, he is also willing to meet better people and gods in the afterlife (63b5–c7). His solitary investigation is not perfect nor the best method, but he still needs to use the method in Socrates’ standpoint when he cannot have an objective discussion. Thus, I think Socrates retains a subjective way of investigation while he also needs an objective examination. Furthermore, as we see in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, I argue that the self-recognition of intellectual desire is also important. While Socrates always wants to have productive discussions with others, he also retains this kind of subjective aspect, namely recognition of an individual motivation, in his investigation. Moreover, while Socrates mentions his hope to see better gods and people after life, he does not say that that meeting directly leads to obtain wisdom. Rather, he claims that wisdom is obtained when the soul becomes alone by itself (in the Defence of Death and the Affinity

²⁰⁴ Woolf 2010, 89.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 102–103.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 104.

Argument). The discussion or dialogue is indispensable way to get close to wisdom. However, wisdom itself is a state of the soul, which arguably can be understood introspectively.

How should Socrates' friends go about their philosophical investigation? In the middle of the dialogue, Socrates himself encourages the interlocutors to look for an enchanter to persuade them about the immortality of the soul (77d5–78a9). Socrates sees that the interlocutors have a childish fear that the soul should be dissipated when it parts from the body, then recommends that they chant spells to their inner child every day until they put away that fear. Cebes asks Socrates where they will find a good enchanter when Socrates leaves. Socrates replies that they should look for the enchanter all over Greece and foreign countries, sparing neither money nor effort. Furthermore, as he says, they must try to find the enchanter within themselves, "because you may not easily find others more able to do this than you" (78a8–9). They must be enchanters by themselves after losing Socrates, which can also mean that they should look for the encouraging examiner of philosophy within each other. Socrates' friends in *Phaedo* should keep practising philosophy by themselves and go further than Socrates with the advantage of having had him as a philosophical midwife.

They must also recognise their own childish fear and overcome their weakness by themselves. Examining each other through discussions is an indispensable way for it. However, it does not mean that merely listening to the discussion is sufficient for improving themselves. They need to continuously and actively participate in the self-recognition of their intellectual desire for the Forms. Without that motivation, they cannot truly purify their soul. If they just keep discussing without desiring for knowing the Forms, they cannot get close to know them. As a result of that, they cannot acquire a better mind-set regarding the soul, because the theory of the Forms is a foundation to know the soul's nature. This would cause inconsistent beliefs about the soul in the interlocutors, which force them to continue having the childish fear.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I intend to clarify the significance of self-discovery in Plato's *Phaedo*. The requirement of self-discovery is suggested by two agents, a philosopher depicted in the arguments and the interlocutors who participate in the arguments. Self-discovery is implicitly suggested in the dialogue and is as important as explicit demonstrations of soul's immortality. Self-discovery has specific objects and a complex method.

Objects of self-discovery

The objects of self-discovery are intellectual desire for the Forms, the governing function and false beliefs in the soul. The interlocutors must recognize their own desire for the Forms and their independency from the body. Their false beliefs or problematic mind-sets regarding the soul must become apparent. Specifically, I attempted to clarify this desire in Chapters 1 and 2 (the Defence of Death and the Recollection Argument). Moreover, the governing and animating functions of the soul over the body are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (the Affinity Argument, the Criticism of the Harmonia Theory and the Final Argument). I analysed the revelation of the interlocutor's false beliefs in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 (the final part of the *Phaedo*). Chapter 3 also includes both a recognition of the soul's essential dispositions and the encouragement of avoidance of bodily disturbances. The worst kind of disturbance is characterised by its ability to cause the soul to misunderstand what is true. Thus, in a comparatively ontological argument, the Affinity Argument suggests the discovery of a close relationship between the soul and the Forms as well as revelation of a serious disturbance stemming from erroneous beliefs.

I summarize my description of the objects of self-discovery in each chapter:

Chapter 1.

In the Defence of Death (DD), we saw that the goodness of death or the soul's separation from the body is based on a desire for wisdom (Ch.1, sections 1 and 2). Through this intellectual desire, a philosopher manages his life by evaluating pleasures and pains (Ch. 1, section 3). The interlocutor, Simmias, is required to agree with the philosopher's desire and self-management. He also needs to discover the desire in his own soul.

Chapter 2.

In the Recollection Argument (RA), I argued that the interlocutor's practice of recollection is important (Ch. 2, specifically section 1). Simmias discovers his own intellectual desire to know the Forms by recollecting them from particular things. In this case, he also finds that perceptible objects in this world seemingly reveal shortcomings (Ch. 2, section 2). Although these shortcomings are apparent to the agent of recollection, they are not necessarily observable by everyone. Only those who desire to know the Forms perceive the objects' shortcomings (Chapter 2, sections 2 and 3). The RA causes the interlocutor to experience intellectual desire and discover the shortcomings of perceptible things. Additionally, we are able to observe how the agent of recollection develops a cognitive function that is independent from the bodily perceptions. In that sense, the argument propels the interlocutor to the point at which he is able to discover his own intellectual desire and cognitive function through the experience of recollection.

Chapter 3

We observed Socrates' treatment of his interlocutors' unfounded fears and beliefs in the Affinity Argument (AA). The introduction to the AA describes its goal as the act of dispelling the interlocutors' childish fear of the soul's dissipation after death (Chapter 3, section 1). Socrates and the interlocutors determine the essential

characteristics of the soul: it is invisible, it “considers alone by itself,” and it governs the body. Through these characteristics, Socrates declares the soul’s affinity with the divine entity (Chapter 3, section 2). Socrates and the interlocutors also recognize that ‘philosophy’ provides an encouragement for the soul’s separation from the body (Chapter 3, section 4). The discussion of the AA would also improve the interlocutor’s soul because he could then develop more accurate beliefs about his own soul and free himself from inappropriate fear. The interlocutor is encouraged to cultivate his soul to be compatible with a divine existence and must remain separate from the bodily disturbance. The worst disturbance of the body is to make the soul misunderstand what is true. Thus, the interlocutor should distance himself from such a false belief about truth.

Chapter 4.

The criticism of the Harmonia theory is made in response to Simmias’ counterargument against the AA. Simmias’ Harmonia theory suggests that the soul is a kind of attunement consisting of material parts. According to the theory, the soul seems to be a derivative of the body. This theory ambiguously mixes inconsistent beliefs about the soul. Socrates reveals this issue in both explicit and implicit ways. Socrates explicitly highlights the inherent inconsistency of Simmias’ multiple beliefs about the soul (Ch. 4, sections 1 and 2), while also implicitly suggesting the culpability of the Harmonia theory for its lack of harmonizing agent (Ch. 4, section 3). This latter point also implies the importance of causation in considerations related to the soul. As we see in the AA, the soul governs the body and it must therefore be a causal factor. The body must not be credited with the ability to sustain or give rise to the soul. Simmias recognizes his false beliefs regarding the soul and also reaffirms its governing function.

Simmias finds critical faults in his own beliefs, at least regarding Socrates’ more explicit statement. The problem related to the lack of a harmonizing agent is not resolved through the criticism of the Harmonia theory. However, Cebes’

counter-argument considers the soul as the cause of life, which is more improved than Simmias' argument regarding an understanding of causation. Thus, discussions of Simmias' problematic beliefs involve two arguments. The criticism of the Harmonia theory strongly encourages Simmias to discover his faults in these complex ways.

Chapter 5.

Cebes' criticism correctly grasps the AA, especially concerning the soul's essential characteristics and its causal relationship with the body (Ch. 5, section 1). However, he has the following apprehension: even if the soul is stronger than the body and animates the body, it may perish after its many births and deaths (87d3–88a1). Cebes acknowledges the soul's animating function and its position as the cause of the living body.

Socrates takes Cebes' argument seriously; therefore, he confesses his previous disappointment with the existing causal theory and develops the Final Argument (FA), which considers the soul as the cause of life (Chapter 5, sections 3–5). According to the FA, as the cause of life, the soul can never accept death, and must therefore be immortal. In Cebes' counterargument, the soul can be damaged through the process of giving life to the body and enduring death.

The FA offers a completely different perspective, which holds that the soul could never be damaged; as the cause of life, the soul does not merely endure death but never accepts it. The soul is the cause of life, furthermore, the cause should be imperishable. Socrates' perspective on life encourages Cebes to drastically alter his own understanding of the cause of life. Cebes suggests the concept of a consumable soul, as the soul must be damaged through its own animating function of the body and through its separation from the body. According to his perspective on the soul, the soul is merely animating energy, and like the body, it will eventually perish. Even though the soul can exist much longer than the body, it is consumable and perishes in the end. In other words, the soul is merely a

strengthened or improved version of a physical entity. However, in the FA, the soul fundamentally differs from the body, similar to the way the Forms completely differ from particular things, which is suggested in the AA through its discussion on the oppositional nature of their essential characteristics. Therefore, Cebes must also drastically alter his perspective on both the soul and the body when he agrees with Socrates. Cebes' mode of self-discovery affects how he lives and cares for his soul. If he clings to his first view—which is that of a consumable soul—he would be caught by a kind of nihilism that suggests that everything will perish in the end, which would diminish the value of self-improving. Conversely, if he adopts Socrates' perspective on the soul, he must continue improving his own soul in this life and even after death.

Chapter 6.

The scene of Socrates's death vividly depicts the contrast between Socrates and his friends. Although they share discussions with Socrates, only he can remain in a harmonized state when confronting his own death (Ch. 6, sections 1–3). Additionally, each person understands Socrates and his arguments in a different way (Ch. 6, section 4). Crito, Phaedo and the prison servant shows different levels of understanding of Socrates. The result of sharing discussions with Socrates differs depending on their conditions. This implicitly suggests that they are required to manage their own conditions and their respective internalization of concepts as encouraged by Socrates through his arguments. The final part draws a contrast between Socrates as a person and his friends. It suggests that the requirement of improving one's self is based on one's recognition of the true target in life and the removal of false beliefs.

As we see in each argument suggested above, self-discovery is concerned with the intellectual desire, governing function, and false beliefs in the soul. This does not mean that Socrates and the interlocutors come to know the nature of the self

or of the soul when they are living.²⁰⁷ The soul is given multiple attributes; it is an entity independent from the body (in the DD), an intellectual ability (in the RA), an existence that is similar to the divine but which can be polluted by bodily desire (in the AA), the cause of life (in the Criticism of the Harmonia Theory and the FA), a core of “Socrates” (in the ending part of *Phaedo*). Socrates does not seem to provide an absolute definition of the nature of the soul. Furthermore, Socrates retains epistemic modesty about the metaphysical status of the soul and acknowledges the necessity of further investigation of the theory of Forms (in the FA), which are foundational to the arguments in *Phaedo*.

The nature of the self is the final goal of the philosopher’s investigation but is not the direct object of self-discovery in *Phaedo*. The nature of the self can be known after coming to know the Forms, however, such knowledge is possible only after death. Socrates and the interlocutors recognize the intellectual desire of the soul and its governing or animating function. That recognition serves to encourage self-improvement since it reveals goodness of a life spent pursuing the Forms and the harmful effect of false beliefs, which disturb the philosophical life. In this view, the nature of self is not considered as a fixed position from which one begins investigation; rather, it is a goal to which one aspires through the improvement of his internal conditions. The type of self-discovery found in *Phaedo* presupposes such a continuous improvement of one’s own conditions.

Method of self-discovery

²⁰⁷ In *Republic* Book X 611b9-d6, Socrates discusses the difficulty in knowing the true nature of the soul. This point is criticized by Dorothea Frede: “That Plato leaves the nature of the soul undefined, however, is a reproach from which one cannot, in my opinion, so easily release him, for this violates a rule which Socrates himself in several Platonic dialogues imposes on himself and on his partners: not to try to argue that a certain thing possesses a quality as long as one has not grasped the nature of the thing itself (cf. *Meno* 100 b on “virtue”; *Rep.* I, 354 c-e on “justice”; implicitly the same criticism is made at the end of the *Euthyphro* 15 d and the *Laches* 199cff).” (D. Frede 1978, 39.)

Phaedo utilizes an ingenious and complex method to reveal self-discovery; on one hand, it illuminates the philosopher's normative dispositions and the occasions in which he can recognize his intellectual desire. On the other hand, it describes the interlocutor's development through his self-recognition of the intellectual desire, the governing function and false beliefs of the soul.

This complex structure is displayed with particular salience in the RA. Socrates discusses the process of recollection and the agent's desire to know the Forms. At the same time, *Phaedo* shows that the interlocutor wants to practise that recollection by himself. If the interlocutor accurately practises recollection, the desire to know the Forms must be included in that practice. Furthermore, with regard to the revelation of false beliefs, Socrates uses an ingenious method in his criticism of the Harmonia Theory. He not only notices explicit self-contradiction in the interlocutor's claim regarding the Harmonia theory but also highlights an implicit and serious issue in the theory's lack of a harmonizing agent. The interlocutor is required to admit his intellectual desire and his false beliefs in ingenious and complex ways. The success of *Phaedo*'s overarching argument of the *Phaedo* depends on the interlocutors' agreement; thus, it is implicitly suggested that they must discover both their intellectual desire and false beliefs.

This method of self-discovery reveals its peculiar characteristics, which require self-awareness and the individual experiences of a philosopher and the interlocutors. It seems to proclaim the requirement of a subjective approach to the philosophical life. However, as I have already suggested in the Introduction, some influential scholars reject such a subjective approach to developing an understanding of ancient Greek thought: Christopher Gill's mapping of personality or selfhood in ancient Greek and modern thought draws on thorough research of ancient texts and offers a comprehensive view of the problems raised by significant ancient Greek thinkers. Gill suggests two different views of selfhood: one is "the subjective-individualist conception" found in modern or post-Cartesian ideas, the other is "the objective-participant conception" found in ancient Greek

ideas.²⁰⁸ According to Gill, we must interpret ancient ideas, including those of Plato, from the viewpoint of the objective-participant conception. Gill's research primarily focused on *Republic*²⁰⁹ and *Alcibiades I* ²¹⁰ to justify his interpretation of Plato's thought; however, he also seems to think that his interpretation covers a wide range of ancient Greek ideas. Therefore, I believe that Gill's research is a helpful stance with which I can compare my interpretation of *Phaedo* by focusing on its subjective aspects.

Gill characterizes his two sets of conceptions through five key points.²¹¹ To compare my perspective with Gill's view, I have adopted the first and third points:

First point.

'I' vs 'Reason': In the subjective-individualist conception, "To be a 'person' is to be conscious of oneself as an 'I', a unified locus of thought and will"²¹² In the objective-participant conception, "To be a human being (or a rational animal) is to act on the basis of reasons, though these reasons may not be fully available to the consciousness of the agent."²¹³

Third point.

In the subjective-individualist conception, "To be a 'person' is to be capable of the kind of disinterested moral rationality that involves abstraction from localized interpersonal and communal attachments and from the emotions and desires associated with these."²¹⁴ In the objective-participant conception, "To be human is to be the kind of animal whose psycho-ethical life (typically conceived as 'dialogue' between parts of the psyche) is capable, in principle, of being shaped so as to

²⁰⁸ Gill 1996, 11–12.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 240–320.

²¹⁰ Gill 2006, 344–359.

²¹¹ Gill 1996, 11–12.

²¹² Ibid., 11.

²¹³ Ibid., 11.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 11.

become fully ‘reason ruled’ by (a) the action-guiding discourse of interpersonal and communal engagement and (b) reflective debate about the proper goals of a human life.”²¹⁵

These two points show that the contrast between the two conceptions is related to both the cognitive and ethical structures of a human being. Regarding cognition, the modern subjective concept presupposes the essence of consciousness as ‘I.’ Conversely, the objective-participant conception focuses on actions guided by reason, while consciousness is not a central issue. In the modern subjective-individualist conception, morality should be abstracted from communal rules and desires connected with these communal rules. In comparison, the objective-personal conception regards “interpersonal engagement” and “reflective debate” about the “goals of a human life” as integral to becoming a “fully reason ruled” human being.

Regarding the cognitive structure of a human being, subjectivity is a central target of criticism in Gill’s argument of ancient Greek thought. Furthermore, he also rejects an autonomous or absolute perspective towards morality in ancient Greek ethics and perceives attributes of ethics that are more communal and participatory. To understand Gill’s claim and compare it with my own perspective, we need further explanation regarding “subjectivity,” since my reading emphasizes the subjective aspects of the dialogue. Gill explains Cartesian or post-Cartesian subjective views using Wilkes’ criticism of subjectivity as a perspective that investigates the mind:²¹⁶ subjectivists ascribe “a privileged status” to the subject or ‘I’ as “a seat of consciousness” and also ascribe the privileged status to the “subjective perspective” in the “access of human psychology”; this perspective especially takes the form of the first-person view.²¹⁷ Thus, ‘I’ is emphasized as the

²¹⁵ Ibid., 12.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 6–7.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 6.

basis of our cognition, which gives the 'I' privileged status of knowing oneself; this is representative of the subjective view.

In contrast to Gill's perception of a human being in ancient Greek thought, my perspective of *Phaedo* holds that Socrates and his interlocutors require a subjective way of self-examination. As I have suggested in Chapters 1 and 2, the interlocutors must recognize and experience their intellectual desire. If they do not experience that type of desire and instead live according to other kinds of desire (specifically, physical desire), they must cling to fake virtues, as suggested in the DD, and their souls may come into animal's bodies after death, as suggested in the AA. Furthermore, if the interlocutors do not have that desire, the demonstration of the soul in the RA would be meaningless to them, because Socrates suggests that intellectual desire is an essential factor in recollection.

Moreover, as we see in Chapter 3, in the AA the interlocutors must find that they still have a childish fear that the soul will dissipate after death, as if it had been blown away by a strong wind. In other words, this fear is a result of a materialistic view of the soul, whether they hold it consciously or unconsciously. The AA also suggests the positive development of the philosopher's soul after receiving the encouragement of "philosophy" (82d9–83b4). The soul finally agrees with that encouragement and chooses a good life, which implies a soul's self-made decision concerning life. We should also notice that this passage states that "lovers of learning" are "aware" that the prisoner perceives the philosopher's encouragement (82d9–82e1). Thus, Socrates supposes the self-recognition of goodness of being released from the body.

In his Soul-Harmonia theory (discussed in Chapter 4), Simmias also shows his unstable understanding of the theory. Socrates makes him recognize the critically problematic inconsistency in his beliefs. Why is that inconsistency problematic? It is problematic because the interlocutor himself agrees that he has these inconsistent beliefs. Indeed, the interlocutor, Simmias, finds that his Harmonia theory is inconsistent with the RA and chooses the latter since the

former is merely with “a sort of plausibility and outward appeal” but “with no proof” (92c11–d2).²¹⁸ However, he is also “aware that arguments that give their proofs by means of what is plausible make hollow claims...” (92d2–4).²¹⁹ Conversely, the RA “has been provided by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance” (92d6–7). Therefore, he offers Socrates the following agreement: “And I have accepted that hypothesis, or so I convince myself, on both sufficient and correct grounds. So, for these reasons, it seems, I mustn't allow myself or anyone else to say that soul is attunement.” (92e1–4)²²⁰. Simmias discovers the issue of the Harmonia theory. It is noteworthy that Simmias discovers that the place where the problem arises is “myself” (ἐμαυτὸν). His acceptance of the hypothesis is also indicative of the point at which he has convinced himself. Simmias directly convinces himself and prohibits himself from claiming an incorrect theory.²²¹ In this act of self-persuasion, he references his own experiences in geometry and other subjects (92d5–6). These subjects taught him that he should not rely on mere plausibility to find truth. This concept is particularly relevant to geometry because accurate demonstrations are needed to arrive at a correct answer in a geometrical problem. Thus, Simmias discovers a problematic inconsistency in his beliefs by making use of his own experiences, which took place outside of the discussion itself.

These points which suggest the requirement of self-awareness of intellectual desire and problematic inconsistency cannot be reduced to mere objective discussions. The dialogue of *Phaedo* displays various and ingenious

²¹⁸ ὁδε μὲν γὰρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· (92c11–d2)

²¹⁹ ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιούμενοις λόγοις σύννοια οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν... (92d2–4)

²²⁰ ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἁρμονία. (92e1–4)

²²¹ cf. A. G. Long 2013, 86. “Simmias agrees that he will never allow himself such an answer, and later concedes that he cannot accept a view of soul as attunement either *from himself* or from someone else (92e2–4). So Socrates invites a companion to undertake the sort of self-criticism that, as the autobiography reveals, Socrates himself has undertaken.”

approaches to foster the improvement of the interlocutors. Self-discovery is accomplished through these complex methods.

Significance of self-discovery

If my claim regarding self-discovery in *Phaedo* is correct, what significance does that kind of self-discovery have? In other words, how do the discovery of the intellectual desire, governing function, and false beliefs in the soul benefit a human being? I argue that self-discovery contributes to a philosopher's decision on how he should live. He manages his bodily pleasure by making use of his intellectual ability and desire to the extent that it is possible and conducts his life accordingly. At first glance, *Phaedo* seems to focus on demonstrating the soul's immortality. In this dialogue, however, we can also understand what a good life is for a philosopher and how one can organize one's life accordingly. Self-discovery contributes to an understanding of what constitutes a good life.

Phaedo also includes points of uncertainty. As I have mentioned in this thesis, Socrates and the interlocutors do not know the nature of the soul. Thus, we cannot identify self-discovery with the self-knowledge regarding the nature of self. They do not know the nature of the soul, therefore, they do not know their own nature either. Arguably, Socrates cannot define himself. This limitation accords his statement in *Phaedrus*:

I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. This is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is generally believed, and, as I was just saying, I look not into them but into my own self: Am I a beast more complicated and savage than Typhon, or am I a tamer, simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature?²²² (229e5–230a6)

²²² Translation by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in *Plato Complete Works*.

Although Socrates cannot determine the soul's nature, he suggests a guiding principle in *Phaedo*: the soul is depicted by its affinity to the Forms. If one continues investigating the Forms and making use of the soul's intellectual ability, one understands more regarding both the Forms and the purified conditions of the soul. All Socrates can do in *Phaedo* is to suggest the soul's essential characteristics (its intellectual desire and governing function). This is not worthless in aiming at knowing soul's nature, because the recognition of its characteristics encourages an investigation of the Forms. When Socrates and the interlocutors know the Forms after death, their soul's nature will also be revealed. A philosopher must do his best, even though he cannot know his own nature in this life.

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